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Chapter 1:
How does transfer-pricing enforcement aﬀect reported profits?
1 Introduction
To maximize after-tax profits, a multinational corporation that has related firms (aﬃliates)
located across a number of countries has an incentive to shift profits from an aﬃliate that
faces a high corporate tax rate to an aﬃliate the faces a lower corporate tax rate. Manip-
ulating transfer prices is one of the main means by which corporations reallocate profits.
When goods and services are transferred between members of the multinational corporation,
the transactions must be valued so that each individual member of the multinational can
establish its taxable profits. The prices used for these related-party transactions are referred
to as the transfer prices. By under-valuing goods or services passed from a high-tax aﬃliate
to a low-tax aﬃliate or over-valuing goods or services passed from a low-tax aﬃliate to a
high-tax aﬃliate, the multinational corporation is able to shift profits to the lower-tax firm.
While these transactions are supposed to occur at “arm’s length” prices, i.e. the transaction
should be priced as it would be if it were occurring between two unrelated parties, diﬃculty
in establishing exactly what the “arm’s length” price would be provides an opportunity to
shift profit to low-tax countries.
The recent launching of the OECD action plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS) is indicative of the increased attention that many countries are turning towards the
issue of multinational corporations using transfer prices to shift profits. While the number of
countries with regulations designed to make profit shifting more costly, and the complexity
of the regulations in place, have increased dramatically in recent years, little is understood
about how these regulations aﬀect the behavior of multinational corporations. Specifically,
for governments interested in increasing tax revenue, nothing has been done to capture the
full eﬀect of increased transfer-pricing regulation on the reported profits of the local aﬃliate
of a multinational corporation. This paper is the first to consider how changes in transfer-
pricing enforcement aﬀect three components that determine a local aﬃliate’s reported profits:
the amount that is shifted out to other aﬃliates of the multinational corporation, the amount
that is shifted in from other aﬃliates of the multinational corporation, and the aﬃliate’s costs
of doing business.
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This paper presents a model that illustrates that increased regulation can actually reduce
the reported profits of local aﬃliates of multinational corporations. While past papers have
focused solely on how regulations aﬀect an aﬃliate’s ability to shift profit out to other
related parties, this paper uses a model of aﬃliate-to-aﬃliate profit-shifting flows to show
that regulation will not just aﬀect how much profit is shifted out (outflows), but that it
will also aﬀect both how much profit is shifted in (inflows) and the aﬃliate’s cost of doing
business. The potential for increased regulation to aﬀect true profits in the longer run is also
discussed.
For firms that are using related-party transactions to shift profits, the eﬀect of increased
regulation on reported profits will depend on how the magnitude of the increase in costs
compares to the magnitude of the change in profit-shifting flows. If the increase in costs is
large or the decrease in outflows is small, then a firm would be expected to reduce reported
profits in response to an increase in regulation. For firms that have related-party transactions
that are not being used for profit shifting, the sole eﬀect of increased regulation is to increase
the cost of doing business. For these firms, increased regulation will reduce reported profits.
Overall, the model suggests that many firms would be expected to reduce reported profits in
response to increased transfer-pricing regulation. The eﬀect of increased regulation on the
reported profits of a specific firm, however, should depend on the distribution of the other
aﬃliates that are a part of the multinational corporation, as that is what will determine the
eﬀect that regulation has on outflows and inflows.
To consider the question of how increased regulation aﬀects reported profits empirically,
panel data on the reported profits of multinational corporations at the aﬃliate level are
obtained from the ORBIS database. Changes in transfer-pricing regulation are measured
using an index of transfer-pricing risk. Regressing reported profits on the index of transfer-
pricing risk reveals a negative relationship between increased regulation and reported profits.
The results suggest that the eﬀect of regulation on the cost of doing business must be large
relative to the eﬀect of regulation on the amount of profit that is shifted out. This indicates
that countries should not expect increased regulation to increase corporate tax collections,
and calls into question the optimality of the strategies aimed at increased regulation that
have been pursued by many countries in recent years.
The baseline results suggest that an increase of one category in transfer-pricing audit risk
reduces reported profits by approximately 1.5%. The magnitude of this eﬀect suggests that
the costs associated with increased regulations must be high. While there are many direct
costs of increased regulation, e.g. the need to produce more detailed documentation, the
magnitude of this result is probably indicative of multinational corporations responding to
changes in regulation by making more structural changes, such as changing the path used to
2
shift profits or having to shift some operations out of higher-tax locations and to lower-tax
locations in order to facilitate profit shifting. The eﬀect is less negative for firms that have
aﬃliates in lower-tax countries, which is consistent with increased enforcement decreasing
profit-shifting outflows. The fact that the eﬀect is still negative, however, again suggests
that the eﬀect of regulation on the costs of doing business is large.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some background
on profit shifting and the use of transfer pricing manipulation. It also discusses previous
studies of profit shifting, and the assumptions these studies have made about the costs and
benefits of profit shifting. Section 3 introduces a model of optimal profit shifting which
allows for both diﬀerential enforcement across countries and multiple avenues through which
enforcement can aﬀect the cost of profit shifting. Section 4 discusses the data used to test
the predictions of the model. Section 5 contains the empirical results. The conclusions and
implications are discussed in Section 6.
2 Past research on profit shifting
As discussed briefly in the introduction, a multinational corporation can inflate its reported
pre-tax profits in low-tax locations by manipulating the transfer prices it uses in related-
party transactions.1 While countries attempt to limit the opportunities for profit shifting
by requiring related parties to use the same price that would be set if the transaction were
between unrelated parties, in practice it is often extremely diﬃcult to find a comparable
transaction between unrelated parties. This is especially true when considering transactions
that involve intangibles assets such as intellectual property. There is a growing perception
that multinational corporations are using transfer-pricing manipulation to avoid paying their
fair share of corporate taxes. This has caused many countries to turn their attention towards
trying to limit opportunities for profit shifting. The vast majority of countries now have reg-
ulations in place requiring corporations to use arm’s length prices. There has also been an
increase in the number of countries with other transfer-pricing specific regulation.2 These
regulations include, for example, limitations on the methods that can be used for establish-
ing an arm’s length price, specific requirements for the documentation needed to support
the transfer prices used and transfer-pricing specific penalties. On top of the increase in
regulatory complexity, countries have been devoting increased resources to transfer-pricing
compliance, with many countries creating transfer-pricing specific audit teams. The increas-
1There are other methods of profit shifting, such as the strategic use of debt, that are not discussed in
this paper.
2This is emphasized in many of the transfer-pricing surveys published by the Big Four accounting firms.
See, for example, pages 6-11 of Ernst & Young (2012).
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ing number of publications aimed at helping firms navigate the transfer-pricing environment
also reflects this increase in regulatory complexity over time. The eﬀect of the increased
focus of tax agencies on transfer-pricing compliance is reflected in surveys by the Big Four
accounting firms that indicate that an increasing number of firms identify transfer-pricing
compliance as a major tax risk.3
Past research on profit shifting has generally been focused on finding evidence that multi-
nationals are responding to the tax diﬀerentials that exist across aﬃliates and on estimating
the sensitivity of reported profits to these corporate tax rates. The true profits of the aﬃliates
of multinational corporations are not known to researchers, leading papers to use a variety of
methods to estimate the extent to which multinationals actually manipulate the distribution
of profits across aﬃliates in response to tax incentives. Hines and Rice (1994), and some
papers that followed, such as Huizinga and Laeven (2008), assume that true profits are gener-
ated by a Cobb-Douglas production function and so estimate true profits based on available
data on assets, labor compensation and a proxy for productivity. These papers find evidence
that reported profits deviate from estimated true profits in a manner that is consistent with
profit shifting; higher than expected profits are reported by low-tax aﬃliates and lower than
expected profits are reported by high-tax aﬃliates. These studies have used a variety of data
sets, which results in variation in the magnitude of the estimated responsiveness of reported
profits to the corporate tax rate. Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) do a meta-analysis of
the existing literature. They determine that the consensus estimate of the semi-elasticity
of reported profits with respect to the corporate tax rate is 0.8, which indicates that a 10
percentage point increase in the corporate tax rate would decrease reported profits by 8%.
Clausing (2003) uses a diﬀerent approach and looks at US intra-firm trade flows. She finds
evidence that strongly suggests that sales to low-tax aﬃliates are underpriced and that sales
to high-tax aﬃliates overpriced, which is consistent with transfer prices being used for the
purpose of profit shifting. Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) examine how earnings shocks at
the parent level are passed along to subsidiaries and find that earnings shocks are associated
with an increase in pre-tax profits at low-tax aﬃliates relative to high-tax aﬃliates. This is
again suggestive of profit shifting. Their results suggest that 2% of parent income is shifted
out to lower-tax aﬃliates.
Early models of profit shifting, such as those in Hines and Rice (1994) and Grubert and
Mutti (1991), gave the simple prediction that the declared profits of aﬃliate i should depend
negatively on the corporate tax rate in aﬃliate i’s home country, ⌧i. As mentioned above,
a number of studies confirmed this negative relationship between reported profits and the
statutory corporate tax rate. The limitations of having to use aggregate data, however,
3See, for example, the Ernst & Young 2012 Tax Risk and Controversy Survey.
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meant that little attention was given to the role of the tax rates of the other countries in
which a multinational operates. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) further solved through the
Hines and Rice framework to yield the prediction that the amount of profit shifting into
or out of country i depends on the tax rates in all n countries in which the multinational
corporation operates, as well as on the tax diﬀerentials between country i and all countries
k 6= i. The main contribution of this extension is that it provides a model driven prediction
of the magnitude of shifting and allows to define which countries will be “low tax” enough to
be the recipient of shifted profits within a multinational. While previous papers often had
to depend on using a specific reference country, so that the set of higher-tax aﬃliates and
a set of lower-tax aﬃliates were defined, the result by Huizinga and Laeven allows for the
flows of profits within a multinational to be modeled more generally. Overall, while there is
variation in the methods used and, therefore, in the estimated elasticity of reported profits,
papers have generally found evidence that supports the theory that reported profits respond
to diﬀerences in corporate tax rates.
While the incentives for profit shifting have received a great deal of attention, little
attention has been given to what determines the cost of profit shifting. Most theoretical
models of optimal profit shifting have simply assumed that the cost of shifting depends on
the amount shifted, and have ignored other, likely important, determinants of the cost.4 As
mentioned above, countries are increasingly devoting resources towards trying to prevent
profit shifting through transfer pricing manipulation and the strategic use of debt. These
changes in the eﬀort and resources devoted to prevent profit shifting should translate into
a change in the cost of shifting. Additionally, diﬀerences across countries in the strictness
of regulation and resources available to limit shifting should change the incentives a firm
faces when deciding how to shift profits between aﬃliates. It should be far more costly to
shift profits out of a country with well-trained tax oﬃcials and high penalties for transfer
pricing abuse than it is to shift profits out of a country where the tax enforcement agency has
limited resources. While there have been some papers that have focused on profit shifting
in developing countries, with a focus on the fact that these developing countries may be less
able to detect, and therefore prevent, profit shifting, e.g.Fuest, Hebous, and Riedel (2011),
the only papers in the literature on profit shifting that have explicitly included transfer-
pricing enforcement eﬀort as a factor in determining the responsiveness of reported profits
to corporate tax diﬀerentials are Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003), Lohse and Riedel (2012),
Beer and Loeprick (2013), and Klassen and Laplante (2012).
In Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003), transfer-pricing enforcement is not added to the
4These models have assumed that the cost of shifting is an increasing non-linear function of the amount
shifted. This assumption means that there will be an interior solution for optimal shifting.
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theoretical model of optimal profit shifting that is used to develop their empirical strategy,
but they do add a rough measure of enforcement as a robustness check in their empirical
section. They create an enforcement index for each country in their sample based on (1)
the existence of explicit transfer pricing rules, (2) the existence of formal transfer pricing
documentation rules and (3) the existence of transfer pricing specific penalties. They include
this enforcement index in country i as a determinant of the reported value added by the firm
in country i. They find that the responsiveness of reported value added to tax diﬀerentials
seems to be stronger for observations with lax enforcement than it is for observations with
strict enforcement. While an important first step, the measure of enforcement used does not
allow for a great deal of variation and their data set only includes multinational firms located
in 16 diﬀerent countries. Additionally, from the perspective of a government, the question
when considering stricter enforcement is not simply one of if that enforcement decreases
profit shifting, but rather if that stricter enforcement would be expected to increase tax
revenue.
Lohse and Riedel (2012) use an index of transfer-pricing documentation requirements
to proxy for enforcement, where countries are placed in one of three possible categories.
While this measure captures diﬀerences in cost due to stricter documentation requirements,
it has clear limitations because it does not capture how likely it is that the documentation
will actually be examined or the likelihood of penalties being imposed if the transfer prices
are challenged. The advantage to the measure, however, is that the information needed
is available for both a large set of countries and a long time period. Using this measure
of enforcement, they find, using a firm fixed-eﬀects approach, that increased enforcement
decreases reported profit, but that the eﬀect is less negative for higher tax rate countries.
They use this evidence to conclude that transfer-pricing regulation is key if a government
wishes to make reported profits less responsive to increases in the corporate tax rate. Their
results suggest that documentation requirements reduce the responsiveness of reported profits
to the corporate tax rate by 50%. They focus on how enforcement aﬀects profit shifting,
which, although important, is only one part of the eﬀect of enforcement on reported profits.
Beer and Loeprick (2013) look at the initial date of introduction of mandatory transfer-
pricing documentation requirements across countries. Unlike other papers, they consider
the time path of the response of reported profits to the mandatory requirement. The find
that the interaction of a variable capturing the number of years since the implementation of
the documentation requirement and the corporate income tax diﬀerential between an firm
and its aﬃliates has a negative, but insignificant coeﬃcient. A quadratic in the time since
the introduction of the documentation requirement interacted with the same tax diﬀerential,
however, has a positive and significant coeﬃcient. They take this to indicate that it takes time
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for documentation requirements to reduce profit shifting. It is diﬃcult to tell if this lagged
response is actually due to the documentation requirement taking eﬀect or if it is the result
of policies that are likely to follow the implementation of documentation requirements. Their
results suggest that, within 4 years, documentation requirements lower the responsiveness of
reported profits to the corporate tax rate by about 60%, similar to what is found by Lohse
and Riedel. Their paper again focuses solely on how enforcement aﬀects firms responsiveness
to tax diﬀerentials rather than focusing on the full eﬀect of enforcement.
Klassen and Laplante (2012) give more consideration to the interaction between enforce-
ment and profit shifting by recognizing the role that enforcement in other countries plays
in determining profit shifting into and out of the United States. It is the only paper to go
beyond looking at the relationship between reported profits and own-country enforcement.
They use a number of diﬀerent measures of transfer pricing regulation for the countries in
which a corporation is active and find that lower regulation in the United States is correlated
with greater shifting to low-tax locations. While they find some suggestive evidence, they
are unable to conclusively support the hypothesis that increases in the regulation parameter
decrease shifting into the United States for firms with a high average foreign tax rate. Their
paper takes the important step of considering how enforcement eﬀorts in other countries
should aﬀect reported profit in the United States, something that is not recognized in the
two papers mentioned above.
With the focus governments have placed on transfer-pricing enforcement as a way to
increase tax revenues, it seems important to better understand how enforcement levels and
changes in enforcement levels over time have aﬀected profit shifting. The papers above all
consider the eﬀect that enforcement has on deterring firms from shifting profit out of a given
country. This paper will show, in a simple theoretical framework, that enforcement should
also be expected to aﬀect shifting in and the cost of doing business. The major contribution
that this paper makes to the literature is that it recognizes that these three eﬀects must
all be considered when weighing the costs and benefits of increased enforcement. These
three eﬀects will also result in heterogeneity in how a firm’s reported profit responds to a
change in enforcement. Additionally, the model gives a framework in which to consider how
enforcement in other countries in which aﬃliates are located will aﬀect the reported profits
of the local aﬃliate. To capture enforcement, an index of transfer price risk developed
in Mescall (2011) is used. Compared to simple measures of documentation requirements,
it better captures the full set of transfer-pricing regulations that exist in a given country.
The analysis that follows focuses on profit shifting through transfer-pricing manipulation
and ignores profit shifting through the strategic use of debt and other mechanisms. This
approach seems reasonable given the recent focus on transfer pricing by governments and the
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popular press. Additionally, there is a great deal of variation in transfer-pricing enforcement
across countries and over time which will allow for the estimation of the eﬀect of increased
enforcement. The theoretical framework could be adapted to apply to either method of
profit shifting, but, because of the empirical focus, the framework is discussed in terms of
the eﬀect of changes in transfer-pricing enforcement.
3 Framework
Before moving to the question of how changes in enforcement will aﬀect reported profit,
let us first step back and consider what determines reported profits for an aﬃliate of a
multinational corporation. Reported profits can be expressed as:
ReportedProfits = TrueProfits Outflows+Inflows CostsofRelated Party Transactions
The basic idea of the model that follows is that a change in enforcement will aﬀect
optimal outflows, optimal inflows, and the cost of related-party transactions. The change in
outflows is likely to be the only positive eﬀect of increased enforcement on reported profits.
An increase in enforcement will increase the costs of related-party transactions. The eﬀect
of enforcement on inflows is ambiguous, for reasons discussed below, and must be considered
empirically. Reported profits will fall for any firm for whom the decrease in outflows is
dominated by the increase in the cost of related-party transactions. The cost of related-
party transactions is likely to be composed of a number of diﬀerent pieces.
Most of the papers that have looked at the eﬀect of enforcement on profit shifting have
solely looked at how enforcement aﬀects the amount shifted, and have concluded that en-
forcement makes firms less responsive to tax diﬀerentials. Changes in enforcement, however,
should aﬀect outflows, inflows and the cost of shifting. In that respect, there is both a be-
havioral response to enforcement that must be considered, i.e. changes in optimal shifting,
and a direct response, the change in the cost of shifting.
In order to consider variation in enforcement, both across countries and over time, it is
necessary to move beyond standard models of profit shifting. Standard multi-country models
of profit shifting allow a multinational corporation to maximize after-tax profits with respect
to net inflows and outflows of profits, but do not allow the corporation to maximize with
respect to gross flows between country pairs. More precisely, the corporation is allowed to
select, Si, the net amount of profit that is taken into or out of the aﬃliate in country i, but
it is not allowed to select how much goes from country i to country j or from country k to
country i. The model used in Hines and Rice (1994) and Huizinga and Laeven (2008), for
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example, considers a multinational corporation that maximizes:
max
Si
nX
i=1
(1  ⌧i)
✓
Bi + Si    
2
S2i
Bi
◆
subject to the constraint:
nX
i=1
Si = 0
where Bi is the true, before tax, profit of the aﬃliate in country i and Si is the amount
shifted to the aﬃliate in country i from other aﬃliates. The corporation maximizes profits
by setting net shifting out of country i, Si, such that:
(1  ⌧i)
✓
1   i
Bi
Si
◆
    = 0
where   is the multiplier on the constraint that
P
Si = 0. As solved for in Huizinga and
Laeven, this means that the net shifting out of country i depends on the corporate tax rate
in country i relative to the corporate tax rates in countries k 6= i in the following way:
Si =
Bi
 (1  ⌧i)
nX
k 6=i
(⌧k   ⌧i)
(1  ⌧k)Bk
nX
k=1
Bk
(1  ⌧k)
The multiplier on the cost of shifting,  , can be thought of as representing, among other
things, enforcement eﬀort. A higher value of   reduces net shifting out of aﬃliate i.
Variation in enforcement, however, cannot be captured by simply making the multiplier
country specific. In considering the profit shifting involving the aﬃliate in country i, net
shifting, Si, comes from some profit being shifted in from higher-tax aﬃliates and some profit
being shifted out to lower-tax aﬃliates. It is not correct, then, to say that the enforcement
level in firm i’s own country is the only thing that matters in determining the cost of Si. The
country that has profit shifted out is likely have a stronger incentive to try to prevent that
shifting. This means that the importance of enforcement in country i in determining the cost
of shifting will depend on the direction of the gross flow that is being considered. It will likely
be very important if we are looking at profits flowing out of country i to country j, but it
will probably be less important if we are looking at profits flowing out of country k and into
country i. Enforcement in higher-tax countries, k, should play a major role in determining
the cost of shifting in from k, and enforcement in lower-tax countries, j , will likely play at
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least some role in determining the cost of shifting out to the aﬃliates in lower-tax countries.
Additionally, it seems reasonable to assume that the cost of shifting depends not only on
net shifting, but also on the magnitude of gross shifting flows. The cost of documentation
requirements, for example, should not just depend on the amount of net shifting that a firm
does, it should also depend on the number of related party transactions the firm has. A firm
that shifts ten thousand dollars in and ten thousand dollars out should face some positive
cost of shifting.
Consider a multinational that is active in n countries and has one aﬃliate in each of those
countries. Assume that the aﬃliate is indexed by the ranking of the corporate tax rate it
faces, such that aﬃliate one faces the lowest corporate tax rate of any aﬃliate in the multi-
national corporation, aﬃliate three faces the third lowest corporate tax rate, etc. Assume
that profit flows between countries always move in the direction of the tax diﬀerential. 5
For aﬃliate i then, Si is composed of two pieces, profits that flow out to lower-tax
countries and profits that flow in from higher-tax countries. This means that Si can be
represented as:
Si =
i 1X
j=1
Sij  
nX
k=i+1
Ski
where Sij is shifting out of country i to country j and Ski is shifting out of country k to
country i.
Assume that share ↵ , 0  ↵  1 , of the cost of shifting from i to j, cij, is deducted
in the higher-tax country and share (1   ↵) is deducted in the lower-tax country. Since
deductions have more value in the higher-tax country, it is likely that ↵ is close to one, but
this restriction is not imposed. In addition to the costs associated with each related-party
transaction, assume, as discussed above, that aﬃliate i faces a fixed cost of dealing with its
home country’s regulatory environment, FCi. The inclusion of this fixed cost is intended
to capture the fact that a more complex regulatory environment may necessitate hiring an
accounting firm or using an accounting firm with greater intensity. This is the cost that is
likely to be large, as a firm might, for example, be forced to increase the scale of operations
at a low-tax aﬃliate in order to facilitate profit shifting, even when the direct return of that
additional investment is low. This cost is not additive across transactions, although it is still
possibly increasing in the number of related party transactions a firm has. This would be
5This will always hold if the cost of shifting between two countries only depends on the amount shifted
between the two countries. In another paper, Saunders-Scott (2013b), I show that it will not always hold
if the cost of shifting between i and j depends on both the amount shifted from i to j and the net amount
shifted out of i. In this paper, I only consider a model where the gross flow is what matters in determining
the cost.
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the case if, for example, the fee charged by the accounting was increasing in the size of the
firm. It is also possible, however, that it is the firms with complex structures that are most
able to adjust to changes in regulation, in which case this cost would be lower for large firms,
as those firms have more potential ways to shift profits. This cost could be related, then,
to the size of the firm, the number of subsidiaries the firm has, the industry of the firm and
any other factors that determine how transfer-pricing regulation aﬀects a firm, but it is not
directly a function of a firm’s distribution of subsidiaries. This means that the corporation
maximizes:
max
nX
i=1
(1  ⌧i)(Bi   FCi  
X
j<i
Sij +
X
k>i
Ski  
X
j<i
↵cij  
X
k>i
(1  ↵)cki) (3.1)
There are a number of things that should contribute to determining the cost of shifting
profit between a given pair of aﬃliates, c. In terms of thinking about how regulations
aﬀect the cost of shifting, it seems clear that some regulations, such as penalties imposed
if a company is found to have manipulated its transfer prices, will mostly contribute to
increasing the cost of each dollar of shifting. Other things, however, such as documentation
requirements or restrictions on cost-contribution agreements or advance-pricing agreements
will have an eﬀect on the cost of doing business for firms that are not actually shifting profit
between aﬃliates. Even an increase in audit risk is likely to increase costs for a firm that
is not actually doing any shifting, as that firm will still have to put additional resources
towards justifying the transfer prices used in its related party transactions.
In terms of thinking about the cost of shifting and how it relates to the amount shifted
then, it seems reasonable to think of the cost as being composed of two pieces. The first
piece is essentially the variable cost, g, which is increasing in the amount shifted between an
aﬃliate in i and an aﬃliate in j (Sij), the enforcement level in country i (Ei), the enforcement
level in country j (Ej), the true profits in countries i and j, (Bi and Bj respectively) and a
vector of additional variables (Xij), which includes other things that might cause variation
in the cost of shifting, such as the sector of the firms. The second piece of the cost function
can be thought of as the fixed cost of having related party transactions. This piece, f , does
not depend on the amount that is shifted between the two aﬃliates, but does depend on the
level of enforcement in each country, the size of each aﬃliate and other characteristics of the
firms.
cij = g(Sij, Ei, Ej, Bi, Bj, Xij) + f(Ei, Ej, Bi, Bj, Xij) (3.2)
This could, of course, be rewritten as a single function, where Ei and Ej each appeared
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both interacted with Sij and separately on their own, but the form above gives greater
clarity to these two diﬀerent components. Assuming the fixed cost of using the related party
transaction is not too high, optimal shifting between the aﬃliate in country i and country j
is determined by:
@gij
@Sij
=
(⌧i   ⌧j)
(1  ↵ij⌧i   (1  ↵ij)⌧j) (3.3)
where gij simply indicates that the function g is being evaluated at the values specific to
aﬃliates i and j, i.e. gij = g(S⇤ij, Bi, Bj, Ei, Ej, Xij). For the firm in country i then, assuming
that the fixed cost of related-party transactions is low enough that profits are shifted between
each aﬃliate pair where there is a tax incentive to do so, reported profits will be equal to:
⇧Ri =
 
Bi   FCi  
i 1X
j=1
S⇤ij +
nX
k=i+1
S⇤ki  
i 1X
j=1
↵cij  
nX
k=i+1
(1  ↵)cki
!
(3.4)
The question of interest in this paper is how a change in enforcement in country i aﬀects
reported profits in country i. Additionally, we can consider how reported profits in country i
are aﬀected by changes in enforcement in countries in which higher-tax aﬃliates are located
and changes in enforcement in countries in which lower-tax aﬃliates are located.
3.1 Response to own-country enforcement
To consider the eﬀect of increased enforcement in country i on the reported profits of the
aﬃliate in country i, it is necessary to consider the eﬀect Ei has on outflows,
P
S⇤ij, on
inflows,
P
S⇤ki, on the cost of outflows,
P
↵ijcij , on the cost of inflows,
P
(1  ↵ki)cki, and
on FCi. Enforcement is the interaction of many discrete policies, so clearly is not actually a
continuous variable, but, for analytical tractability, it is treated as a continuous variable in
this section. The actual measure of enforcement I used in the empirical analysis is described
is Section 4.1.
d⇧Ri
dEi
=  dFCi
dEi
 
i 1X
j=1
dS⇤ij
dEi
+
nX
k=i+1
dSki
dEi
 
i 1X
j=1
↵ij
dcij
dEi
 
nX
k=i+1
(1  ↵ki)dcki
dEi
(3.5)
Evaluating how S⇤ij must change in response to an increase in Ei, we know that S⇤ij must
satisfy:
@gij
@Sij
=
(⌧i   ⌧j)
(1  ↵ij⌧i   (1  ↵ij)⌧j)
Since the right-hand side is unchanged when Ei changes, it must be that S⇤ij adjusts to
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leave the left-hand side unchanged. This means that:
@S⇤ij
@Ei
=  
✓
@2gij
@Ei@Sij
◆✓
@2gij
@S2ij
◆ 1
Evaluating the change in reported profit with respect to a change in enforcement in
country i gives the following:
d⇧Ri
dEi
=
i 1X
j=1
✓
@2gij
@Ei@Sij
◆✓
@2gij
@S2ij
◆ 1
| {z }
A
 
i 1X
j=1
↵
✓
@gij
@Ei
+
@S⇤ij
@Ei
@gij
@Sij
+
@fij
@Ei
◆
| {z }
B
(3.6)
 
nX
k=i+1
✓
@2gki
@Ei@Ski
◆✓
@2gki
@S2ki
◆ 1
| {z }
C
 
nX
k=i+1
(1  ↵)
✓
@gki
@Ei
+
@S⇤ki
@Ei
@gki
@Ski
+
@fki
@Ei
◆
| {z }
D
 dFCi
dEi| {z }
E
While this expression looks complicated, each term simply captures that a change in
enforcement in country i will have an eﬀect on profit-shifting outflows, the cost of profit-
shifting outflows, profit-shifting inflows, the cost of profit-shifting inflows, and the fixed
cost of doing business respectively. Summation A captures the fact that an increase in
enforcement decreases the amount shifted out to each aﬃliate in a lower-tax country. In
considering the cost of outflows, both the change in enforcement and the change in the
amount shifted from country i to country j will have an eﬀect on the cost. These changes in
costs are captured by the three terms of the summation labeled B. All else equal, an increase
in enforcement increases gij, this is captured by the first term of summation B. In response
to an increase in enforcement though, there will be a decrease in the amount shifted from i to
j and this will decrease gij, this is captured by the second term of the summation B. Finally,
an increase in Ei will increase the fixed cost, fij, of having related-party transactions between
the aﬃliate in i and the aﬃliate in j, this is captured by the third term of the summation B.
Summation C captures the fact that an increase in enforcement in country i will also change
profit-shifting inflows from all higher-tax aﬃliates. If an increase in enforcement increases
the cost of shifting profit in, then this term will be negative, capturing the fact that inflows
will decrease and that will reduce reported profits. It is possible, however, that an increase
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in enforcement actually makes shifting in less costly, in that case, this term will be positive.6
Finally, summation D captures the fact that, to the extent that the costs of shifting from a
higher-tax aﬃliate to the aﬃliate in country i are actually deducted in the lower-tax country,
i, determined by the value of ↵ki, the change in the cost of shifting from k to i will change
reported profits in country i. Assume for now that an increase in Ei increases the cost of
shifting from k to i. In that case, the first part of the summation captures the fact that the
increase in the cost gki that results from the increase in Ei will decrease reported profits.
The second piece of the summation captures the fact that the decrease in Ski that results
from the increase in Ei will decrease gki and increase reported profits. Finally, the third
piece of summation D captures the fact that an increase in Ei will increase fki, which will
decrease reported profit. The final term, dFCidEi , simply captures the fact that an increase in
transfer-pricing regulation will increase the fixed cost of doing business in country i.
Simplifying the summation a bit more and grouping terms gives the following:
d⇧Ri
dEi
=
i 1X
j=1
 ✓
1 + ↵
@gij
@Sij
◆✓
@2gij
@Ei@Sij
◆✓
@2gij
@S2ij
◆ 1
  ↵@gij
@Ei
  ↵@fij
@Ei
!
  (3.7)
nX
k=i+1
 ✓
1  (1  ↵) @gki
@Ski
◆✓
@2gki
@Ei@Ski
◆✓
@2gki
@S2ki
◆ 1
+ (1  ↵)@gki
@Ei
+ (1  ↵)@fki
@Ei
!
 dFCi
dEi
Under the assumption that an increase in enforcement also makes it more costly to shift
profits in, the first term of the first summation of equation 3.7 is the only positive term in the
expression. For an increase in enforcement in aﬃliate i0s home country to have a positive
eﬀect on its reported profit, it must be that this first term is large relative to the other,
negative, terms. For the majority of firms, then, it seems that an increase in enforcement
should actually be expected to decrease reported profits.
For a firm with only higher-tax aﬃliates, the eﬀect should be unambiguously negative.
For a firm with only lower-tax subsidiaries, the second summation would disappear. This
means that there an increase in its home country’s enforcement level would increase reported
profits if the first summation is positive enough to oﬀset the increase in the fixed cost of
doing business. The only way the first summation can be positive is if, for each transaction
6It could be possible, for example, that increased enforcement in country i means that oﬃcials in country
k trust the reported profits in country i more, and, therefore, actually pay less attention to transactions
between the aﬃliate in country k and the aﬃliate in country i. In that case, the increase in enforcement
could actually make it easier to shift from k to i. While it still seems likely that enforcement in the lower-tax
country would increase the cost of shifting to that country, the question of how enforcement maps to the
cost of enforcement is ambiguous from the perspective of theory and is ultimately an empirical question.
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with lower-tax aﬃliates, the reduction in the profit shifted out and the decrease in the cost
that results from that is greater than the direct eﬀect of enforcement on the variable cost of
shifting and the direct eﬀect of enforcement on the fixed-cost of the related-party transaction.
If this is true, then it would suggest that the response of reported profits to own-country
enforcement should be less negative for firms with more low-tax subsidiaries.7 If the first
summation is positive for some firms, then this leaves open the possibility that some firms
would increase reported profits in response to an increase in own-country enforcement while
others would decrease reported profits.
All of this analysis is for a multinational that is actually shifting profit between aﬃliates.
In some sectors, it will be the case that the marginal cost of shifting between aﬃliates is
high enough that no shifting occurs. For any two aﬃliates, it will be optimal set Sij to
zero if Equation 3.3 is not satisfied by a positive value of Sij. When no shifting between
aﬃliates occurs, the only eﬀects of an increase in enforcement are to increase the fixed cost
of related-party transactions and to increase the fixed cost of doing business in that country.
This means that the firm could experience a decrease in profits either because it is still uses
related-party transactions to obtain goods and services, and those transactions are now more
expensive, or because the increase in the cost of the related-party transaction causes the firm
to switch to obtaining the good or service from an unrelated party. All firms that are not
shifting profit, but that do use related-party transactions, should experience a reduction in
reported profits when there is an increase in enforcement. In sectors where arm’s length
prices are easier to identify and, therefore, opportunities for profit-shifting are limited, we
should see all firms experience a reduction in reported profits, even those firms with many
lower-tax subsidiaries. For any firm that does not have international aﬃliates, increased
transfer-pricing enforcement should have no eﬀect on reported profits.
Together, these predictions suggest that, for a country with a relatively low corporate
tax rate, an increase in enforcement would be very likely to decrease tax revenue, as many of
the firms aﬀected by the increase in enforcement will be firms with many higher-tax aﬃliates
and few lower-tax aﬃliates. Even for a country with a high corporate tax rate, increased
transfer-pricing enforcement can only have the potential to increase reported profits, and
therefore tax revenue, if there is evidence that the reduction in outflows in response to
increased enforcement is large. Together, these results suggest that an indiscriminate in-
crease in transfer-pricing enforcement that aﬀects all related-party transactions should only
7Controlling for size and other things that determine the opportunities for shifting. It is not necessarily
true that a firm with five small lower-tax aﬃliates should respond less negatively to increased enforcement
than a firm with one large lower-tax aﬃliate. If, on the other hand, two firms are identical in all respects
outside of the fact that firm 2 has an additional lower-tax aﬃliate, then the response of firm 2’s reported
profits to increased enforcement should be less negative.
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be considered in countries where transfer-pricing abuse is a real problem. A country that
implements transfer-pricing regulation simply as a preventative measure is very likely to ex-
perience a reduction in tax collections. The push towards all countries implementing detailed
transfer-pricing regulation, therefore, does not actually seem to be in the best interests of
those countries, at least from the perspective of tax collections.
3.2 Response to aﬃliate-country enforcement
Consider now, instead, the eﬀect of enforcement in a higher-tax country, say aﬃliate k0s home
country, on reported profit in country i. As long as shifting is occurring between aﬃliate k
and aﬃliate i, then the change in aﬃliate i0s reported profits from the change in enforcement
in aﬃliate k0s home country can be represented as:
d⇧Ri
dEk
=
dS⇤ki
dEk
  (1  ↵)dcki
dEk
  dFCi
dEk
Using the result above, we know that:
@S⇤ki
@Ek
=  
✓
@2gki
@Ek@Ski
◆✓
@2gki
@S2ki
◆ 1
so the expressions can be rewritten as:
d⇧Ri
dEk
=  
✓
@2gki
@Ek@Ski
◆✓
@2gki
@S2ki
◆ 1
  (1  ↵)
✓
@gki
@Ek
+
@S⇤ki
@Ek
@gki
@Ski
+
@fki
@Ek
◆
  dFCi
dEk
(3.8)
or:
d⇧Ri
dEk
=
✓
(1  ↵) @gki
@Ski
  1
◆✓
@2gki
@Ek@Ski
◆✓
@2gki
@S2ki
◆ 1
  (1 ↵)
✓
@gki
@Ek
+
@fki
@Ek
◆
  dFCi
dEk
(3.9)
Equation 3.9 should always be negative. An increase in enforcement in a higher-tax
country will decrease profit-shifting inflows into aﬃliate i, which will decrease the reported
profits of aﬃliate i. The decrease in shifting between aﬃliate k and aﬃliate i will decrease
the cost of shifting between the two aﬃliates, but that will only increase the reported profits
of the aﬃliate in country i to the extent to which the cost of shifting is actually deducted
in the lower-tax country. Additionally, the cost of shifting will be increased by the direct
eﬀect of enforcement on the variable cost of shifting between aﬃliate k and aﬃliate i and
the direct eﬀect of enforcement on the cost of having related-party transactions between the
two aﬃliates. Finally, it is possible that the increase in enforcement in aﬃliate k0s home
country will increase aﬃliate i0s use of accounting services or other general costs of doing
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business and, therefore, increase FCi, but this eﬀect should be fairly small. Given the small
eﬀect that enforcement in aﬃliate k0s home country is likely to have on the costs that are
actually deducted by aﬃliate i, the change in i0s reported profits will mostly be driven by
the change in the amount of profit that flows between k and i. If there is a large reduction
in the inflow, then we should see firm i0s reported profit decrease significantly. If there is a
small reduction in the inflow, then the eﬀect on firm i0s reported profits will be quite small.
Finally, consider the eﬀect of enforcement in a lower-tax country, say aﬃliatej0s home
country, on aﬃliate i0s reported profits. If there is shifting between aﬃliate i and aﬃliate j,
then the change in firm i0s reported profits can be represented as:
d⇧Ri
dEj
=  dS
⇤
ij
dEj
  ↵dcij
dEj
  dFCi
dEj
The response of S⇤ij to a change in enforcement in aﬃliate j0s home country is given by:
@S⇤ij
@Ej
=  
✓
@2gij
@Ej@Sij
◆✓
@2gij
@S2ij
◆ 1
so the response of aﬃliate i’s reported profits to a change in enforcement in aﬃliate j’s
home country can be written as
d⇧Ri
dEj
=
✓
@2gij
@Ej@Sij
◆✓
@2gij
@S2ij
◆ 1
  ↵
✓
@gij
@Ej
+
@S⇤ij
@Ej
@gij
@Sij
+
@fij
@Ej
◆
  dFCi
dEj
(3.10)
or:
d⇧Ri
dEj
=
✓
1 + ↵
@gij
@Sij
◆✓
@2gij
@Ej@Sij
◆✓
@2gij
@S2ij
◆ 1
  ↵
✓
@gij
@Ej
+
@fij
@Ej
◆
  dFCi
dEj
(3.11)
If gij is increasing in Ej, then the first term represents the fact that increased enforcement
in firm j’s home country deters some shifting from i to j. This increases firm i’s reported
profits. The decrease in the amount shifted from i to j also decreases the cost of shifting from
i to j. This also works to increase the reported profits of aﬃliate i. Increased enforcement in
firm j’s home country, however, also has a direct eﬀect on the cost of shifting between i and
j, so ↵cij will increase. This will decrease firm i0s reported profits. Additionally, changes in
enforcement in aﬃliate j0s home country might aﬀect the fixed cost firm i faces of dealing
with the regulatory environment. The bigger the direct eﬀect of Ej on the three costs is, the
more likely it is that an increase in Ej will decrease firm i0s reported profits.
Alternatively, it is possible that gij is decreasing in Ej. In that case, an increase in Ej
would increase outflows, so the first term would capture the resulting reduction in firm i0s
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reported profits. The direct eﬀect of Ej on gij would result in an increase in aﬃliate i’s
reported profits. The remaining two terms could be either positive or negative depending
on how Ej is related to fij and FCi. Overall, regardless of the relationship between gij and
Ej, the eﬀect of an increase in Ej on ⇧Ri is ambiguous.
It is worth remembering that, although the above focuses on the question of how profit is
reallocated across countries in response to changes in enforcement, there is second question
of how enforcement eﬀorts interact with the initial decision to invest in a given country, i.e.
how do Ei, Ek and Ej aﬀect Bi, the initial level of profit of aﬃliate i. As an increase in
enforcement can, to some extent, be thought of as an increase in the eﬀective tax rate, in
a more general framework, higher levels of enforcement are also likely to decrease reported
profits through a decrease in investment in that country. This means that the possibility
of decreased tax revenue from an increase in own-country enforcement may be even more
of a threat than is suggested by the model that focuses on the impact of enforcement on
transfer-pricing behavior alone. The fear that increased enforcement might drive firms to
locate operations in lower-enforcement countries might also explain why higher-tax countries
would want to push lower-tax countries to implement regulations designed to make profit
shifting more diﬃcult.
An additional question that is not considered in this paper is how diﬀerences in enforce-
ment across countries aﬀect optimal shifting. Optimal shifting between any two aﬃliates
is given by Equation 3.3. The eﬀect of Ei and Ej on optimal shifting will depend on the
assumptions made about the functional form of gij. For some forms of gij, diﬀerences in
enforcement between firm i0s home country and firm j’s home country can even result in
profit shifting that moves against the tax diﬀerential. This is a topic I consider in depth in
Saunders-Scott (2013). For the purposes of this paper, however, the sign of the change in
shifting in response to increased enforcement is what matters, and that will be consistent
across diﬀerent forms.
4 Data
The model above suggests that, controlling for true profits and the tax incentives to shift
profits, enforcement in both the country a firm is located in and the other countries in which
the firm has aﬃliates should aﬀect the firm’s reported profits. To test this, information
on reported profits by aﬃliate, a proxy for true profits, corporate tax rate information for
the firm and its aﬃliates and information on the level of transfer-pricing enforcement across
countries is needed. The major focus of this paper is the role of enforcement, so the main
measure of transfer-pricing enforcement that is used is described first. The country-level data
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collected on corporate tax rates, GDP per capita and government deficits are then described.
Finally, the firm-level data on reported profits and other firm characteristics are described. It
is possible to obtain panel data on firm-level variables, as well as enforcement and corporate
tax rates. This allows for the use of a firm fixed-eﬀects specification in the empirical section.
This approach accounts for unobservable characteristics of the firm. Response to changes
in transfer-pricing enforcement will be identified oﬀ of changes in enforcement levels over
time, so it is important that the enforcement measure used have within-country variation
over time.
4.1 Enforcement
Transfer-pricing enforcement can take many diﬀerent forms, which means that countries can
diﬀer in their transfer-pricing enforcement along many diﬀerent dimensions. This means
that it is very diﬃcult to get a single measure of enforcement that will truly capture the
variation in the strictness of eﬀorts to prevent profit shifting across countries. While other
papers in the area have used measures of transfer-pricing documentation requirements, this
paper instead use a measure of transfer-pricing risk, tprisk, developed in Mescall (2011).
The Mescall index, discussed in detail in Appendix A, takes values between 1.03 and 5.20
depending on the transfer-pricing regulation that is in place in a given country. The factors
used in the index include: if disclosure of related party transactions is required on the tax re-
turn; the availability of information on comparable transactions; if transfer-pricing penalties
can be reduced by keeping suﬃcient documentation; the perceived likelihood of a transfer-
pricing audit; and other, more technical, details of transfer-pricing regulation in a country.
This measure is better than documentation-based measures for three reasons. The first, and
most important advantage, is that it captures dimensions of transfer-pricing enforcement
that go beyond documentation requirements alone. The second reason that the risk mea-
sure is preferred to documentation-based measures has to do with the fact that the eﬀect
of transfer-pricing documentation on shifting should depend on how likely the paperwork
is to actually be examined or challenged by individuals who have the knowledge needed to
recognize transfer-pricing abuse. This means that the eﬀect of an increase in the documen-
tation requirement should be specific to the country that is being considered. The inclusion
of audit risk as an input in the transfer-pricing risk measure at least partially captures this
variation. The third reason the Mescall index is preferred is that it exhibits greater variation
over time which can be exploited to estimate the eﬀect of increased enforcement.
As mentioned earlier, past papers that have considered variation in transfer-pricing en-
forcement have focused on variation in transfer-pricing documentation requirements across
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countries. In Appendix B, details on a documentation measure that is very similar to that
developed in Lohse, Riedel, and Spengel (2012) are provided. Appendix B also reproduce
some of the baseline regressions from Section 5 using the documentation measure instead of
tprisk to represent variation in enforcement.
4.2 Country-level data
In order to capture the incentives for profit shifting, information on corporate tax rates is
needed for the countries in which the firms in the sample and their subsidiaries are located.
Data on the top statutory corporate tax rates (including local taxes) are obtained from
Ernst & Young’s worldwide corporate tax guides. This information is supplemented with
information from KPMG’s global tax database and Deloitte’s taxation guides to obtain
corporate tax rates for as large a set of countries as possible. Additionally, the World Bank
database is used to obtain real GDP per capita for all countries that have that information
available. Finally, because it seems likely that increasing enforcement is a counter-cyclical
policy, information on government deficit is obtained from the World Bank database to
control for the possibility that the decision to increase enforcement is a result of decreased
tax collections.
4.3 Firm-level data
The Bureau van Dijk ORBIS database is used to obtain information on a sample of multi-
national corporations. ORBIS is a firm-level dataset that collects information from national
and local accounts. It currently contains financial information on over 93 million active
corporations. Given that the focus of this paper is how enforcement interacts with the struc-
ture of the corporation, the sample is limited to the subset of almost 3 million corporations
that have information available on ownership links. To look at the eﬀect of enforcement on
reported profit, it is necessary to know reported profit at the firm level rather than at the
multinational level. For this reason, the sample is further restrict to the subset of corpora-
tions in ORBIS that have unconsolidated reports available. This means that information on
assets, labor and reported profit can be obtained for individual aﬃliates rather than for the
entire corporate group. Transfer-pricing enforcement is only going to be relevant for firms
that actually have related-party transactions, so the sample is additionally limited to only
include firms that own a foreign subsidiary. Given the complex structure of many multi-
nationals, it can be diﬃcult to define ownership links. Although any cutoﬀ used will be
somewhat arbitrary, the sample used includes all firms that own at least 50% of a foreign
subsidiary that is within ten tiers of the firm (i.e. it would include a firm that owns a do-
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Table 4.1: Sample of Firms
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Firms 16,498 18,174 19,833 22,125 23,163 24,328 23,061 24,898 24,270
Avg Profit (th $) 6,531 7,722 9,583 9,724 12,204 10,371 10,975 11,899 10,619
Median Profit (th $) 765 874 812 1,076 1,378 1,190 1,040 1,070 1,092
Note: Sample of firms with positive earnings before interest and tax and information available on cost of
employees and fixed tangible assets.
mestic firm which owns another domestic firm which owns a foreign firm). For these firms,
information is obtained on both foreign subsidiaries and foreign shareholders where there is
an ownership link of at least 50%.
All firms are required to have data available for at least one year between 2003 and 2011
on earnings before interest and tax, the cost of employees and fixed tangible assets. Firms
are assumed to produce output using capital and labor, and so the cost of employees and
fixed tangible assets are included as proxies for the true profits of the firm. Fixed tangible
assets are used over other measures of assets as they are likely to be less endogenous to
profit shifting than a measure that also includes intangible assets. Finally, since the paper is
examining how enforcement changes the incentives for profit shifting, the statutory corporate
tax rate for the country in which the firm is located is also required to be available. The
incentives for profit shifting change when a firm has negative profits, so, for now, the sample
is limited to firms with positive profits, as the model should do a better job of matching
the behavior of these firms. Information on the number of firms in the sample for each year
that meet those requirements and the average and median profits of firms in the sample are
detailed in Table 4.1.
The geographic distribution of the firms in the sample is detailed in table 16.1. The firms
are located across 41 countries. While the coverage of firms in ORBIS has expanded in
recent years, the focus on European firms is still evident from the large share of firms in the
sample that are located in Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Many of the countries
in which firms are located are middle tax-rate countries, which, from the perspective of the
model, should be the most interesting set of countries in terms of the ambiguity of the eﬀect
of increased enforcement.
The main question of interest is how reported profit responds to changes in transfer-
pricing enforcement in the home country of the firm. The information needed to generate
the preferred measure of transfer-pricing enforcement, tprisk, is currently only available from
2006 to 2011, so, in most empirical specifications, that will be the period considered. Table
4.3 details the availability of the measure for the firms in the sample. It also summarize
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Table 4.2: Location of Firm (% of Sample)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0.004 0.013 0.012 0.012
Austria 0.103 1.326 1.573 2.721 2.962 2.684 2.472 2.35 2.798
Belgium 10.886 10.317 9.802 8.827 8.604 7.958 7.94 8.005 7.977
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 0 0 0.199 0.319 0.296 0.317 0.257 0.255
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.004 0.004 0
Bulgaria 0.249 0.264 0.247 0.262 0.307 0.308 0.299 0.297 0.326
Croatia 0.933 0.957 0.882 1.071 1.075 1.011 1.015 0.888 0.915
Czech Republic 2.085 2.173 2.133 2.011 2.068 1.961 1.951 1.924 1.842
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0.082 6.112 6.353 6.205 6.786
Ecuador 0 0 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Estonia 0.497 0.462 0.454 0.452 0.453 0.366 0.373 0.37 0.4
Finland 3.77 3.593 3.434 3.304 3.553 3.403 3.231 3.342 3.494
France 16.335 15.935 15.177 14.581 14.454 13.33 12.51 12.708 12.509
Germany 5.031 5.788 9.106 10.088 9.848 9.397 9.527 9.667 9.526
Hungary 0.455 0.594 0.575 0.511 0.527 0.415 0.421 0.466 0.42
Iceland 0.018 0.044 0.04 0.005 0.004 0.021 0.013 0.028 0.049
India 0.006 0.006 0.005 0 0 0.016 0.039 0.04 0.029
Ireland 0 0 0.045 0.362 0.591 0.534 0.503 0.554 0.564
Italy 18.299 19.853 18.469 18.038 17.83 16.635 15.55 15.821 15.863
Japan 0.285 0.336 0.333 0.307 0.268 0.214 0.238 0.289 0.231
Latvia 0.018 0.017 0.02 0.018 0.017 0.012 0.013 0.02 0.016
Luxembourg 0.273 0.319 0.424 0.551 0.548 0.485 0.75 0.727 0.63
Malta 0 0 0 0.009 0.004 0.016 0.013 0.024 0.012
Montenegro 0.006 0.011 0.03 0.036 0.043 0.041 0.052 0.04 0.033
Morocco 0 0 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.012 0.008
Netherlands 1.043 1.084 1.074 1.035 1.217 1.102 1.171 1.229 1.228
New Zealand 0 0 0.005 0.009 0.013 0.021 0.017 0.024 0.029
Norway 4.71 4.683 4.729 4.601 4.663 4.559 4.891 4.655 4.747
Poland 0.503 0.539 0.565 0.538 0.596 0.612 0.681 0.598 0.63
Portugal 1.534 1.453 1.568 1.451 1.438 1.278 1.366 1.325 1.29
Romania 0.291 0.281 0.267 0.221 0.268 0.275 0.295 0.237 0.255
Serbia 0.321 0.363 0.318 0.601 0.587 0.571 0.585 0.546 0.511
Slovakia 0.515 0.693 0.923 0.881 0.885 0.81 0.82 0.823 0.655
Slovenia 0.649 0.589 0.555 0.565 0.574 0.551 0.507 0.546 0.536
South Korea 0.327 0.325 0.323 0.289 0.272 0.255 0.299 0.313 0.313
Spain 18.875 17.69 16.392 15.372 14.29 13.084 13.447 13.274 12.423
Sweden 7.601 5.965 6.535 6.432 6.666 6.992 7.12 7.065 7.388
Switzerland 0.055 0.055 0.045 0.036 0.056 0.049 0.061 0.056 0.049
Taiwan 0.073 0.154 0.055 0.859 0.997 0.9 0.919 0.964 0.919
Ukraine 0.03 0.017 0.025 0.023 0.026 0.029 0.026 0.024 0.016
United Kingdom 4.225 4.116 3.862 3.724 3.881 3.679 4.176 4.253 4.297
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Table 4.3: Summary of tprisk enforcement index for sample used
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
% Missing Value 2.87% 5.43% 4.29% 4.33% 3.03% 3.04%
Average 3.81 3.86 3.83 4.09 4.16 4.16
Minimum 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03
Maximum 4.46 4.69 5.09 5.09 4.87 5.20
Note: Calculation of the tprisk index is discussed in detail in Appendix A.
the values of the index for the firms in the sample. Although available for a relatively
short period, this measure gives a lot of within-country variation over time as, given the
multiple dimensions accounted for by the index, countries experience multiple changes over
the relevant time period.
In order to both understand the tax incentives for shifting within a multinational, and
to the capture the eﬀects of aﬃliate-level enforcement predicted by the model, information
on the aﬃliates of the firms that are in the sample is also required. For the firms in the
sample, the locations of all foreign subsidiaries that are at least 50% owned by the firm
and all foreign shareholders of the firm that hold a total share of at least 50% of the firm
are obtained. While this will capture many of the possible paths for profit shifting, it will
not capture all possible paths. This is partially due to the requirement of ownership links
of greater than 50%, but is also partially due to the fact that there is not information on
aﬃliates of a multinational that are within the same tier of the multinational corporation.
Firms that are parent companies (GUOs) will suﬀer from the first problem, but not from
the second. The issue of ownership links is discussed in more depth in Appendix C.
For the purposes of the analysis, limited information can be obtained on foreign sub-
sidiaries and foreign shareholders. The most important piece of information for understand-
ing the incentives for profit shifting is the location of the aﬃliate, as that is what makes it
possible to link the aﬃliate with a corporate tax rate and a value for transfer-pricing risk.
For some subsidiaries and shareholders, there is information available on assets and revenue,
but that information is extremely limited. For firms in the sample, information on the aver-
age number of foreign aﬃliates, the number that are located in higher-tax countries versus
lower-tax countries and the breakdown between subsidiaries and shareholders are detailed
in Table 4.4. The firms in the sample have between 1 and 218 aﬃliates. The number of
subsidiaries ranges between 1 and 218 and the number of shareholders ranges between 0
and 4. Firms have between 0 and 195 lower-tax subsidiaries and between 0 and 167 higher-
tax subsidiaries. Firms have between 0 and 4 lower-tax shareholders and between 0 and 4
higher-tax shareholders. The foreign aﬃliates in the sample are located across 200 coun-
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Table 4.4: Composition of aﬃliates
Average number of Foreign Aﬃliates 2.59
Median Number of Foreign Aﬃliates 1
Maximum Number of Foreign Aﬃliates 218
Average Number of Lower-Tax Aﬃliates 1.60
Average Number of Higher-Tax Aﬃliates .99
% with just higher-tax aﬃliate 27.19%
% with just lower-tax aﬃliate 47.39%
% with both 21.69%
% with neither 3.73%
Notes: Aﬃliate refers to both the subsidiaries and the shareholders of the firm in the sample. To be
included in the sample, all firms had to have at least one foreign subsidiary.
tries, with heavy concentrations (defined by there being more than 1% of the total sample of
subsidiaries located in that country) in Austria, Belgium, Brazil, China, the Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and
the United States.
While changes in the firm’s home-country corporate tax rate will generally be used to
capture changes in the incentives to shift profits, as the firm-level fixed eﬀects should absorb
the opportunities for shifting that are available for the firm, in some specifications the tax
diﬀerential between the firm and its aﬃliates will be used instead. The tax diﬀerential
is defined simply to be the diﬀerence between the tax rate that the firm faces and the
(unweighted) average of the tax rates faced by all aﬃliates. If, for example, firm 1 has four
aﬃliates: A1, B1, C1 and D1 then
avgtaxdiﬀ1 = ⌧1   (⌧A1 + ⌧B1 + ⌧C1 + ⌧D1)
4
This measure can also be used to get a sense for how the tax rates of the firms in the
sample compare to those of their aﬃliates. A positive value indicates that a firm is high tax
relative to its subsidiaries. Although the weighting should also account for diﬀerences in size
between the firm and its aﬃliates, as an approximation, firms with positive values would be
expected an incentive to shift out on net. A negative value indicates that a firm is low tax
relative to its subsidiaries. These firms would be expected to shift in on net.
The model predicts that the enforcement eﬀorts of the countries in which higher-tax
aﬃliates and lower-tax aﬃliates are located should also aﬀect reported profit. For each firm,
then, in an attempt to capture the level of transfer-pricing enforcement in the countries
where subsidiaries are located, the average level of the transfer-pricing risk measure across
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Table 4.5: Subsidiary Characteristics by Firm
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
avg tax diﬀ 0.038 0.036 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.025
min tax diﬀ -0.267 -0.284 -0.242 -0.25 -0.235 -0.233
max tax diﬀ 0.372 0.372 0.340 0.35 0.35 0.35
AvgRiskHiWeight .201 .212 .199 .204 .214 .220
-std dev .161 .175 .148 .152 .155 .156
AvgRiskLoWeight .239 .219 .189 .192 .230 .251
-std dev .182 .147 .136 .134 .150 .160
Notes: For each firm in the sample, the tax diﬀerence in a given year is calculated as the tax rate faced by
the firm minus the (unweighted) average of the tax rates faced by its subsidiaries. The calculation of the
average risk score is discussed in the text.
aﬃliates is calculated. Reported profit should respond diﬀerently to enforcement in higher-
tax countries and enforcement in lower-tax countries, so the measure of average enforcement
is calculated separately for higher-tax aﬃliates and for lower-tax aﬃliates. The exact form
of the aﬃliate enforcement terms will depend on the assumptions made about the functions
f , g and FC. For now, the terms used imposes the assumption that the importance of
aﬃliate-country enforcement depends on the tax diﬀerential. For higher-tax subsidiaries, for
example, the weighted measure of tprisk is calculated as:
AvgRiskHiWeight =
Pi 1
k=1(⌧k   ⌧i)tpriskk
(i  1)
This measure will suﬀer from the problem that the value will change not only with changes
in enforcement in the countries in which subsidiaries are located, but also with changes in
own-country or subsidiary-country corporate tax rates. The importance of aﬃliate-country
enforcement clearly should depend on the size of the aﬃliate, but the limited data available on
aﬃliates preclude that at this time. Table 4.5 summarizes the tax diﬀerences and subsidiary
enforcement characteristics for the firms in the sample.
5 Empirical
5.1 Baseline Results
The model predicts that the response to own-country enforcement will vary based on firm
characteristics. This means that the response of reported profits to changes in the level of
own-country enforcement is potentially ambiguous, but, given the model, it would not be
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surprising to find a negative relationship. First then, consider a simple firm fixed-eﬀects
regression of log reported profits on tprisk. In the first column of Table 5.1, the log of
fixed tangible assets and the log employee compensation are included as regressors. These
controls are included to capture variation in the true profits of the firm. Both variables have
positive and statistically significant coeﬃcients, which is consistent with expectations.The
coeﬃcient on tprisk is -0.101 and is statistically significant. The value of the coeﬃcient
indicates that an increase in a country’s tprisk index of 0.5, roughly the change that a
country would experience if its transfer-pricing audit risk increased by one category, would
decrease reported profits by 5%. In the second column, country level controls (log GDP per
capita, log GDP per capita squared, and government deficit) and industry (1 digit NACE
code) by year fixed eﬀects are included. This lowers the coeﬃcient on tprisk to -0.0267,
but it is still negative and significant. In the third column, the corporate tax rate faced by
the firm is included to control for the fact that we might expect a country to increase its
enforcement at the same as it increases its corporate tax rate. This has little eﬀect on the
coeﬃcient on tprisk. The coeﬃcients in columns (2) and (3) indicate that an increase of
one category in audit risk (an increase in tprisk of .559) would decrease reported profits by
approximately 1.5%.
The firm fixed-eﬀects setting means that the eﬀect of enforcement on reported profits is
being estimated oﬀ of variation in tprisk within a country over time. The estimates will
capture both the immediate response to changes in enforcement and any potential delayed
response. While the fixed-eﬀects approach reduces concern about the endogeneity across
countries of eﬀorts to prevent profit-shifting and reported profits, there is still a concern that
changes in tprisk over time are correlated with other government policies that also aﬀect
reported profits. If that is the case, then the decrease in reported profits found in Table 5.1
cannot actually be attributed to changes in transfer-pricing enforcement. To test for this,
firms that should be unaﬀected by changes in transfer-pricing regulation, i.e. firms with no
international aﬃliates, are selected from ORBIS.8 Controlling for changes in other country-
level factors, columns (2) and (3) of Table 5.2 indicate that changes in transfer-pricing risk
do not have a statistically significant eﬀect on the reported profits of firms in this sample.
The sample, however, is very small, so it would not be possible to reject the hypothesis that
the coeﬃcient for the placebo group is the same as the coeﬃcient for the full sample. Given
that this sample still contains firms whose names reflect a likely link to a multinational
corporation, e.g. Netflix Ireland, this result probably indicates that a diﬀerent data source
likely needs to be used to establish a true placebo group.
8Specifically, I select firms that have no subsidiaries and that are less than 5% owned by shareholders.
The results are similar if I instead select firms that are less than 10% owned by shareholders.
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Table 5.1: Eﬀect of Transfer-Pricing Enforcement
(1) (2) (3)
Log EBIT Log EBIT Log EBIT
tprisk -0.101*** -0.0267*** -0.0269***
(0.00834) (0.00915) (0.00916)
Tax Rate -0.0607
(0.186)
Log Assets 0.0591*** 0.0730*** 0.0730***
(0.00638) (0.00662) (0.00663)
Log Labor 0.404*** 0.401*** 0.401***
(0.0119) (0.0123) (0.0123)
Log GDP -0.374 -0.390
(1.083) (1.085)
Log GDP2 0.191 0.194
(0.149) (0.149)
Deficit -0.00320 -0.00333
(0.00201) (0.00204)
Observations 136,421 135,051 135,051
Within R-squared 0.047 0.061 0.061
Number of Firms 34,502 34,219 34,219
Industry-Year F.E.
Notes: Firm fixed-eﬀects regressions. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable in all columns is the log of reported profit before
interest and taxes. tprisk=index of transfer-pricing risk described in Section 4.1. Tax Rate=corporate tax
rate in the firm’s home country. Log Assets=log(fixed tangible assets). Log Labor=log(employee
compensation). Log GDP=log(per capita GDP). Log GDP2=log(per capita GDP)2. Deficit=government
deficit/surplus as a percentage of GDP.
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Table 5.2: Placebo Group
(1) (2) (3)
Log EBIT Log EBIT Log EBIT
tprisk -0.113*** -0.0297 -0.0291
(0.0228) (0.0261) (0.0260)
Tax Rate 0.524
(1.039)
Log Assets 0.0629*** 0.0651*** 0.0654***
(0.0175) (0.0178) (0.0178)
Log Labor 0.256*** 0.242*** 0.242***
(0.0409) (0.0415) (0.0416)
Log GDP -1.984 -1.962
(2.917) (2.916)
Log GDP2 0.601 0.587
(0.463) (0.465)
Deficit -0.0130** -0.0140**
(0.00534) (0.00574)
Observations 15,888 15,855 15,855
Within R-squared 0.021 0.039 0.039
Number of Firms 4,518 4,509 4,509
Industry-Year F.E.
Notes: Firm fixed-eﬀects regressions. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable in all columns is the log of reported profit before
interest and taxes. tprisk=index of transfer-pricing risk described in Section 4.1. Tax Rate=corporate tax
rate in the firm’s home country. Log Assets=log(fixed tangible assets). Log Labor=log(employee
compensation). Log GDP=log(per capita GDP). Log GDP2=log(per capita GDP)2. Deficit=government
deficit/surplus as a percentage of GDP.
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As mentioned in Section 4.3, the firms in the sample are heavily concentrated in Denmark,
France, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Of these countries, Spain experienced a large change in
tprisk over the sample period. In column (1) of Table 5.3, to ensure that it is not the
response of firms in Spain to that change in enforcement that is driving the result, firms
that are located in Spain are excluded. The exclusion of these firms actually results in an
even more negative relationship between reported profits and the index of transfer-pricing
risk. In column (2), firms that are located in France, Italy and Spain are excluded.9 Again,
the response to tprisk is negative, and even larger in magnitude than in the baseline case.
Interestingly, the statistically insignificant coeﬃcient on the corporate tax rate in column
(3) of Table 5.1 seems to be driven by Italian firms. Excluding Italian firms results in a
coeﬃcient on Tax Rate of -.52, which suggests that a 10% increase in the corporate tax rate
decreases reported profits by 5.2%. It is possible that, through the early part of the sample,
Italian firms were still responding to the changes in corporate taxation that occurred in
2004. Column (3) of Table 5.3 only includes firms that are their own global ultimate owner,
while Column (4) only includes firms that are not their own global ultimate owner. GUOs
are diﬀerent from non-GUOs both in the fact that more complete aﬃliate information is
included for GUOs and in the fact that the incentives for shifting might be diﬀerent for
parent firms.10 The relatively small sample of GUOs means that the estimates are noisy, but
the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on tprisk is very similar across the two groups. Although
insignificant, the positive coeﬃcient on the corporate tax rate in column (3) is consistent
with corporations being reluctant to shift profits away from the parent firm.
These baseline results suggest that increased transfer-pricing enforcement has a negative
eﬀect on reported profits. The fact that this eﬀect is not seen for a group of firms that should
be unaﬀected by transfer-pricing regulation is consistent with the interpretation that the
results are reflecting a change in transfer-pricing enforcement. The relatively large magnitude
of the eﬀect of increased enforcement may indicate that the results are capturing both an
increase in the cost of doing business, and the longer-run relocation of investment to lower-
enforcement locations.
5.2 Heterogenous response to own-country enforcement
The model predicted that a positive response of reported profits to transfer-pricing enforce-
ment was most likely for firms that have lower-tax aﬃliates. A negative response of reported
profits to transfer-pricing enforcement was most likely for firms with few lower-tax aﬃliates
and many higher-tax aﬃliates. The most basic test for this is to see if firms with low-tax
9The three countries that had the highest concentration of firms.
10See, for example, Dischinger, Knoll, and Riedel (2010).
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Table 5.3: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log EBIT Log EBIT Log EBIT Log EBIT
tprisk -0.0380*** -0.0706*** -0.0236 -0.0265**
(0.0141) (0.0155) (0.0160) (0.0112)
Tax Rate -0.186 -0.639*** 0.182 -0.180
(0.196) (0.229) (0.346) (0.221)
Log Assets 0.0711*** 0.0698*** 0.0951*** 0.0641***
(0.00722) (0.00914) (0.0111) (0.00816)
Log Labor 0.391*** 0.372*** 0.396*** 0.405***
(0.0133) (0.0166) (0.0188) (0.0161)
Log GDP -0.277 -1.150 -1.806 0.261
(1.085) (1.109) (1.829) (1.347)
Log GDP2 0.168 0.171 0.444* 0.0838
(0.150) (0.153) (0.255) (0.184)
Deficit -0.00742*** 0.00232 0.000404 -0.00488**
(0.00267) (0.00302) (0.00356) (0.00249)
Observations 115,736 73,291 44,471 90,580
Within R-squared 0.059 0.055 0.066 0.059
Number of Firms 29,592 19,841 11,488 22,731
Industry-Year F.E.
Notes: Firm fixed-eﬀects regressions. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable in all columns is the log of reported profit before
interest and taxes. tprisk=index of transfer-pricing risk described in Section 4.1. Tax Rate=corporate tax
rate in the firm’s home country. Log Assets=log(fixed tangible assets). Log Labor=log(employee
compensation). Log GDP=log(per capita GDP). Log GDP2=log(per capita GDP)2. Deficit=government
deficit/surplus as a percentage of GDP. Column (1) excludes firms that are located in Spain. Column (2)
excludes firms that are located in France, Italy and Spain. Column (3) only includes firms that are GUOs.
Column (4) only includes firms that are not GUOs.
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aﬃliates respond diﬀerently to changes in transfer-pricing risk than firms that do not have
low-tax aﬃliates. The model predicts that the eﬀect of increased transfer-pricing enforce-
ment should be less negative for firms that do actually have lower-tax aﬃliates, as these are
the firms where increased enforcement can have a deterrent eﬀect and can, therefore, serve to
decrease outflows and increase reported profits. Table 5.4 shows evidence that is consistent
with this hypothesis. Column (1) replicates the baseline specification for firms that have
lower-tax aﬃliates, while Column (2) replicates the same specification for firms that do not
have lower-tax aﬃliates. The response of reported profits to an increase in enforcement is
significantly more negative for firms that do not have lower-tax aﬃliates. Columns (3) and
(4) indicate that firms with higher-tax aﬃliates also exhibit a more negative response to in-
creased enforcement than firms that do not have higher-tax aﬃliates, this is also consistent
with the predictions of the model.
Another basic test for the prediction of the model is to see if the response of reported
profit to transfer-pricing enforcement is less negative for firms facing a higher corporate
tax rate. Although, in a given country, there will still be variation across firms in terms
of the distribution of high-tax subsidiaries versus low-tax subsidiaries, the higher corporate
tax rate a country has, the more likely it is that the majority of a firm’s subsidiaries will
be lower tax. Looking at Column (1) of Table 5.5, there is a positive coeﬃcient on the
interaction of the transfer-pricing enforcement measures and corporate tax rate, although
the coeﬃcient is not statistically significant. This indicates that, for higher-tax rate countries,
the response of reported profit to increased enforcement is less negative than for lower-tax
countries. Given that enforcement makes shifting out more costly, it makes sense that
countries which experience greater outflows, higher-tax countries, would see a more positive
eﬀect of enforcement. Similar results are found if the firm-specific average tax diﬀerence is
used instead of the corporate tax rate. The model also predicts that having low-tax aﬃliates
should make a firm’s response to an increase in transfer-pricing enforcement less negative.
Column (2) includes interactions between the transfer-pricing risk measure and both the
number of lower-tax aﬃliates a firm has and the number of higher-tax aﬃliates a firm has.
The positive coeﬃcient on the interaction of the number of lower-tax aﬃliates and tprisk is
consistent with enforcement serving to reduce profit-shifting outflows. The fact that tprisk
continues to maintain its negative coeﬃcient, however, still suggests that the compliance
costs of dealing with increased enforcement are large. In Column (3) of Table 5.5, both the
number of lower-tax aﬃliates and higher-tax aﬃliates the firm has interacted with tprisk
and indicators for if the firm has at least one lower-tax aﬃliate and at least one higher-tax
aﬃliate interacted with tprisk are included. The results suggest that having a lower-tax
aﬃliate makes a firm’s response to increased enforcement less negative, which is consistent
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Table 5.4: Type of Aﬃliates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log EBIT Log EBIT Log EBIT Log EBIT
tprisk -0.0080 -0.0549*** -0.0298** -0.0163
(0.0115) (0.0164) (0.0126) (0.0135)
Tax Rate -0.149 -0.150 1.067*** -0.545**
(0.218) (0.620) (0.390) (0.263)
Log Assets 0.0690*** 0.0780*** 0.0803*** 0.0675***
(0.00781) (0.0146) (0.0111) (0.00895)
Log Labor 0.405*** 0.382*** 0.418*** 0.373***
(0.0155) (0.0232) (0.0199) (0.0160)
Log GDP 2.488* -2.546 -1.257 2.455
(1.409) (1.684) (1.509) (1.623)
Log GDP2 -0.178 0.420* 0.219 -0.115
(0.194) (0.235) (0.210) (0.220)
Deficit -0.00352 0.00192 -0.00354 -0.00476
(0.00274) (0.00333) (0.00277) (0.00328)
Observations 98,454 36,597 63,638 71,413
Within R-squared 0.060 0.065 0.065 0.056
Number of Firms 26,536 12,454 19,388 20,770
Year-Industry F.E.
Sample of Firms with Firms with no Firms with Firms with no
firms lower-tax aﬀ. lower-tax aﬀ. higher-tax aﬀ. higher-tax aﬀ.
Notes: Firm fixed-eﬀects regressions. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable in all columns is the log of reported profit before
interest and taxes. tprisk=index of transfer-pricing risk described in Section 4.1. Tax Rate=corporate tax
rate in the firm’s home country. Log Assets=log(fixed tangible assets). Log Labor=log(employee
compensation). Log GDP=log(per capita GDP). Log GDP2=log(per capita GDP)2. Deficit=government
deficit/surplus as a percentage of GDP.
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with the story above. More surprisingly, it appears that having at least one higher-tax
aﬃliate also makes the response of reported profits to increased enforcement less negative.
This could capture the fact that having a higher-tax aﬃliate might be an indicator that the
firm is part of a multinational where profit shifting occurs.
5.3 Response to aﬃliate-country enforcement
In addition to predicting diﬀerences across firms in the response of reported profit to own-
country enforcement, the model also predicts that reported profit should be decreasing in
the enforcement levels of the countries in which higher-tax aﬃliates are located and that
the enforcement levels of countries in which lower-tax aﬃliates are located should have an
ambiguous eﬀect on reported profit. The first column of Table 5.6 adds two additional terms
to the specification, the average level of enforcement in the countries of higher-tax aﬃliates,
where tprisk for each aﬃliate is weighted by the tax diﬀerential between that country and
the firm’s home country, and the average level of enforcement in the countries of lower-tax
aﬃliates, where tprisk for each aﬃliate is again weighed by the tax diﬀerential between the
firm’s home country and the tax rate faced by that aﬃliate. The sign on AvgRiskHi is
consistent with the predictions of the model, but the results are not statistically significant.
Partially, this could be due to the fact that the size of the subsidiary is also important in
determining the response of reported profit to a change in tprisk in that subsidiary’s country.
The opportunities for shifting are likely to be greater with larger subsidiaries, but currently,
for any given tax diﬀerential, subsidiaries all receive the same weight due to the extremely
limited information available on subsidiary size. In the future, aﬃliate tprisk should be
weighted by aﬃliate-level assets for the subset of aﬃliates for which this information is
available.
Another problem with the regression is that, by including both average risk for higher-tax
aﬃliates and average risk for lower-tax aﬃliates, only the small subset of firms that have both
high-tax and low-tax aﬃliates is used. To take into account the eﬀect of using this subset of
firms, each measure of aﬃliate transfer-pricing enforcement is considered separately. Only
limiting the sample to firms that have at least one higher-tax aﬃliate, Column (2) of Table
5.6 shows that the coeﬃcient on AvgRiskHiWeight continues to be negative, but statistically
insignificant. Only limiting the sample to firms that have at least one higher-tax aﬃliate,
Column (3) of Table 5.6 provides weak evidence that stricter enforcement in the countries
where lower-tax aﬃliates are located decreases reported profit. Since a firm will have an
incentive to deduct the compliance costs of transactions in the higher-tax country, this would
be consistent with transfer-pricing regulation having a relatively large eﬀect on compliance
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Table 5.5: Variation in distribution of aﬃliates
(1) (2) (3)
Log EBIT Log EBIT Log EBIT
tprisk -0.112* -0.109* -0.110*
(0.0619) (0.0622) (0.0621)
Tax Rate -1.224 -1.165 -0.922
(0.884) (0.894) (0.897)
tprisk*Tax Rate 0.292 0.258 0.215
(0.215) (0.216) (0.217)
tprisk*NumLo 0.00540* 0.00504
(0.00324) (0.00320)
tprisk*HasLo 0.0110***
(0.000406)
tprisk*NumHi 0.00521 -0.000235
(0.00349) (0.00327)
tprisk*HasHi 0.0133***
(0.00393)
Log Assets 0.0730*** 0.0729*** 0.0729***
(0.00663) (0.00664) (0.00664)
Log Labor 0.401*** 0.401*** 0.401***
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123)
Log GDP -0.423 -0.307 -0.165
(1.085) (1.086) (1.086)
Log GDP2 0.198 0.180 0.159
(0.149) (0.149) (0.149)
Deficit -0.00228 -0.00229 -0.00237
(0.00210) (0.00211) (0.00211)
NumLo -0.00761 -0.0174
(0.0167) (0.0166)
NumHi 0.00583 -0.00699
(0.0172) (0.0167)
Observations 135,051 135,051 135,051
Within R-squared 0.061 0.061 0.061
Number of Firms 34,219 34,219 34,219
Year-Industry F.E.
Notes: Firm fixed-eﬀects regressions. The dependent variable in all columns is the log of reported profit
before interest and taxes. tprisk=index of transfer-pricing risk described in Section 4.1. Tax
Rate=corporate tax rate in the firm’s home country. NumLo=number of lower-tax aﬃliates. HasLo=1 if
the firm has at least one lower-tax aﬃliate. NumHi=number of higher-tax aﬃliates. HasHi=1 if the firm
has at least one higher-tax aﬃliate. Log Assets=log(fixed tangible assets). Log Labor=log(employee
compensation). Log GDP=log(per capita GDP). Log GDP2=log(per capita GDP)2. Deficit=government
deficit/surplus as a percentage of GDP. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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costs and a relatively small eﬀect on the actual amount shifted out. As discussed briefly in
section 4.3, the measures used in these regressions to capture enforcement in the countries
in which aﬃliates are located will all suﬀer from the problem that they will also partially
be capturing the eﬀect of changes in corporate tax rates that change the weighting of tprisk
across aﬃliates and that the precise form of the term will depend on the assumptions that
are made about the cost functions.
6 Conclusions
This paper considers the eﬀect of transfer-pricing enforcement on reported profits using a
model of optimal profit shifting to capture how profit-shifting flows respond to changes in
enforcement. The model recognizes that there are three eﬀects of increased transfer-pricing
enforcement. It deters shifting out; it can potentially deter shifting in; and it increases the
cost of doing business for any firm with related-party transactions. Policy makers often
seem to suggest that increased transfer-pricing regulation is always a good thing, but this
indicates that they are implicitly focusing on only the first of these eﬀects. Using a firm fixed-
eﬀects estimation strategy, the results in this paper suggest that increased transfer-pricing
enforcement has a negative eﬀect on reported profit, although the eﬀect is less negative
for firms that are located in higher-tax countries. Consistent with the predictions of the
model, the eﬀect of enforcement is also less negative for firms with low-tax aﬃliates, which
indicates that enforcement does deter shifting out. These results mean that, even if increased
regulation is costless from the perspective of the government, increased enforcement should
not be automatically assumed to increase tax collections.
Both individual countries and international groups such as the OECD are increasingly
focusing on preventing profit shifting. While measures to make profit shifting more costly
may seem appealing, it is necessary to recognize that these measures have many eﬀects
beyond simply decreasing the amount of profit that corporations shift out. Especially for
countries with relatively low corporate tax rates, the increased compliance costs that result
from increased regulation and the decrease in the incentive for shifting in mean that imple-
menting transfer-pricing regulation is likely to decrease corporate tax revenue. The empirical
results suggest that, even for relatively high-tax countries, the increase in the cost of doing
business for all corporations with related-party transactions may mean that many forms of
increased transfer-pricing regulation do more harm than good. Forms of enforcement like
documentation requirements, that are unlikely to have a large eﬀect on the marginal cost of
shifting, but are likely to result in a significant fixed cost for any firm that has transactions
with its aﬃliates, are especially likely to decrease reported profits and, therefore, decrease
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Table 5.6: Eﬀect of Aﬃliate-Level Enforcement
(1) (2) (3)
Log EBIT Log EBIT Log EBIT
AvgRiskHi -0.217 -0.122
(0.141) (0.0827)
AvgRiskLo -0.168 -0.130**
(0.112) (0.0528)
tprisk -0.0237 -0.0350** -0.0174
(0.0271) (0.0149) (0.0156)
tprisk*NumHi 0.00290 -0.000793 0.00585
(0.00789) (0.00334) (0.00684)
tprisk*NumLo 0.00283 0.00555 0.00246
(0.00357) (0.00338) (0.00334)
Tax Rate 0.957 0.399 0.0811
(0.844) (0.526) (0.296)
Log Assets 0.0685*** 0.0799*** 0.0715***
(0.0164) (0.0112) (0.00852)
Log Labor 0.446*** 0.419*** 0.400***
(0.0339) (0.0201) (0.0170)
Log GDP 3.038 -1.563 4.145*
(3.641) (1.557) (2.205)
Log GDP2 -0.445 0.263 -0.408
(0.494) (0.216) (0.298)
Deficit -0.0124** -0.00342 -0.00525*
(0.00525) (0.00280) (0.00307)
NumHi -0.0419 -0.0237 -0.0267
(0.0345) (0.0189) (0.0294)
NumLo -0.0316 -0.0350* -0.00869
(0.0208) (0.0190) (0.0187)
Observations 28,459 62,891 86,117
Within R-squared 0.069 0.065 0.058
Number of Firms 8,951 19,114 24,820
Industry-Year F.E.
Notes: Firm fixed-eﬀects regressions. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable in all columns is the log of reported profit before
interest and taxes. AvgRiskHiWeight =weighted (by tax diﬀerential) average of the tprisk index of the
countries of all higher-tax aﬃliates. AvgRiskLoWeight=weighted (by tax diﬀerential) average of the same
index for the countries of all lower-tax aﬃliates. tprisk=index of transfer-pricing risk described in Section
4.1. Tax Rate=corporate tax rate in the firm’s home country. NumLo=number of lower-tax aﬃliates the
firm has. NumHi=number of higher-tax aﬃliates the firm has. Log Assets=log(fixed tangible assets). Log
Labor=log(employee compensation). Log GDP=log(per capita GDP). Log GDP2=log(per capita GDP)2.
Deficit=government deficit/surplus as a percentage of GDP.
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tax revenues. Partially, this may suggest that the best approach to deterring profit shifting
is to improve the targeting of transfer-pricing investigations rather than forcing all firms to
comply with detailed documentation requirements. The more these eﬀorts can be targeted
towards the firms that are actually shifting large amounts of profit out, the more likely these
measures should be to have a positive eﬀect on tax revenue. This paper does not touch on the
separate issue of how diﬀerences in enforcement across countries would be expected to aﬀect
optimal shifting between aﬃliates. Given that weaker eﬀorts to prevent profit shifting are
probably attractive to a firm, however, this is likely to provide further support for increased
own-country enforcement reducing reported profits and, therefore, tax collections.
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Chapter 2:
Shifting Against the Tax Diﬀerential
7 Introduction
In order to maximize after-tax profits, a multinational corporation that has related firms
(aﬃliates) located across a number of countries with diﬀering corporate tax rates has an
incentive to shift profits from aﬃliates that face a high corporate tax rate to aﬃliates that
face a lower corporate tax rate. Given that the end goal of profit shifting is to minimize tax
payments, it is generally assumed that profits will only ever move from a higher-tax country
to a lower-tax country. This paper shows that diﬀerences across countries in the cost of
profit shifting can actually create an incentive to shift profits from a lower-tax aﬃliate to
a higher-tax aﬃliate, provided that this shifting facilitates shifting on to an aﬃliate that
is even lower tax than the original source country. This incentive to shift from a middle-
tax aﬃliate to a higher-tax aﬃliate is especially strong if the middle-tax country targets its
attempts at preventing profit shifting towards transactions with lower-tax aﬃliates. While
this shifting against the tax diﬀerential may seem counterintuitive at first, in many ways,
moving profits through a higher-tax country in order to take advantage of lax enforcement,
is no diﬀerent than moving profits through a higher-tax country in order take advantage
of a beneficial tax treaty. This behavior has consequences both in terms of thinking about
how profit shifting should be modeled and in terms of thinking about optimal government
policies to try to limit profit shifting.
To understand why shifting against the tax diﬀerential may occur, consider an extreme
example. Suppose that a multinational corporation is composed of three firms, where firm
A is located in the highest-tax country, firm B is located in the middle-tax country and firm
C is located in the lowest-tax country. All three firms have positive profits. Assume that the
only thing that the tax-collection agency in firm A’s home country cares about is that the
reported profits of firm A match the profits that firm A has actually earned. In that case,
anything shifted to firm A can be shifted out costlessly. As long as shifting from B to C
via A results in higher after-tax profits than shifting directly from B to C, then the optimal
strategy for the corporation involves moving profits against the tax diﬀerential.11
11The corporation will shift from B to A as long as the marginal cost of shifting from B to A is less than
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While this is an extreme case, it captures two of the characteristics that must hold
for shifting against the tax diﬀerential to be optimal. First, the high-tax country must be
relatively focused on net shifting, i.e. deviations between earned profits and reported profits.
Second, the middle-tax country must focus more of its attention on transactions between
firm B and its lower-tax aﬃliate, firm C, than it does on transactions between firm B and
its higher-tax aﬃliate, firm A.
This potential for profit shifting against the tax diﬀerential has not been recognized up
to this point because past models of profit shifting have followed one of two approaches.12
The first class of models, used in papers such as Hines and Rice (1994) and Huizinga and
Laeven (2008), have allowed a corporation to be active in many countries and have modeled
the net shifting (outflows minus inflows) into or out of each firm. The focus on net shifting
means that the path of profit-shifting flows cannot be considered in the framework of these
models, as all that can be established is the total amount that is shifted into or out of each
aﬃliate. This framework also does not allow the cost of profit shifting to depend on the
route that the profits follow.
The second class of models, used in papers such as Haufler and Schjelderup (2000) and
Lohse and Riedel (2012), have considered a corporation that is active in only two countries.
In the two-country setting, there are no intermediate tax rate countries, so these models do
not have the potential to capture the more complex incentives for shifting that occur in a
multi-country setting. Overall, no paper has considered aﬃliate-to-aﬃliate (gross) flows in
a setting with more than two countries. This means that these papers have not had the
potential to capture the possibility of gross profit-shifting against the tax diﬀerential.
This paper considers gross flows in a three-country setting, where the determinants of
the cost of profit shifting are allowed to vary across countries. Allowing variation in the
cost of profit shifting across countries opens up the possibility of gross profit-shifting flows
that go against the tax diﬀerential. While predictions about the sign of net shifting will still
hold, high-tax aﬃliates will see profits shifted out on net and low-tax aﬃliates will see profits
shifting in on net, gross shifting does not necessarily have to occur in the direction of the tax
diﬀerential. If a multinational has an aﬃliate in a high-tax country whose enforcement eﬀorts
are targeted at deviations between expected profits and reported profits, the model shows
that this can induce a country to shift profits to that country from a lower-tax aﬃliate. This
both the marginal cost of shifting from B to C and the marginal benefit of shifting, i.e. the tax diﬀerential
between B’s home country and C’s home country.
12Note that this paper is looking at shifting that goes against the eﬀective tax rate diﬀerential, not just the
statutory tax rate diﬀerential. Given that the marginal benefit of shifting is determined by the diﬀerence in
eﬀective tax rates, there are many scenarios where a corporation would optimally want to shift from a firm
that faces a lower statutory corporate tax rate to a firm that faces a higher statutory corporate tax rate.
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shifting occurs because shifting profits to the high-tax aﬃliate enables further profit shifting
out. Considering profit shifting in this framework opens up the possibility of a specific type
of high-tax country being used as a flow through entity for profit-shifting purposes. The
enforcement of the middle-tax country is also important in determining the direction of
profit-shifting flows. If the tax agency in that country assumes that profit shifting will move
in the direction of the tax diﬀerential, then this will encourage profit shifting against the tax
diﬀerential.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The second section introduces a
simple setting in which a corporation will optimally shift against the tax diﬀerential. The
third section discuss the more general conditions under which we would and would not see
gross profit shifting against the tax diﬀerential. The fourth section briefly discusses why
some countries might choose to have lax enforcement. The fifth section discusses how the
cost of profit shifting has been modeled in the literature. It also discusses how profit shifting
against the tax diﬀerential could aﬀect diﬀerent strategies for empirically estimating the
magnitude of profit shifting. The sixth section concludes.
8 Shifting Against the Tax Diﬀerential with Non-Convex
Costs
Consider a multinational that has three aﬃliates, A, B and C, where aﬃliate A faces an
eﬀective corporate tax rate of ⌧A, aﬃliate B faces an eﬀective corporate tax rate of ⌧B and
aﬃliate C faces an eﬀective corporate tax rate of ⌧C . For this simple example, assume that the
cost of shifting profit is linear in the amount shifted and that the cost is not deductible.13
The cost of shifting diﬀers across aﬃliate pairs. This allows for the possibility that the
aﬃliates’ home countries put diﬀerent amounts of eﬀort towards enforcement, which results
in the cost of shifting being diﬀerent across countries. It also allows for the possibility that
it is more costly to shift to an aﬃliate in a lower-tax country than it is to shift to an aﬃliate
in a higher-tax country. Assume that the cost of shifting one dollar from aﬃliate i to aﬃliate
j is  ij.
For a corporation that seeks to maximize after-tax profits, the end goal is to get profits
to aﬃliate C. This means that the corporation will never optimally shift profits out of
aﬃliate C. In terms of getting profits to aﬃliate C, however, the corporation has a number
of possible paths: (1) it can shift from A to C directly and from B to C directly, (2) it can
shift from A to B and then from B to C or (3) it can shift from B to A and then from A
13These assumptions will be relaxed in the next section.
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to C. It is also possible that shifting might be costly enough that the corporation does not
shift anything out of one or more of the higher-tax countries.
The marginal benefit of shifting from A to C is the tax diﬀerential between aﬃliate A’s
home country and aﬃliate C’s home country, ⌧A  ⌧C . The marginal benefit of shifting from
B to C is the tax diﬀerential between aﬃliate B’s home country and aﬃliate C’s home
country, ⌧B   ⌧C . The marginal cost of shifting will depend on the path the profit follows.
The corporation can shift from A to C directly with a marginal cost of  AC . It can shift
from B to C directly with a marginal cost of  BC . Alternatively, to get profits from A to C,
the corporation could shift from A to B and then B to C at a marginal cost of  AB +  BC .
To get profits from B to C, the corporation could instead shift from B to A and then from
A to C at a marginal cost of  BA +  AC .
In this setting, the corporation will shift everything out of aﬃliate A as long as the
marginal cost of shifting is less than that marginal benefit. The profits will be shifted along
the path that results in the lower marginal cost. This means the corporation will shift from
A to C directly if  AC < ⌧A   ⌧C and  AC   AB +  BC . It will shift from A to B and
then from B to C if  AB +  BC < ⌧A   ⌧C and  AB +  BC <  AC . If  AC   ⌧A   ⌧C and
 AB +  BC   ⌧A   ⌧C , then the corporation won’t shift anything out of aﬃliate A.
In terms of shifting out of aﬃliate B, the corporation will shift everything out of B as
long as the marginal cost of shifting either from B to C directly or from B to A and then
from A to C is less than the marginal benefit. This means the corporation shifts from B
to C directly if  BC < ⌧B   ⌧C and  BC   BA +  AC . It will first shift to the higher-tax
country, A, and then shift on from A to C if  BA +  AC < ⌧B   ⌧C and  BA +  AC <  BC . If
 AB   ⌧A   ⌧B and  BA +  AC   ⌧A   ⌧B then the corporation won’t shift anything out of
aﬃliate B.
Proposition 1: If the marginal cost of gross shifting is constant, then, assuming
the corporation shifts profit out of aﬃliate B, the corporation will shift those
profits against the tax diﬀerential as long as  BA +  AC <  BC .
Even in this simple setup, then, there is a situation where gross profit-shifting flows go
against the tax diﬀerential. If  BA+  AC <  BC and  BA+  AC < ⌧B  ⌧C then, even though
all profits earned by aﬃliate B will, in the end, be shifted to aﬃliate C, the shifting that
actually occurs is from aﬃliate B to its higher-tax aﬃliate, aﬃliate A. This situation would
be consistent with a setting where aﬃliate A’s home country is high tax but low enforcement
and where aﬃliate B’s home country focuses its enforcement eﬀorts at transactions with the
lower-tax aﬃliate, while putting less eﬀort towards preventing shifting to the higher-tax
aﬃliate. If aﬃliate A’s home country has lax enforcement then that would translate into
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 AC being relatively small. If aﬃliate B’s home country focuses its resources on transactions
with lower-tax aﬃliates, then that would mean that  BC would be large relative to  BA.
This is consistent with a country with limited resources focusing on transactions made with
tax havens, but paying little attention to transactions with higher-tax aﬃliates, an approach
many countries seem to follow in practice.14 This simple example, however, shows that
if these higher-tax aﬃliates are located in low-enforcement countries, then this targeting
may be risky as it may encourage shifting through the higher-tax country instead. The
country may, incorrectly, assume that it has cut down on profit shifting, when its actions
have instead simply changed the route the corporation uses to shift profits. In the end, the
high-tax country essentially functions as an enforcement haven. Although this is an extreme
example, where the corporation either shifts everything or nothing, the next section shows
that the intuition behind the example carries over to other, less extreme, settings.
Net shifting has been the focus of most empirical papers in the profit-shifting literature.
This means that it is also important to understand how allowing for the possibility of gross
profit shifting against the tax diﬀerential might aﬀect the predicted relationship between
tax diﬀerentials and net shifting. This example has demonstrated the potential for gross
profit shifting against the tax diﬀerential, but, in this simple setting, shifting against the tax
diﬀerential generally does not aﬀect predictions about the magnitude of net profit-shifting
flows.15 Regardless of the direction of the profit shifting, if shifting occurs, then all profits are
shifted out of the higher-tax countries. In the more general examples discussed in the next
section, the direction of the gross shifting can, in fact, aﬀect the magnitude of net shifting.
Section 5 briefly discusses how empirical estimates of the magnitude of profit shifting might
be aﬀected by this potential for shifting against the tax diﬀerential.
9 General Model
9.1 Setup
The example above was an extreme case, where the linear cost of shifting meant that, as
long as the marginal cost of shifting was less than the marginal benefit, then all profits would
be shifted out of higher-tax countries. In reality, multinationals do not generally report zero
profits in high-tax locations and extremely high profits in low-tax locations. They instead
14Looking at transfer-pricing guides from the Big Four accounting firms, it is quite common for countries
to state that transactions with aﬃliates located in known tax havens will face additional scrutiny. See, for
example, Ernst & Young (2006-2013).
15Unless the costs and tax rates are such that  BA +  AC < (⌧B   ⌧C) <  BC . In that scenario, nothing
would be shifted out of aﬃliate B if shifting is only allowed in the direction of the tax diﬀerential, but
everything will be shifted out if profits can be moved against the tax diﬀerential.
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report lower than expected profits in high-tax countries and higher than expect profits in
low-tax countries. The relationship between reported profits and the tax rate indicates that
shifting occurs, but the amount of shifting must be limited by some kind of non-linear cost
function. This means that is important to understand if the incentive for shifting against the
tax diﬀerential can also carry over to a model of profit shifting that yields interior solutions.
This section shows that shifting against the tax diﬀerential can, under certain circum-
stances, be optimal whenever we allow for the possibility that shifting from B to A enables
shifting out of aﬃliate A, i.e. lowers the marginal cost of shifting out of A. How likely we are
to see shifting against the tax diﬀerential will depend on the relative responsiveness of the
cost of shifting in aﬃliate A’s home country and aﬃliate B’s home country to net shifting,
as well as the interaction of other cost parameters. The model introduced below allows the
cost of shifting between any two aﬃliates to depend on how much is being shifted between
the two (gross shifting), and also on how much is being shifted into or out of the aﬃliate in
total (net shifting).
Before considering which types of cost functions can result in shifting against the tax
diﬀerential, consider first a setting in which the cost functions will only yield shifting that
moves in the direction of the tax diﬀerential. Any model of profit shifting that assumes
that the cost of shifting between two aﬃliates is only a function of the amount of profit
shifted between those two aﬃliates will give the result that shifting will only ever occur
in the direction of the tax diﬀerential.16 In order for there to be the possibility for profit-
maximizing shifting to a higher-tax aﬃliate, that shifting must facilitate shifting on to an
even lower-tax aﬃliate. In a model where the cost of shifting only depends on gross shifting,
shifting profits to an aﬃliate does not have this positive eﬀect of enabling additional shifting
out. When the cost depends solely on gross shifting, there are only two marginal eﬀects of
moving a dollar between aﬃliates: (1) the tax rate faced by that dollar changes, and (2) the
cost of shifting goes up. The only way there will be a positive net benefit from shifting then,
is if the dollar is moved to an aﬃliate that faces a lower tax rate. Shifting from a lower-tax
aﬃliate to a higher-tax aﬃliate would both increase the tax rate faced by that dollar and
would incur a cost, so such shifting could never be optimal.
Things change, however, when the cost of shifting between two aﬃliates is assumed to
depend on both gross shifting and the net shifting (i.e. outflows minus inflows) into or out
of the source aﬃliate. Consider again a multinational that has three aﬃliates, each located
in a diﬀerent country. If the cost of shifting between any two aﬃliates depends on both
gross shifting and net shifting, then, even when the corporation does not optimally shift
everything out of aﬃliate A, it can be optimal for the multinational to shift from B to A
16Assuming that the model yields an interior solution.
43
instead of from A to B. This is because, if the cost of shifting is assumed to depend on
net shifting, then there are now four eﬀects of shifting from aﬃliate A to aﬃliate B. It
will change the tax rate the profits face from ⌧A to ⌧B, it will increase cAB both because it
increases SAB and because it increases SA, it will increase cAC because it increases SA and
it will decrease cBC because it decreases SB. If the corporation instead shifted from B to
A, there would also be four eﬀects. It would increase the tax rate from ⌧B to ⌧A, it would
increase cBA, it would increase cBC and it would decrease cAC . The decrease in cAC means
that there is now a positive benefit of shifting from B to A. If it is large enough, then it
can actually induce shifting against the tax diﬀerential, as it can make the net benefit of
shifting from B to A both positive and higher than the net benefit of shifting from A to B.
Generally, this shifting against the tax diﬀerential is likely to occur when the cost of shifting
in the higher-tax country places more weight on net shifting than the cost of shifting in the
lower-tax country.
9.2 Conditions for Optimal Shifting
Again consider a multinational corporation that has three aﬃliates, A, B and C. They are
located across three diﬀerent countries, where A’s home country has the highest corporate
tax rate and C’s home country has the lowest corporate tax rate, ⌧A > ⌧B > ⌧C . Aﬃliate i
earns true profit of Bi. In determining its optimal profit shifting, the corporation is selecting
between two possible maximizations. The first option is that it can shift from A to B, from
A to C and from B to C. In this case it selects the amount to shift from A to B (SAB),
the amount to shift from A to C (SAC), and the amount to shift from B to C (SBC), to
maximize:
max
SAB 0,SAC ,SBC
(1  ⌧A)(BA SA  cAB   cAC)+ (1  ⌧B)(BB  SB   cBC)+ (1  ⌧C)(BC  SC)
where:
SA = SAB + SAC
SB = SBC   SAB
SC =  SAC   SBC
Alternatively, it can shift from B to A, from A to C and from B to C. In this case it
selects the amount to shift from B to A (SBA), the amount to shift from A to C (SAC), and
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the amount to shift from B to C (SBC), to maximize:
max
SBA 0,SAC ,SBC
(1  ⌧A)(BA SA  cBA  cAC)+ (1  ⌧B)(BB  SB   cBC)+ (1  ⌧C)(BC  SC)
where:
SA = SAC   SBA
SB = SBC + SBA
SC =  SAC   SBC
In both maximizations, the cost of a given path of shifting, cij, is assumed to take a
form such that it depends on both the amount shifted from i to j, Sij, and the net shifting
out of aﬃliate i, Si, i.e. cij = fij(Sij, Si). This setup also imposes the assumption that the
cost of shifting between i and j is fully deductible and is always deducted by the higher-tax
aﬃliate.17
If the corporation shifts a positive amount from A to B, then that shifting must satisfy
the three first-order conditions below:
⌧A   ⌧B = (1  ⌧A)
✓
@cAB
@SAB
+
@cAB
@SA
+
@cAC
@SA
◆
  (1  ⌧B)
✓
@cBC
@SB
◆
(9.1)
⌧A   ⌧C = (1  ⌧A)
✓
@cAB
@SA
+
@cAC
@SAC
+
@cAC
@SA
◆
(9.2)
⌧B   ⌧C = (1  ⌧B)
✓
@cBC
@SBC
+
@cBC
@SB
◆
(9.3)
The right-hand side of equation (9.1) reflects the fact that, in addition to the direct
cost of shifting, moving profits from A to B increases the cost of shifting from A to C and
decreases the cost of shifting from B to C. Similarly, the right-hand side of equation (9.2)
captures that shifting profits from A to C increases the cost of moving profits from A to B.
If the corporation shifts a positive amount from B to A, then that shifting must instead
17In future work, it would be interesting to also treat the decision of where to deduct costs as a strategic
choice. As higher costs mean lower reported profits, it seems likely that the cost of shifting would also aﬀect
the likelihood of a firm being audited, as it would increase the gap between expected profits and reported
profits. Diﬀerences across countries in terms of responsiveness to deviations between expected profits and
reported profits could then influence the decision about where to actually deduct the costs.
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satisfy:
⌧B   ⌧A = (1  ⌧A)
✓
@cBA
@SBA
+
@cBA
@SB
  @cAC
@SA
◆
+ (1  ⌧B)
✓
@cBC
@SB
◆
(9.4)
⌧A   ⌧C = (1  ⌧A)
✓
@cAC
@SAC
+
@cAC
@SA
◆
(9.5)
⌧B   ⌧C = (1  ⌧A)
✓
@cBA
@SB
◆
+ (1  ⌧B)
✓
@cBC
@SBC
+
@cBC
@SB
◆
(9.6)
The right-hand side of equation (9.4) reflects the fact that there is not only a direct cost
of shifting profits from B to A, but that doing so also increases the cost of shifting profits
from B to C, but reduces the cost of shifting profits from A to C.
Just from comparing these sets of first order conditions, it is clear that shifting from B to
A allows for additional shifting from A to C, but less shifting from B to C. The additional
shifting from A to C can be seen from the additional term in equation (9.2) that does not
appear in equation (9.5). This is because shifting from A to C increased the cost of shifting
from A to B but does not aﬀect the cost of shifting from B to A. The reduced shifting
from B to C can be seen from the additional term in equation (9.6) that does not appear in
equation (9.3). This is because shifting from B to C aﬀects the cost of shifting from B to
A, but did not aﬀect the cost of shifting from A to B.
Because the cost of shifting between A and B depends on the direction the profits are
going, the first maximization is restricted to SAB   0, this means that the first maximization
will actually be solved by setting SAB = 0 if, at SAB = 0:18
(⌧A   ⌧B)  (1  ⌧A)
✓
@cAB
@SAB
+
@cAB
@SA
+
@cAC
@SA
◆
+ (1  ⌧B)
✓
@cBC
@SB
◆
 0 (9.7)
Likewise, the second maximization will actually be solved by setting SBA = 0 if, at
SBA = 0:19
(⌧B   ⌧A)  (1  ⌧A)
✓
@cBA
@SBA
+
@cBA
@SB
  @cAC
@SA
◆
  (1  ⌧B)
✓
@cBC
@SB
◆
 0 (9.8)
If, for all values of SAC and SBC , (9.7) holds, and (9.8) does not, then the corporation will
maximize profits by shifting a positive amount from B to A, i.e. it will shift profits against
the tax diﬀerential. Under the reasonable assumption that @cAB@SA = 0 when SAB = 0 and
that @cBA@SB = 0 when SBA = 0, then these conditions for shifting against the tax diﬀerential
18This assumes that the profit function is strictly concave in SAB .
19This assumes that the profit function is strictly concave in SBA
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to be optimal can be written as:
(⌧A   ⌧B)  (1  ⌧A)@cAC
@SA
+ (1  ⌧B)@cBC
@SB
 (1  ⌧A)  cAB
 SAB
(9.9)
at SAB = 0, and
(⌧A   ⌧B)  (1  ⌧A)@cAC
@SA
+ (1  ⌧B)@cBC
@SB
<  (1  ⌧A)  cBA
 SBA
(9.10)
at SBA = 0. If (9.10) holds, then (9.9) is guaranteed to hold. This condition indicates that
shifting against the tax diﬀerential is most likely to be optimal if the tax diﬀerence between
A and B is small, if the cost of shifting from B to A is small, if the cost of shifting out of A
is very responsive to net shifting, and if the cost of shifting out of B is relatively
unresponsive to net shifting.
Condition (9.10) holding for all values of SAC and SBC when SBA = 0 is a suﬃcient
condition for profit shifting against the tax diﬀerential, but it is not necessary. Shifting
from B to A will be optimal anytime the after-tax profits from shifting from A to B,
evaluated at S⇤AB, S⇤AC , S⇤BC :20
(1  ⌧A)(BA   SA   cAB   cAC) + (1  ⌧B)(BB   SB   cBC) + (1  ⌧C)(BC   SC)
are less than the after-tax profits from shifting from B to A evaluated at SˆBA, SˆAC , SˆBC :21
(1  ⌧A)(BA   SA   cBA   cAC) + (1  ⌧B)(BB   SB   cBC) + (1  ⌧C)(BC   SC)
It is not possible, however, to further assess this condition for when shifting against the tax
diﬀerential will be optimal without imposing assumptions on the forms of the cost
functions.
Proposition 2: If after-tax profits are strictly concave in the amount shifted be-
tween aﬃliateA and aﬃliateB, then if (⌧A ⌧B) (1 ⌧A)@cAC@SA +(1 ⌧B)@cBC@SB < (1 
⌧A)
@cBA
@SBA
for all values of SAC and SBC when SBA = 0, then this is suﬃcient to
guarantee that shifting against the tax diﬀerential will be optimal.
20Where S⇤AB , S⇤AC , S⇤BC satisfy first-order conditions (1), (2), and (3), and the requirement that S⇤AB   0.
21Where SˆBA, SˆAC , SˆBC satisfy first-order conditions (4), (5), and (6) and the requirement that SˆBA   0.
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9.3 Special Case: Initially no shifting between A and B
A special case of the scenario just discussed can be considered if it is assumed that (1) the
corporation starts from a point where it is not initially shifting profits between aﬃliate A
and aﬃliate B and that (2) when it first begins to shift between aﬃliate A and aﬃliate B,
is not initially able to adjust the amount it shifts from aﬃliate A to aﬃliate C and from
aﬃliate B to aﬃliate C. This could occur if, for example, the corporation has an opportunity
to manipulate transfer prices because it begins to sell goods and services between aﬃliate A
and aﬃliate B for the first time. With this setup, it is relatively straightforward to establish
a condition for when it will be optimal for the corporation, when it first begins shifting
between aﬃliate A and aﬃliate B, to shift against the tax diﬀerential. Consider conditions
(9.2) and (9.3) when SAB = 0. The optimal amount of shifting from A to C (S⇤AC) must
satisfy:
⌧A   ⌧C = (1  ⌧A)
✓
@cAB(SAB = 0, SA = S⇤AC)
@SA
+
@cAC(SAC = S⇤AC , SA = S
⇤
AC)
@SAC
+
@cAC(SAC = S⇤AC , SA = S
⇤
AC)
@SA
◆
(9.11)
The optimal amount of shifting from B to C (S⇤BC) must satisfy:
⌧B   ⌧C = (1  ⌧B)
✓
@cBC(SBC = S⇤BC , SB = S
⇤
BC)
@SBC
+
@cBC(SBC = S⇤BC , SB = S
⇤
BC)
@SB
◆
(9.12)
Now consider the optimal shifting from A to C when shifting from B to A, SBA, is equal
to zero. That optimal shifting, SˆAC , must satisfy condition (9.5) evaluated at SBA = 0:
⌧A   ⌧C = (1  ⌧A)
 
@cAC(SAC = SˆAC , SA = SˆAC)
@SAC
+
@cAC(SAC = SˆAC , SA = SˆAC)
@SA
!
(9.13)
The optimal shifting from B to C when SBA = 0 (SˆBC) must satisfy:
⌧B   ⌧C = (1  ⌧A)
 
@cBA(SBA = 0, SB = SˆBC)
@SB
!
+ (9.14)
(1  ⌧B)
 
@cBC(SBC = SˆBC , SB = SˆBC)
@SBC
+
@cBC(SBC = SˆBC , SB = SˆBC)
@SB
!
Again imposing the reasonable assumption that @cAB@SA = 0 when SAB = 0 and
@cBA
@SB
= 0
when SBA = 0, equation (9.11) will be the same as equation (9.13) and equation (9.12) will
be the same as equation (9.14). This means that S⇤AC = SˆAC and S⇤BC = SˆBC . Initially
then, after-tax profits are the same for both profit functions. As long as shifting from B to
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A increases profits, and shifting from A to B does not, then the corporation will optimally
shift against the tax diﬀerential.
For shifting from B to A to increase profits, it must be that the derivative of profits with
respect to SBA at SBA = 0, SAC = S⇤AC (given SBA = 0), SBC = S⇤BC (given SBA = 0) is
greater than zero. This means that it must be the case that:
(⌧B   ⌧A)  (1  ⌧A)
✓
@cBA
@SBA
  @cAC
@SA
◆
  (1  ⌧B)@cBC
@SB
> 0
or
(⌧A   ⌧B)  (1  ⌧A)@cAC
@SA
+ (1  ⌧B)@cBC
@SB
<  (1  ⌧A) @cBA
@SBA
(9.15)
As long as @cBA@SBA > 0 at SBA = 0, then this holding will guarantee that shifting from A to B
will not increase profits. This is because, for shifting from A to B to increase profits, it has
to be the case that:
(⌧A   ⌧B)  (1  ⌧A)@cAC
@SA
+ (1  ⌧B)@cBC
@SB
> (1  ⌧A) @cAB
@SAB
at SAB = 0, SAC = S⇤AC (given SAB = 0) and SBC = S⇤BC (given SAB = 0). This condition
follows the same intuition as the condition in the previous section. If the tax diﬀerence
between A and B is relatively small, the cost of shifting S⇤AC from A to C is significantly
reduced by profits being shifted to aﬃliate A, the cost of shifting S⇤BC from B to C is
relatively unaﬀected by profit being shifted out of B, and the cost of shifting from B to A is
relatively low, then, starting from the situation where there is no shifting between aﬃliate A
and aﬃliate B, the corporation will maximize profits by shifting from B to A. Once allowed
to adjust SAC and SBC , however, this result does not guarantee that profits will still be
maximized by shifting from B to A. In the current setup, there is nothing that prevents
there from being some other combination of SAC and SBC and a positive value of SAB that
give a higher value of after-tax profits than S⇤AC , S⇤BC and S⇤BA > 0.
9.4 Examples with Specific Cost Functions
In order to gain more understanding of when shifting against the tax diﬀerential will be
profit maximizing, this section considers a few specific forms of the general cost functions
used in the last section. First, consider again the case, discussed briefly in the introduction,
where profit-shifting enforcement in country A is such that the cost of total shifting out of
country A only depends on the net amount shifted, i.e. outflows minus inflows. In country
B, on the other hand, enforcement is such that the cost of shifting to another country is
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solely a function of how much is shifted to that country, i.e. the gross flow, and does not
depend on net shifting at all. These assumptions are represented by the cost functions:
cAC = f(SA)
cAB = f(SA)
cBA = g(SBA)
cBC = h(SBC)
Given that the cost of shifting out of country A depends only on the net amount shifted,
then, at any given level of SA, the marginal cost of shifting another dollar from A to B is
the same as the marginal cost of shifting another dollar from A to C. The marginal benefit,
i.e. the tax savings, of shifting from A to C is greater than the marginal benefit of shifting
from A to B, so the corporation will not shift any profit from A to B. If the corporation
is considering the first maximization, then, where it is only able to shift from aﬃliate A to
aﬃliate B, it will set optimal shifting from A to C (S⇤AC) such that:
f 0(S⇤AC) =
(⌧A   ⌧C)
(1  ⌧A) (9.16)
Optimal shifting from B to C in this setting, S⇤BC , will satisfy the condition:
h0(S⇤BC) =
(⌧B   ⌧C)
(1  ⌧B) (9.17)
If it only has the option of shifting from A to B then, the corporation will shift from
A to C and from B to C. The corporation does, however, also has the option of shifting
from B to A, from A to C, and from B to C. In that case, the corporation faces the second
maximization and will set SˆBA, SˆAC , and SˆBC such that:
(f 0(SˆAC   SˆBA)  g0(SˆBA)) = (⌧A   ⌧B)
(1  ⌧A) (9.18)
f 0(SˆAC   SˆBA) = (⌧A   ⌧C)
(1  ⌧A) (9.19)
h0(SˆBC) =
(⌧B   ⌧C)
(1  ⌧B) (9.20)
Optimal shifting from B to C remains unchanged, regardless of if the corporation sets
SAB = 0 or SBA = SˆBA. This can be seen from the fact that equation (9.20) is identical
to equation (9.17). This holds because the cost of shifting from B to C has been assumed
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to only depend on the gross shifting between B and C. If the corporation shifts from B
to A, then optimal shifting from A to C will be higher than it was with SAB = 0. This is
because shifting from B to A enables further shifting out of aﬃliate A. Because the amount
of shifting between B and C remains unchanged, the cost of shifting from B to C remains
the same, regardless of the direction of shifting between A and B. Comparing equations
(9.16) and (9.19), it must always be the case that SˆAC = S⇤AC + SˆBA, i.e. anything that
is shifted from B to A is then shifted on to C. This perfect pass through occurs because
the cost of shifting from A to C has been assumed to only depend on net shifting. This
means that S⇤A = SˆA, i.e. net shifting out of A is the same across the two scenarios, and
f(S⇤A) = f(SˆA).
Because the cost of shifting from B to C and the cost of shifting out of A are unchanged
across the two scenarios, assessing if the corporation has higher after-tax profits shifting from
B to A or from A to B is relatively simple. It is only necessary to weigh the benefit, the
additional profit that can be shifted from the high-tax aﬃliate A to the low-tax aﬃliate C,
against the cost of shifting that profit from B to A. Comparing the benefit of this shifting
to the cost, the corporation will optimally shift from B to A if:
(⌧B   ⌧C)SˆBA > (1  ⌧A)f(SˆBA)
Because all profits shifted from B to A are then shifted on to C, the end benefit of shifting
SBA from B to A is that it goes from facing a tax rate of ⌧B to a tax rate of ⌧C . If that
benefit is higher than the cost of shifting SBA dollars from B to A, then it is optimal for
the corporation to do so. So, simply by introducing a higher-tax aﬃliate that is located in a
country where the only focus of enforcement is deviations between true profit and reported
profit, we have an outcome where, if the corporation shifts anything between the aﬃliate in
country A and the aﬃliate in country B, then that shifting will always move from B to A,
i.e. against the tax diﬀerential. This condition can be further rewritten as:
g(SˆBA)
SˆBA
<
⌧B   ⌧C
1  ⌧A
Combining equations (9.18) and (9.19), optimal shifting from B to A will satisfy the
condition:
g0(SˆBA) =
⌧B   ⌧C
1  ⌧A
This means that any cost function where g(SBA)SBA < g
0(SBA) will always result in shifting
against the tax diﬀerential. This would, for example, hold if g(SBA) takes the form  BA ⇤
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(SBA)n for any value of n > 1. If the incentives to shift against the tax diﬀerential do exist,
then this means that, compared to a scenario where the corporation is assumed to shift
in the direction of the tax diﬀerential, aﬃliate A’s home country will experience the same
amount of net shifting, but net shifting for the aﬃliates in countries B and C will change.
The aﬃliate in country B will see greater outflows and therefore lower reported profit, and
the aﬃliate in country C will experience greater inflows and so will have higher reported
profit than it did in the scenario where profit shifting always occurred in the direction of
the tax diﬀerential. In this case, shifting against the tax diﬀerential is partially induced by
aﬃliate A’s home country’s focus on net profit shifting, this is in contrast to the linear case,
where shifting against the tax diﬀerential was due to lax enforcement in aﬃliate A’s home
country.
As a less extreme case, consider what happens when the cost of shifting out of aﬃliate
B is instead assumed to depend on both gross shifting and net shifting. The cost of shifting
out of aﬃliate A is still assumed to depend only on net shifting. If the corporation shifts a
positive amount of profit from aﬃliate A to aﬃliate B then it faces the maximization:
max
SAB 0,SAC ,SBC
(1 ⌧A)(BA SA f(SA))+(1 ⌧B)(BB SB h(SBC) l(SB))+(1 ⌧C)(BC SC)
where:
SA = SAB + SAC
SB = SBC   SAB
SC =  SAC   SBC
If it instead shifts a positive amount from aﬃliate B to aﬃliate A then it faces the
maximization:
max
SBA 0,SAC ,SBC
(1  ⌧A)(BA   SA   f(SA)  g(SBA)) + (1  ⌧B)(BB   SB   h(SBC)  l(SB))
+(1  ⌧C)(BC   SC)
where:
SA = SAC   SBA
SB = SBC + SBA
SC =  SAC   SBC
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Positive profit shifting from aﬃliate A to aﬃliate B must satisfy:
(⌧A   ⌧B)  (1  ⌧A)f 0(SA) + (1  ⌧B)l0(SB) = 0
(⌧A   ⌧C)  (1  ⌧A)f 0(SA) = 0
(⌧B   ⌧C)  (1  ⌧B)l0(SB)  (1  ⌧B)h0(SBC) = 0
In this setup, although shifting from A to B now has an additional marginal benefit, in
that it decreases the cost of shifting out of B, it is still the case that the corporation will
optimally set shifting from A to B equal to zero. This is because shifting from B to C will be
set such that the tax diﬀerential between A and B plus the reduction in the cost of shifting
out of B will still be less than the tax diﬀerential between A and C. This means that the
optimal values of shifting given the first maximization must satisfy:
S⇤AB = 0 (9.21)
f 0(S⇤AC) =
⌧A   ⌧C
1  ⌧A (9.22)
l0(S⇤BC) + h
0(S⇤BC) =
⌧B   ⌧C
1  ⌧B (9.23)
If the corporation shifts a positive amount of profit from aﬃliate B to aﬃliate A then
that shifting must satisfy:
(⌧B   ⌧A) + (1  ⌧A)f 0(SA)  (1  ⌧B)l0(SB)  (1  ⌧A)g0(SBA) = 0
(⌧A   ⌧C)  (1  ⌧A)f 0(SA) = 0
(⌧B   ⌧C)  (1  ⌧B)l0(SB)  (1  ⌧B)h0(SBC) = 0
or
1  ⌧A
1  ⌧B f
0(SˆAC   SˆBA)  l0(SˆBA + SˆBC)  1  ⌧A
1  ⌧B g
0(SˆBA) =
⌧A   ⌧B
1  ⌧B (9.24)
f 0(SˆAC   SˆBA) = ⌧A   ⌧C
1  ⌧A (9.25)
l0(SˆBA + SˆBC) + h0(SˆBC) =
⌧B   ⌧C
1  ⌧B (9.26)
Because firm A’s home country is still assumed to only care about net shifting, it continues
to be the case that anything shifted from B to A will then be shifted on to aﬃliate C. This
can be seen by comparing equations (9.22) and (9.25). This means that SˆAC = S⇤AC + SˆBA.
Through substitution, it can be shown that, in the second scenario, the corporation will shift
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from B to A and from B to C until:
1  ⌧A
1  ⌧B g
0(SˆBA) = h0(SˆBC)
If the enforcement agency in country B targets enforcement at transactions with firm C, then
this is likely to make h0 large relative to f 0. This would result in the corporation shifting
a lot from B to A, because shifting through A would have a low marginal cost relative to
shifting directly to C.
In comparing how shifting from B to C will change when the corporation shifts a positive
amount from B to A, it must be the case that:
l0(S⇤BC) + h
0(S⇤BC) = l
0(SˆBA + SˆBC) + h0(SˆBC)
This means that the reduction in the amount shifted from B to C, or S⇤BC   SˆBC , is
SˆBA
l00
h00+l00 . Because enforcement in aﬃliate A’s home country allows for perfect pass through,
the corporation now shifts SˆBA from B to C via A. The perfect pass through occurs because
the cost of shifting out of aﬃliate A only depends on gross shifting. This perfect pass through
guarantees that, on net, more profit is now shifted from aﬃliate B to aﬃliate C. In a setting
where enforcement in A’s home country did not allow for perfect pass through, only some
fraction of the amount shifted from B to A would be passed on. In that setting, the total
amount shifted from B to C would increase by less, or could even actually decrease, with
shifting via A. The change in shifting from A to C would still be relatively large as long as
the cost of shifting out of A was very responsive to net shifting.
Overall, then, the total change in the amount shifted from B to C is (1  l00h00+l00 )SˆBA, or
h00
h00+l00 SˆBA. The benefit of shifting against the tax diﬀerential is that this amount now faces
a tax rate of ⌧C instead of ⌧B. The reduction in tax payments with shifting from B to A is:
(⌧B   ⌧C) h
00
h00 + l00
SˆBA (9.27)
The less responsive aﬃliate B’s home country is to net shifting, the smaller l00 should be, and
the larger the increase in total shifting from B to C will be. This makes it more likely that
shifting against the tax diﬀerential will be profit maximizing. The increase in cost between
the first scenario and the second is:
(1  ⌧B)
⇣
l(SˆBA + SˆBC)  l(S⇤BC) + h(SˆBC)  h(S⇤BC)
⌘
+ (1  ⌧A)g(SˆBA) (9.28)
There is no change in the cost of shifting from A to C because net shifting out of firm A
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remains the same. The corporation will shift against the tax diﬀerential if (9.27) is greater
than (9.28). It is again diﬃcult to evaluate this condition without imposing assumptions
on the forms of the cost functions, but it is possible to assess what characteristics of the
cost functions will make it more likely for shifting against the tax diﬀerential to be profit
maximizing.
If the cost of net shifting in aﬃliate B’s home country, l, increases slowly with net shifting,
then the cost of shifting from B to A will be relatively small. Intuitively, the less responsive
the cost of shifting in aﬃliate B’s home is to net shifting, the lower the cost of shifting
more profits out of B. This makes it less costly to shift from B to C via A. It was shown
earlier that S⇤BC > SˆBC . If the cost of gross shifting from B to C is increasing quickly in
the amount shifted, then this will also serve to make it more likely that shifting against the
tax diﬀerential is profit maximizing, as it makes shifting from B to C via A more attractive.
Finally, the smaller the direct cost of shifting from B to A, g(SBA), is, the more likely it is
that the corporation will shift profits against the tax diﬀerential.
Both scenarios discussed in this section provide similar intuition for when shifting against
the tax diﬀerential will be profit maximizing. If the cost of shifting out of the high-tax
country is very responsive to net shifting, the cost of shifting out of the middle-tax country
is relatively unresponsive to net shifting, and the cost of shifting from the middle-tax country
to the high-tax country is low relative to the cost of shifting from the middle-tax country
to the low-tax country, then the corporation will find that it is profit maximizing to move
profits from B to C via aﬃliate A.
10 Optimal Enforcement
One interesting result indicated by the examples above is that it is not necessary for the
high-tax country to have lax enforcement to create an incentive for shifting against the
tax diﬀerential. The incentive can also be created if a high-tax country simply focuses its
attention on deviations between reported profits and expected profits, a strategy that seems
to be in line with what many countries actually do in practice.22
The fact that the enforcement policy of a high-tax country can change the direction of
profit shifting flows may create an incentive for high-tax countries to choose enforcement
policies that facilitate shifting profits through that country. As long as there are benefits
that are associated with having profits flow through, then it might be optimal, for example,
for a high-tax country’s enforcement policy to consciously focus on just net profit shifting.
The role enforcement can play in determining profit shifting flows emphasizes the importance
22See the audit risks discussed in Ernst & Young (2006-2013).
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of thinking about enforcement, not as an exogenous factor, but instead as a policy decision.
This is discussed in papers such as Altshuler and Grubert (2005).
There are likely diﬀerences between the type of high-tax country that would see profits
flow through because of lax enforcement and the type of high-tax country that would see
profits flow through because of a focus on net profit shifting. Generally, high-tax countries
probably would not find it attractive to have lax profit shifting enforcement, as lax enforce-
ment would result in large profit shifting outflows and an associated decrease in tax revenue.
Having profits flow through might be an unexpected benefit of lax enforcement in a high-
tax country where the expertise and resources for better enforcement are unavailable, but,
given the necessary resources, most high-tax countries probably would not want to make the
choice to have lax enforcement overall. Having enforcement that is focused on net shifting,
however, should be attractive to most high-tax countries, as it is unlikely to change overall
shifting. A policy focused on net shifting would mean that these high-tax countries would
see profits flow through as long as middle-tax countries continued to focus their enforcement
eﬀorts towards transactions with lower-tax countries.
11 Models and Estimates of Profit Shifting
11.1 Modeling the cost of profit shifting
As mentioned in the introduction, the way that the cost of profit shifting had been modeled
in the literature meant that it was not possible to recognize the potential for gross profit
shifting against the tax diﬀerential. Past models have focused on either two-country models
or have focused on estimating optimal net shifting in an n-country setting. Neither of these
setups allows for the consideration of the direction or magnitude of aﬃliate-to-aﬃliate profit
shifting flows. Allowing for the possibility of a more general cost function is important
in order to better understand the incentives for profit shifting that exist. Not only does
a more general model capture the potential for shifting against the tax diﬀerential, but it
also allows for variation in the cost of shifting across aﬃliate pairs. Generally speaking,
as documented by surveys of transfer-pricing regulation by the Big Four accounting firms,
countries have been increasing their focus on transfer-pricing regulation as a way to prevent
profit shifting.23 Additionally, as discussed in Buettner, Overesch, Schreiber, and Wamser
(2006), thin capitalization rules to limit the strategic use of debt have also become more
common. Countries still greatly diﬀer, however, in both the level of eﬀort they put towards
preventing profit shifting and the actual ability they have to prevent profit shifting. This
23See, for example, Ernst & Young (2006-2013) or Deloitte (2006-2010).
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means that it is important to have a model that can account for variation in the cost of
profit shifting depending on the origin of the shifted profits.
The increases in enforcement discussed briefly above should clearly aﬀect the cost of profit
shifting. Generally speaking, however, enforcement has not been integrated into models of
profit shifting in order to understand how diﬀerences in enforcement aﬀect the incentives
for profit shifting. Two-country models, such as the one used in Haufler and Schjelderup
(2000), allow for the discussion of what would happen to the cost of shifting if a country
increased its enforcement, but, the two-country setting means that the eﬀect of enforcement
on other profit-shifting paths cannot be considered. These models, therefore, give the simple
prediction that, if a country increases its enforcement eﬀort, then that will decrease the
amount of profit that is shifted out of that country. Given that multinationals generally
have aﬃliates located across many countries, however, a two-country setting cannot give an
accurate picture of the incentives for profit shifting that exist between each pair of aﬃliates.
In Saunders-Scott (2013a), countries are allowed to diﬀer in their enforcement eﬀorts, but
the focus is on how local reported profits are aﬀected by a change in enforcement eﬀort,
rather than how diﬀerences in enforcement across countries aﬀect optimal flows.
A few papers have, in an empirical setting, considered the eﬀect of eﬀorts to prevent
profit shifting. Using a measure that captures variation in transfer-pricing rules, docu-
mentation requirements and penalties, Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) find evidence that
stricter enforcement in a firm’s home country is associated with lower responsiveness to tax
diﬀerentials. Lohse and Riedel (2012) takes a closer look at documentation requirements
and find similar results, transfer-pricing regulation lessens firms responsiveness to tax dif-
ferentials. Saunders-Scott (2013a) finds that increases in transfer-pricing enforcement have
actually decreased the reported profits of local aﬃliates of multinational corporations. Em-
pirical papers provide evidence that enforcement aﬀects the cost of profit shifting. What is
still unclear, however, is how the relationship between enforcement and the cost of shifting
should be modeled in a theoretical framework.
If looking at the amount that a corporation shifts from an aﬃliate in Italy to an aﬃliate in
Ireland, should the cost be determined by how much is shifted between those two aﬃliates,
or should the cost also depend on how much has been shifted into or out of the Italian
firm from other aﬃliates? Should only Italian eﬀorts to prevent profit shifting matter, or
should Irish eﬀorts to prevent profit shifting also play a role in determining the cost? This
paper takes the step of expanding the model of the cost of profit shifting to consider what
happens when the cost of profit shifting is allowed to depend on the amount shifted between
two aﬃliates and the total amount shifted out of the source aﬃliate. The cost is assumed
to depend on both the source and destination country, which allows enforcement to vary
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both by the source country and by where the profits are shifted, although no functional
form is imposed on the relationship between the cost and the enforcement eﬀorts of the two
countries. The relationship between the cost, net shifting, and gross shifting is also allowed to
vary by country, which is important because there does seem to be variation across countries
in terms of likely audit triggers. Some countries focus on unexpectedly low profits, while
others focus on corporations that have transactions with aﬃliates in tax havens. This paper
demonstrates that, in extreme cases, this variation across countries in the determinants of
the cost of profit shifting can create incentives for gross shifting that goes against the tax
diﬀerential. Even in less extreme cases, however, variation in enforcement levels and audit
triggers can change the magnitude of expected profit shifting flows by changing the costs of
and incentives for shifting. This means that tax diﬀerentials alone do not give an accurate
picture of the incentives a corporation faces to shift profits.
11.2 Does the Cost Function Aﬀect Empirical Estimates of Profit
Shifting?
This paper has demonstrated that the form and determinants of the cost function can aﬀect
the magnitude and even the direction of profit shifting flows. Papers that have empirically
estimated the extent of profit shifting flows, however, have generally ignored the role of
enforcement in determining the incentives for profit shifting and have assumed that gross
profit shifting flows always move in the direction of the tax diﬀerential. This section considers
how the assumptions made about the cost function and the direction of profit shifting flows
aﬀect these estimates of profit shifting.
In the early 1990s, economists began to focus on empirically estimating the extent of profit
shifting. Using aggregate BEA data on aﬃliates of U.S. multinational corporations, Grubert
and Mutti (1991) looked at reported profit and found empirical evidence that was consistent
with profit shifting in response to tax incentives.Hines and Rice (1994) was the first paper
to consider a model of optimal profit shifting. It models net profit shifting, assuming that
the cost of net shifting in a given country is quadratic in the net shifting into or out of that
country. They use this model to develop a predicted relationship between reported profits,
true profits, and the tax rate of the country in which an aﬃliate is located. Turning to the
data, they find evidence for the expected negative relationship between reported profit and a
country’s statutory corporate tax rate. While the interpretation of the estimate will depend
on the assumptions made about the cost function, the predicted sign of the relationship
between the tax rate and reported profits will not. This means that these studies that
focus on aggregate profits will not be hugely aﬀected by alternative specifications of the cost
58
function or by the potential for shifting against the tax diﬀerential.
A number of other papers, using a variety of techniques, have found evidence consistent
with profit shifting. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) focus on the incentives for profit shifting
between OECD countries. They use the fact that profit shifting will result in a reported value
added that is diﬀerent from real value added. This gives a predicted relationship between
nominal (reported) value added and corporate tax rates. Using aggregate industry-level
data on value added, they find evidence that suggests that significant profit shifting occurs
between aﬃliates in OECD countries. This relationship should again depend largely on
net shifting, so it is again the interpretation of the estimate, rather than the magnitude
of the estimate that will be aﬀected by the assumptions that are made about the cost of
profit shifting. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) use the model developed in Hines and Rice
(1994) to further solve through the model to determine if a given aﬃliate in a multinational
corporation would expect to see positive inflows of profit or negative outflows of positive.
This enables them to not only predict a negative relationship between the corporate tax rate
and reported profit at a country level, but, using firm-level data from ORBIS, to actually
generate a tax-diﬀerential term determining shifting incentives that is specific to an aﬃliate
in a given country that is a member of a specific multinational. This term, should, in reality,
depend on the enforcement eﬀorts of the countries in which the aﬃliates are located, and the
exclusion of these terms likely biases the estimate of the coeﬃcient on the tax diﬀerential
term. The exclusion of enforcement is also likely to aﬀect the estimates of tax revenue eﬀects
that are developed in the paper. Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) estimate profit shifting by
looking at how earnings shocks at a parent firm are passed along to higher-tax and lower-tax
aﬃliates. They do this by looking at how pretax profits change at the aﬃliate level. This
will again reflect net shifting, so the estimation strategy should be relatively unaﬀected by
the assumptions that are made about the cost function.
So far, all of the papers discussed have estimated profit shifting flows oﬀ of reported prof-
its (or value added) and so have focused on estimating net profit shifting flows. This limits
the importance of ignoring the potential for gross profit-shifting flows that move against the
tax diﬀerential, as this shifting against the diﬀerential has little eﬀect on the magnitude of
net profit shifting flows. Ignoring the possibility of gross profit shifting against the tax diﬀer-
ential, however, is especially important if considering papers, such as Clausing (2003), where
the estimation depends on comparing transactions with lower-tax aﬃliates to transactions
with higher-tax aﬃliates. If some shifting actually flows towards higher-tax aﬃliates, then
this approach would underestimate the true magnitude of profit shifting flows. Attempts to
find evidence for shifting against the tax diﬀerential in the data would likely need to use
similar data on intra-firm trade flows, as they are one of the only ways to get some sense for
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gross profit-shifting flows. If shifting against the tax diﬀerential occurs, then a transaction
between an aﬃliate in a high-tax country and an aﬃliate in medium-tax country should be
priced lower by a corporation that only has those two aﬃliates than it is by a corporation
that also has an aﬃliate in a low-tax country.
12 Conclusions
The literature that has focused on modeling and estimating the profit shifting behavior of
multinational corporations has generally only looked at optimal net profit shifting. This
means that little attention has been paid to optimal country-to-country, or gross, profit-
shifting flows. This paper shows that a corporation can have an incentive to shift profits
from a middle-tax aﬃliate to a higher-tax aﬃliate if this shifting enables shifting on to an
even lower-tax aﬃliate. This shifting against the tax diﬀerential is most likely to occur
when the high-tax aﬃliate is located in either a low-enforcement country or in a country
whose enforcement eﬀorts focus on deviations between expected profits and reported profits.
Shifting against the tax diﬀerential is also more likely if the low-tax aﬃliate is located in
a country that focuses its enforcement eﬀorts at lower-tax countries rather than higher-tax
countries.
While gross profit shifting against the tax diﬀerential will not aﬀect predictions about
the sign of net profit shifting, it is relevant from a policy perspective, as it may call into
question policies that focus on transactions with aﬃliates located in tax havens. It is diﬃcult
to capture if multinational corporations do in fact shift profits against the tax diﬀerential, as
gross profit shifting flows are rarely observed. Corporations clearly do, however, move profits
to the Netherlands in order to take advantage of beneficial tax regulations and tax treaties.
This makes it seems likely that, to facilitate shifting to a low-tax aﬃliate, corporations would
also be willing to move profits through high-tax countries that either have lax enforcement
or that have enforcement policies focused on net profit shifting.
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Chapter 3:
Does Information Exchange Aﬀect Profit Shifting?
13 Introduction
In recent years, there has been a move towards bilateral tax treaties and agreements that
focus on information exchange between the treaty parties. Specifically, there has been growth
in treaties and agreements that require a country to collect information at the request of
its treaty partner, even if the country does not need or want to collect the information
for its own tax purposes. These information exchange clauses can be contained in both
tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) and double taxation conventions (DTCs).
While TIEAs focus on the exchange of information, DTCs are generally intended to have
two goals: (1) to improve cooperation so that individuals and firms are less likely to face
double taxation and (2) to facilitate information exchange so as to limit tax avoidance and
evasion. Given that earlier agreements were often DTCs, and so focused more on the first
goal of eliminating double taxation, past studies of how bilateral tax treaties and agreements
aﬀect multinational corporations have focused on how these treaties and agreements aﬀect
investment, while giving less thought to how these agreements might aﬀect profit shifting.
Although there is a continued focus on information exchange as a way to limit tax evasion,
there has been little evidence provided to support the claim that information exchange
agreements can limit tax evasion and avoidance by multinational corporations. This paper
looks for evidence that the exchange of information has had an eﬀect on the profit-shifting
behavior of multinational corporations.
It might, at first glance, seem that the eﬀect of information exchange on profit shifting
should be straight forward. The exchange of information should increase the cost of moving
profits from an aﬃliate in a higher-tax country to an aﬃliate in a lower-tax country. This
increase in cost occurs because information exchange may force low-tax countries to collect
tax information which helps to prove that a multinational corporation has shifted profits to
an aﬃliate in that country; information the low-tax country would not collect without the
arrangement in place. What is not clear, of course, is if this information will actual be of very
high quality or very useful, since the lower-tax country has little incentive to detect profit
shifting. This is especially true given that many low-tax countries are motivated to sign
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information exchange agreements by a desire to avoid being placed on lists of uncooperative
tax havens. Even in a simple setting, then, considering a multinational with two aﬃliates,
one in a high-tax country and one in a low-tax country, it is not clear that information
exchange would necessarily result in the aﬃliate in the high-tax country reporting higher
profits and the aﬃliate in the lower-tax country reporting lower profits. It is entirely possible
that there would instead be no eﬀect on the reported profits of either aﬃliate.
If information exchange does aﬀect profit shifting, then the sign and magnitude of the
eﬀect should depend on the overall structure of the multinational. For a firm with only
higher-tax aﬃliates, the eﬀect of information exchange should be straight forward. As more
information exchange agreements are signed with the home countries of its higher-tax af-
filiates, the reported profits of the firm should decrease, as less profit can be shifted in.24
Things are more complicated, however, if we consider a firm with both higher and lower-tax
aﬃliates, or even a firm with multiple lower-tax aﬃliates.
For illustrative purposes, consider a multinational that has a high-tax aﬃliate located
in France and a low-tax aﬃliate located in the British Virgin Islands. When France signs
a tax information exchange agreement with the British Virgin Islands, this should reduce
profit shifting from France to the British Virgin Islands, as the cost of this shifting is now
higher with additional information being sent from the British Virgin Islands to France.
What is not clear, however, is if the multinational corporation will now simply shift less
out of the French aﬃliate, or if it will instead alter its profit shifting patterns and shift
from the aﬃliate in France to some other low-tax aﬃliate. In this scenario, it seems clear
that the aﬃliate in the British Virgin Islands should have lower reported profits after the
information exchange agreement goes into place. The eﬀect of information exchange on the
French aﬃliate, however, is ambiguous. If the eﬀect of information exchange is to change the
destination of shifted profits, then there should be little to no eﬀect on the reported profits
of the French aﬃliate. If, on the other hand, information exchange does simply decrease the
amount shifted from the French aﬃliate to the aﬃliate in the British Virgin Islands, without
aﬀecting the amount shifted to other aﬃliates, then the profits of the French aﬃliate should
increase after the information exchange agreement goes into eﬀect. There is an additional
level of ambiguity, as it might be that part of the value of holding or earning profits in
France was the prior lack of information exchange between France and the British Virgin
Islands. If that is the case, then there could also be a reduction in the profits earned by
or shifted to the French aﬃliate. Overall, this suggests that the response of a firm to a
new information exchange agreement going into force with the home country of a lower-tax
24Assuming that the scale of the operations of the low-tax aﬃliate are not increased in order to facilitate
shifting.
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aﬃliate will depend on both if that firm has multiple lower-tax aﬃliates that are not covered
by information exchange and also on if the firm has higher-tax aﬃliates.
This paper presents a theoretical framework that shows the patterns that would be ex-
pected across firms if information exchange does in fact cause a change in profit shifting
behavior. Data on the unconsolidated reported profits of aﬃliates of multinational corpo-
rations are then used to see if the changes in reported profits after information exchange
agreements go into force match these patterns. Overall, there is evidence that firms expe-
rience a decrease in reported profits after information exchange agreements go into force
with the home countries of higher-tax aﬃliates. Things are less clear when looking at the
response of a firm’s reported profits to a new information exchange agreement with lower-tax
aﬃliates. The eﬀect of increased information exchange with lower-tax aﬃliates on reported
profits is not statistically significant, but there is limited evidence that the response varies
with firm characteristics in a way that is consistent with information exchange having some
eﬀect on profit shifting. Together, these results suggest that information exchange may have
a limited eﬀect on the profit-shifting behavior of multinational corporations, but there is no
evidence that the increase in information sharing has resulted in a dramatic change in to-
tal profit-shifting outflows. While an information exchange agreement between a higher-tax
country and a lower-tax country may limit profit shifting to that lower-tax country, it is not
clear that it actually reduces the total amount of profit shifted out of the high-tax country.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains additional infor-
mation on bilateral tax treaties and information exchange agreements. Section 3 considers
the eﬀect of increased information exchange in a simple framework. Section 4 describes the
firm-level data and the data on information exchange arrangements that will be used to cap-
ture the eﬀect of information exchange on the reported profits of aﬃliates of multinational
corporations. Section 5 contains the empirical results. The conclusions that can be drawn
are discussed in Section 6.
14 Information Exchange
14.1 Background on Information Exchange
Starting in 1998, the OECD began to focus its attention on trying to find ways to limit
“harmful tax practices.” The push for increased tax information exchange has been a major
piece of this eﬀort. The expansion of information sharing is discussed in detail in Keen
and Ligthart (2006). In 2000, the OECD released the first draft of its Model Agreement on
Exchange of Information on Tax Matters. While there were, prior to that date, some bilateral
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information exchange treaties that contained provisions for the collection of information on
request, the number of bilateral tax treaties with provisions for the collection of information
on request has increased dramatically since 2000. In Germany, for example, the OECD
Exchange of Information portal shows that only two bilateral agreements prior to 2000 had
provisions for the collection of additional information on request. Since 2000, it has signed 45
agreements that contain such a provision. While some agreements contain both information
exchange provisions and double taxation agreements, agreements that are aimed solely at
information exchange have also grown in popularity. These information exchange agreements
are especially common with countries that have been identified as tax havens. This is in
part because tax havens have faced pressure to sign information exchange agreements in
order to avoid appearing on lists of uncooperative tax havens. In addition to these bilateral
agreements, there has also been some progress in implementing multilateral information
exchange arrangements. While some papers, such as Bacchetta and Espinosa (2000), have
considered the question of why countries would agree to information exchange, little work
has been done to understand the eﬀect that the information exchange component of tax
arrangements has had on the behavior of multinational corporations.
14.2 Eﬀect on FDI
There is a past literature that has focused on capturing the eﬀect of bilateral tax treaties
on foreign direct investment between the treaty partners, with the prior that tax treaties
decrease the uncertainty of tax treatment and should, therefore, facilitate investment. Early
papers, such as Blonigen and Davies (2004), found little evidence that bilateral tax treaties
had any eﬀect on aggregate FDI flows between the United States and treaty partners. They
took this finding to suggest that U.S. tax treaties might be focused more on limiting tax
evasion than on facilitating FDI. Davies, Norbäck, and Tekin-Koru (2009) used data on
Swedish multinationals to show that bilateral tax treaties seem to have an eﬀect on entry,
i.e. it becomes more likely that an aﬃliate will be formed or acquired, but that they do
not seem to aﬀect investment in existing foreign aﬃliates. The reduction in tax position
uncertainty is the main mechanism through which bilateral tax treaties should encourage
investment. Certain characteristics of firms should determine the extent to which they are
exposed to tax uncertainty. Blonigen, Oldenski, and Sly (2013), use firm-level BEA data
to attempt to exploit the fact that firms vary in the degree to which they face tax position
uncertainty. Presumably, those firms that face the most tax uncertainty should benefit the
most from the reduction in uncertainty that comes with a bilateral tax treaty. They find
evidence that bilateral tax treaties signed by the United States do in fact increase foreign
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aﬃliate sales for firms in sectors that trade diﬀerentiated inputs that are diﬃcult to price, i.e.
firms for which the increased tax certainty would be most valuable. Presumably, these firms
would be the same firms that would be most able to shift profits, which raises the possibility
that the increase in sales could also be a means through which to facilitate continued profit
shifting. It is something of an open question, therefore, if this additional investment would
actually be expected to increase the profits of the domestic firm in the United States. All
of the papers discussed above consider a mix of some bilateral tax agreements that contain
information exchange provisions and some that do not. This paper is the first to attempt to
isolate the eﬀect of information exchange by focusing solely on treaties with provisions for
the exchange of information.
15 Theoretical Framework
There are number of ways in which the exchange of information could aﬀect the behavior
of a multinational corporation. Information exchange has the potential to aﬀect both how
the multinational shifts profits and its real investment. As discussed above, past studies
of bilateral tax treaties and agreements have focused on how these treaties and agreements
aﬀect investment. The existence of multiple margins for response means that the overall eﬀect
of information exchange agreements is likely to be ambiguous in a theoretical framework.
Additionally, it means that it may be diﬃcult to separate potential changes in investment
from changes in profit shifting. This section presents a simple framework for thinking about
the response of the reported profits of an aﬃliate of a multinational corporation to newly
signed information exchange agreements. In a simple setting, the framework looks at how
characteristics such as industry and the distribution of the other aﬃliates in the multinational
corporation would aﬀect reported profits if the response is being driven by profit shifting. It
is likely that the response of reported profits to these tax treaties and agreements is being
driven by both changes in investment and changes in profit shifting, but the theoretical
framework will provide a way of understanding what patterns would be expected if changes
in profit shifting are contributing to the overall response.
When the reported profits of an aﬃliate of a multinational corporation are observed, it
is the combination of the actual profits earned by the aﬃliate and any profit shifting that
has taken place. Reported profits, then, can be thought of as:
Reported Profits = Earned Profits Outflows+ Inflows  Cost of Shifting
To understand the eﬀect of the exchange of information on the reported profits of firm
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i, it is necessary to think about how the exchange of information is likely to aﬀect each
piece. The response of a firm is considered in two diﬀerent scenarios: (1) if the information
exchange arrangement is signed between the firm’s home country and the home country of
a higher-tax aﬃliate and (2) if the information exchange arrangement is signed between the
firm’s home country and the home country of a lower-tax aﬃliate. It is possible that firm i
has only higher-tax aﬃliates, both higher and lower-tax aﬃliates, or only lower-tax aﬃliates,
the response is again considered for each possible situation.
15.1 Information Exchange Agreement with Higher-Tax Country
If firm i0s home country signs an information exchange agreement with the home country of
one of its higher-tax aﬃliates, then this can aﬀect the reported profits of firm i in a number of
ways. On the profit shifting front, if the information exchange agreement serves to increase
the cost of profit shifting, then this new agreement should decrease the amount of profit that
flows into the firm. This means that inflows should be reduced and the reported profits of
firm i will decrease. The cost of shifting could either increase or decrease, depending on if
the increase in the cost is oﬀset by the reduction in the amount shifted. The corporation will
have an incentive to deduct this cost in the higher-tax country, however, so this should have
little eﬀect on the reported profits of firm i. Given that information exchange agreements
often also provide for greater tax certainty, it is possible that a new information exchange
agreement will facilitate investment in firm i. This would cause an increase in the earned
profits of firm i and, therefore, an increase in the reported profits of firm i. Tax certainty
may not be the only incentive for increased investment. It is also possible that the higher-tax
aﬃliate would have an incentive to invest in firm i in order to facilitate profit shifting, as
the information exchange agreement could mean that greater eﬀort now needs to be made
to disguise the shifting. Overall then, an information exchange agreement with the home
country of a higher-tax aﬃliate should reduce firm i’s reported profits if the eﬀect on profit
shifting is large. The information exchange agreement should increase firm i’s reported
profits if the eﬀect of investment and, therefore, earned profits is large.
On the empirical side, a negative relationship between the share of higher-tax aﬃliates
that are covered by information exchange and reported profits would suggest that information
exchange has the eﬀect of limiting profit shifting. This negative relationship should hold
regardless of if a firm has only higher-tax aﬃliates or both higher and lower-tax aﬃliates. In
either case, the increase in information exchange coverage should limit profit shifting inflows
to that firm. In reality, however, given that there are likely to be simultaneous changes to
the coverage of higher-tax aﬃliates and the coverage of lower-tax aﬃliates, this eﬀect is likely
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to be most obvious for firms that have only higher-tax aﬃliates.
For increased information exchange to limit profit shifting, there needs to initially be
profit shifting between firm i and the higher-tax aﬃliate. This should create variation in
response by industry, as the industry of the firm and its aﬃliate partially determine the
likelihood and ease of profit shifting. Firms in industries where profit shifting is more diﬃcult
should be less likely to see a reduction in reported profits when information exchange coverage
increases and firms in industries where profit shifting is easier should be more likely to see
a reduction in profits. In reality, however, characteristics that determine the ease of profit
shifting are also likely to be correlated with the change in tax certainty. This means that
firms in industries where inputs are diﬃcult to price would be the most likely to see a large
negative response to information exchange through the reduction in inflows if they currently
use transfer-pricing uncertainty in order to shift profits. If they are not currently taking
advantage of the transfer-pricing uncertainty, however, they might also be the most likely to
exhibit a positive response to information exchange, as the reduction in uncertainty could
serve to facilitate investment.
15.2 Information Exchange Agreement with Lower-Tax Country
If firm i’s home country signs an information exchange agreement with the home country of
one of its lower-tax aﬃliates, then this could also have a number of diﬀerent eﬀects on firm
i’s reported profits. Assuming that profit shifting occurs between firm i and that lower-tax
aﬃliate, the information exchange agreement is likely to decrease the amount of profit that
firm i shifts to that specific aﬃliate. What is unclear, however, is if this will results in a
significant decrease in firm i’s total profit shifting.
If the profits are now kept in firm i’s home country, then there should be an increase
in firm i’s reported profits when this information exchange agreement is signed. The size
of the increase, however, is likely to depend on how the cost of shifting changes when the
information exchange agreement goes into force. Alternatively, it is possible that profits
will now instead be shifted from firm i to some other low-tax aﬃliate. In this case, the
information exchange agreement should have little eﬀect on firm i’s reported profits. Given
that this new route for profit shifting was not the one originally chosen, it is likely that, if
the profit shifting is redirected, then the cost of the shifting will be higher. This means that
firm i’s reported profits could even potentially decrease in response to the new information
exchange agreement.
The above discussion suggests that there should be a diﬀerence between how a firm
with multiple lower-tax aﬃliates and a firm with a single lower-tax aﬃliate responds to the
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implementation of an information exchange agreement with the home country of a lower-tax
aﬃliate. A firm with a single lower-tax aﬃliate should be more likely to increase its reported
profits in response to a new information exchange agreement with the home country of its
lower-tax aﬃliate than a firm that has other lower-tax aﬃliates that are not covered by
information exchange agreements. This is because the second firm has the opportunity to
redirect its shifting.
It is also possible that firm i’s earned profits and profit shifting inflows will change when
i’s home country signs an information exchange agreement with the home country of a lower-
tax aﬃliate. This could occur if, for example, part of the value of earning or declaring profits
in aﬃliate i was the lack of information exchange with, and therefore ability to shift profit to,
the lower-tax country. If this is the case, then, for firms that also have higher-tax aﬃliates,
there is an additional negative eﬀect of an increase in information exchange with lower-tax
aﬃliates.
In summary, the eﬀect of a new information exchange agreement with the home country of
a lower-tax aﬃliate on firm i’s reported profits is ambiguous. It should be the case, however,
that if the agreement is aﬀecting profit shifting, then the structure of the multinational of
which firm i is an aﬃliate should influence the response of firm i’s reported profits. If firm
i has no higher-tax aﬃliates and only a single lower-tax aﬃliate, then a new information
exchange agreement with the home country of that lower-tax aﬃliate should increase firm i’s
reported profits. The increase could, however, be small depending on the relative magnitudes
of the reduction in outflows and the increase in the cost of shifting. If, instead, firm i does has
have other lower-tax aﬃliates available that still are not covered by information exchange,
then the response should be less positive, as profit shifting outflows can be redirected to
a diﬀerent low-tax aﬃliate. Similarly, if firm i does in fact have higher-tax aﬃliates, then
this would also be expected to make the response less positive, as the information exchange
agreement may discourage shifting in.
16 Data
There are total of 34 countries for which both firm-level data and information on bilateral
tax treaties and agreements can be obtained. The availability of the firm-level data limits
the period the sample period to 2003-2012. The panel data on firm-level variables such
as reported profits, assets, and employment will allow for a firm fixed-eﬀects estimation
strategy, where changes in fixed tangible assets and the cost of employees will be used to
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proxy for changes in earned profits.25 The firm-level data also includes information on the
distribution of a firm’s aﬃliates. This means it is possible to determine if a firm has been
aﬀected by a new information exchange arrangement in a given year. This allows for the
estimation of both a country-by-year fixed eﬀect, which will capture country-level changes
that aﬀect all firms, and the eﬀect of new information exchange arrangements.
16.1 Firm-Level Data
The Bureau van Dijk ORBIS database is used to obtain information on a sample of multi-
national corporations. ORBIS is a firm-level dataset that collects information from national
and local accounts. It currently contains financial information on over 93 million active
corporations. Given that the theoretical framework suggests that the structure of the corpo-
ration will aﬀect how a firm responds to exchange of information arrangements, the sample
is limited to the subset of almost 3 million corporations that have information available on
ownership links. The response to the recent increase in exchange of information arrange-
ments is likely to be driven by both changes in investment patterns and changes in profit
shifting. To see how these factors aﬀect the corporation, it is necessary to further limit the
sample to firms for which unconsolidated reports available. This means that information
on assets, labor and reported profit can be obtained for individual aﬃliates rather than for
the entire corporate group. The dependent variable of interest in most specifications will be
the log of a firm’s profits before interest and taxes, which should capture the distribution of
profits across aﬃliates after any profit shifting has occurred. A firm is only included in years
where its earnings before interest and taxes, tangible assets, and cost of employees are all
available and positive. Information is also collected on the firm’s industry, which will allow
for the inclusion of industry-by-year fixed eﬀects in the empirical section.
To isolate firms that have the ability to invest in, or shift profits to, an aﬃliate, the sample
is limited to only include firms which own at least 50% of at least one foreign subsidiary.26
The response of an individual firm’s reported profits to an increase in information exchange
will depend on the ownership structure of its corporate group. Given the complex structure
of many multinationals, it can be diﬃcult to define ownership links. Although any cutoﬀ
used will be somewhat arbitrary, any foreign subsidiaries and foreign shareholders of the firm
where there is an ownership link of at least 50% will be considered to be part of that firm’s
corporate group.
25This assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function in capital and labor. This method is used to proxy
for true profits in Hines and Rice (1994) and other papers in the profit-shifting literature.
26Where the foreign subsidiary must be within 10 tiers of the firm, i.e. the sample would still include a
firm if it owns 100% of a domestic firm and that domestic firm then owns more than 50% of a foreign firm.
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The geographic distribution of the firms in the sample is detailed in Table 16.1. The
firms are located across 34 countries. While the coverage of firms in ORBIS has expanded
in recent years, the focus on European firms is still evident from the large share of firms in
the sample that are located in Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and Sweden.
On average, firms in the sample have 2.75 aﬃliates.27 The average number of lower-tax
aﬃliates is 1.63 and the average number of higher-tax aﬃliates is 0.98. The median firm
has a single aﬃliate. The information available from ORBIS on a firm’s subsidiaries and
shareholders is static. This means that there is only information on when the existence
of an aﬃliate was confirmed, but not information on when that aﬃliate first became a
subsidiary or shareholder of the firm. The empirical section will assume that the distribution
of subsidiaries and shareholders recorded in ORBIS holds for all years the firm appears in
the sample between 2003 and 2012. This is potentially problematic if information exchange
induces the creation or acquisition of a subsidiary in that country. Unfortunately, with the
static data on ownership that is available, it is not possible to account for this margin.
16.2 Growth of Information Exchange Agreements
Data on information exchange agreements and tax treaties that have provisions for the ex-
change of information is obtained from the Exchange of Information Portal of the OECD
Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information. This database contains infor-
mation on both the date double tax conventions and tax information exchange agreements
were signed and the date that these treaties and agreements actually entered into force. It
additionally records if the agreement meets OECD standards and if it contains paragraphs
that require the provision of information that has not otherwise been collected by a country’s
tax agency. Given that the focus of this paper is the eﬀect of information exchange on profit
shifting, only agreements that have these requirements for the provision of additional infor-
mation are included. Generally speaking, all tax information exchange agreements (TIEA)
contain these requirements, but these requirements are only included in a subset of double
tax conventions.28
Of the 34 countries captured in the sample, Table 16.2 shows that there is a great deal
of variation in terms of both the number of arrangements that meet this requirement and
the change in the number of these arrangements over the sample period.
The goal of this paper is to estimate the eﬀect of information exchange on reported profits
27Aﬃliate refers to any firm that is a subsidiary which is at least 50% owned by the firm or is a shareholder
that holds 50% ownership in the firm.
28In the sample used, the only exception is Norway, which has some TIEAs that do not contain these
provisions. For Norway, only TIEAs which require the provision for the collection of additional information
are included.
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Table 16.1: Location of Firm (% of Sample)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Argentina - - - - - 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Austria 0.11 1.35 1.60 2.81 3.07 2.78 2.56 2.43 2.86 1.60
Belgium 11.10 10.53 9.99 9.13 8.93 8.24 8.23 8.28 8.75 11.29
Brazil - - - - - - 0.00 0.00 - -
Colombia - - - - - - 0.00 - 0.01 0.02
Czech Republic 2.13 2.22 2.17 2.08 2.15 2.03 2.02 1.99 1.78 1.24
Denmark - - - - 0.09 6.33 6.59 6.42 6.97 12.38
Estonia 0.51 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.51 0.50
Finland 3.84 3.67 3.50 3.42 3.69 3.53 3.35 3.46 3.45 5.44
France 16.66 16.27 15.46 15.08 15.00 13.81 12.97 13.14 12.17 13.02
Germany 5.13 5.91 9.28 10.43 10.22 9.73 9.88 10.00 9.32 4.53
Hungary 0.46 0.61 0.59 0.53 0.55 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.44 0.59
Iceland 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.01
India 0.01 0.01 0.01 - - 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.20 0.01
Ireland - - 0.05 0.37 0.61 0.55 0.52 0.57 0.63 0.29
Italy 18.66 20.27 18.82 18.65 18.51 17.23 16.12 16.36 15.66 16.57
Japan 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.28 0.22 0.25 0.30 0.39 0.35
Liechtenstein - - - - - - - 0.01 0.01 -
Luxembourg 0.28 0.33 0.43 0.57 0.57 0.50 0.78 0.75 0.66 0.26
Malta - - - 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
Netherlands 1.06 1.11 1.09 1.07 1.26 1.14 1.21 1.27 1.59 0.87
New Zealand - - 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
Norway 4.80 4.78 4.82 4.76 4.84 4.72 5.07 4.81 4.75 5.82
Poland 0.51 0.55 0.58 0.56 0.62 0.63 0.71 0.62 0.75 0.18
Portugal 1.56 1.48 1.60 1.50 1.49 1.32 1.42 1.37 1.36 2.16
Slovakia 0.53 0.71 0.94 0.91 0.92 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.67 0.53
Slovenia 0.66 0.60 0.57 0.58 0.60 0.57 0.53 0.56 0.51 0.02
South Korea 0.53 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.52
Spain 19.24 18.06 16.70 15.90 14.83 13.55 13.94 13.73 12.57 5.99
Sweden 7.75 6.09 6.66 6.65 6.92 7.24 7.38 7.31 8.78 11.68
Switzerland 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
Turkey - - - - - - - - 0.00 0.01
United Kingdom 4.31 4.20 3.94 3.85 4.03 3.81 4.33 4.40 4.72 4.04
Uruguay - - - - - - 0.00 0.00 - -
Total # of Firms 16,181 17,799 19,465 21,395 22,317 23,487 22,246 24,079 25,441 13,275
Note: A “-” indicates that there are no firms in that country that had recorded positive profits, tangible
fixed assets and cost of employees in that year.
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Table 16.2: Number of Exchange of Information Arrangements in Force
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Argentina 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 6 12
Austria 14 14 16 17 18 19 19 23 26 30
Belgium 7 7 7 7 9 10 10 10 10 10
Brazil 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3
Colombia 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2
Czech Republic 5 5 7 7 8 9 10 10 11 21
Denmark 6 6 6 6 6 8 13 19 36 48
Estonia 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 4 5 7
Finland 7 7 7 7 10 14 17 25 41 49
France 15 15 15 15 17 17 19 33 44 48
Germany 6 6 6 7 7 8 10 17 31 39
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 9
Iceland 2 2 2 2 2 5 7 8 15 33
India 8 8 8 8 8 8 10 12 21 30
Ireland 4 4 4 4 4 6 8 20 30 38
Italy 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Japan 4 4 4 5 6 7 9 10 15 16
Liechtenstein 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 14 26
Luxembourg 20 20 21 22 23 23 24 29 31 31
Malta 6 6 7 8 8 9 10 14 15 23
Netherlands 10 10 10 11 12 14 18 25 41 47
New Zealand 1 1 1 2 3 6 7 12 17 18
Norway 10 10 11 11 12 13 17 23 40 50
Poland 6 6 6 8 9 9 9 9 12 15
Portugal 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 11 17
Slovakia 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3
Slovenia 2 2 2 3 3 4 5 7 9 13
South Korea 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 7
Spain 2 2 2 4 5 6 11 17 27 31
Sweden 6 6 6 7 7 8 12 18 26 30
Switzerland 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 24 28 32
Turkey 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 3 6 10
United Kingdom 16 16 16 18 20 24 29 36 48 55
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 10
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using within country variation in the set of firms that are impacted by a given information
exchange agreement. Table 16.3 details, by country, the percentage of firms in the sample
that are impacted by a new information exchange agreement in each year.
17 Results
The availability of the annual unconsolidated financial reports of the firms in the sample
for the period between 2003 and 2012 means that it is possible to use a firm fixed eﬀects
specification to estimate the eﬀect of the increase in information exchange agreements. The
eﬀect of information exchange is identified by variation across firms within a country, since
the eﬀect of a given information exchange agreement on a firm depends on if that firm has
an aﬃliate in the country that is newly covered by information exchange. An information
exchange agreement between France and the British Virgin Islands, for example, will only
aﬀect French firms that actually have a foreign aﬃliate in the British Virgin Islands. The
existence of firms that are not aﬀected by a new information exchange agreement in a given
year, means that it is possible to use these firms to control for country-specific conditions
and policy changes.
Countries often sign multiple agreements that have provisions for information exchange
in a given year, so the main variable used to capture the variation over time in informa-
tion exchange coverage is the share of a firm’s aﬃliates that are covered by an information
exchange agreement in a given year. Given that the response to an information exchange
agreement with a higher-tax aﬃliate is expected to be quite diﬀerent from the response to an
information exchange agreement with a lower-tax aﬃliate, this share is calculated separately
for the set of a firm’s higher-tax aﬃliates and the set of a firm’s lower-tax aﬃliates.
Table 17.1 regresses a firm’s unconsolidated reported profits on these shares, while con-
trolling for changes in a firm’s fixed tangible assets and cost of employees to proxy for changes
in true profits. All columns include both country-by-year and industry-by-year fixed eﬀects
to allow for industry and country specific changes in conditions and policies. The results in
Column (1) indicate a negative relationship between the share of higher-tax aﬃliates covered
by information exchange and the reported profits of the firm. This is consistent with the
intuition that this should reduce profit shifting inflows, but the coeﬃcient is not statistically
significant. Column (2) indicates that the eﬀect of the share of lower-tax aﬃliates covered by
information exchange agreements on reported profits is near zero. Given that this eﬀect was
expected to depend on the structure of the firm’s multinational group, this weak relation-
ship is not surprising. Column (3) includes both the share of higher-tax aﬃliates covered by
information exchange and the share of lower-tax aﬃliates covered by information exchange
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Table 16.3: Percentage of firms that face new Information Exchange Arrangement
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Argentina - - - - 0 0 0 66.67 0
Austria 0 0.32 17.77 31.20 1.23 0 6.67 4.57 1.89
Belgium 0 0 0 12.59 2.53 0 0 0 0
Brazil - - - - - 0 0 - -
Colombia - - - - - 0 - 0 0
Czech Republic 0 1.65 0 7.10 0 0 0 0 21.95
Denmark - - - - 2.36 1.16 0.65 0.73 9.43
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.49
Finland 0 0 0 1.58 0.24 0 6.25 7.67 1.11
France 0 0 0 8.97 0 20.49 0.64 4.28 0.12
Germany 0 0 0.81 0 0.13 0.18 0.96 21.76 14.45
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10.78 0
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
India 0 0 - - 0 0 0 0 0
Ireland - 0 0 0 0 0 2.17 1.46 20.51
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan 0 0 25.00 9.68 1.92 0 0 16.07 0
Liechtenstein - - - - - - 0 0 -
Luxembourg 0 2.38 0 22.83 0 1.16 0 0 0
Malta - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0.37 0 1.96 12.79 0
New Zealand - 0 0 33.33 0 0 33.33 14.29 0
Norway 0 1.49 0 1.85 0 0.09 0.43 8.68 0.65
Poland 0 0 2.52 15.94 0 0 0 1.31 20.83
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.64 2.44
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia 0 0 17.95 0 4.48 0 0 0 0
South Korea 0 0 1.56 0 0 0 0 0 0
Spain 0 0 0.71 0.64 4.50 1.03 0.39 3.58 11.95
Sweden 0 0 8.76 0 0 0.18 0.40 0.06 0
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Turkey - - - - - - - 0 0
United Kingdom 0 0 1.96 7.23 1.12 17.76 2.74 25.41 0
Uruguay - - - - - 0 0 - -
Total (all countries) 0 0.12 1.57 4.37 1.10 3.69 0.87 5.46 3.11
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Table 17.1: Response to information exchange with higher-tax and lower-tax aﬃliates
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log EBIT log EBIT log EBIT
Share IE high -0.0490 -0.0414
(0.0318) (0.0438)
Share IE low 0.00649 0.00741
(0.0248) (0.0414)
Log Assets 0.0868*** 0.0903*** 0.0838***
(0.00802) (0.00603) (0.0113)
Log Labor 0.442*** 0.435*** 0.495***
(0.0147) (0.0113) (0.0236)
Observations 94,803 147,802 45,164
Within R-squared 0.120 0.115 0.135
Number of Firms 22,368 29,472 10,731
Country-by-Year F.E. Y Y Y
Industry-by-Year F.E. Y Y Y
Notes: Firm fixed-eﬀects regressions. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable in all columns is the log of reported profits before
interest and taxes. ShareIEhigh=share of higher-tax aﬃliates covered by information exchange agreements.
ShareIElow=share of lower-tax aﬃliates covered by information exchange agreements. Log Assets=log(fixed
tangible assets). Log Labor=log(employee compensation). Column 1 contains all firms that have at least
one higher-tax aﬃliate. Column 2 contains all firms that have at least one lower-tax aﬃliate. Column 3
contains all firms that have at least one higher-tax aﬃliate and one lower-tax aﬃliate.
as regressors. This has the advantage of controlling for the fact that changes in Share IE
high and Share IE low are likely to correlated, as a country may have specific years that it
is especially active in terms of signing information exchange agreements. This specification
limits the sample to only firms that have both higher-tax aﬃliates and lower-tax aﬃliates,
but the results found are very similar to those in Columns (1) and (2).
These results suggest that information exchange agreements with higher-tax aﬃliates
limit profit-shifting inflows, but they are not conclusive. In order to further isolate the
eﬀect of an increase in the share of higher-tax aﬃliates, without limiting the sample to firms
with both higher and lower-tax aﬃliates, Tables 17.2 and 17.3 isolate firms that are only
aﬀected by new information exchange agreements with higher-tax aﬃliates over the sample
period. Table 17.2 does this by only including firms with higher-tax aﬃliates, while Table
17.3 additionally includes firms that have lower-tax aﬃliates, as long as they do not have a
new information exchange agreement come into force between 2003 and 2012 with the home
countries of these lower-tax aﬃliates. Column (1) of both tables provides further support
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for a negative relationship between the share of higher-tax aﬃliates covered by information
exchange and the firm’s reported profits. The coeﬃcient is still insignificant for the smaller
sample used in Table 17.2, but becomes statistically significant with the extended sample
used in Table 17.3. This result provides at least some evidence that increased information
exchange coverage could be limiting profit shifting.
The second column of both tables looks at what happens if an indicator variable for a
change in the coverage is used, instead of estimating the eﬀect of information exchange oﬀ
of the share of aﬃliates covered. The variable ChangeIEhigh will treat an observation where
a firm goes from 7 of its 10 higher-tax aﬃliates being covered to 8 of its 10 aﬃliates being
covered the same as a firm that goes from 0 of its 1 higher-tax aﬃliates being covered to 1
of its 1 aﬃliates being covered. This could be helpful if the eﬀect of going from .7 to .8 is
actually very similar to the eﬀect of going from 0 to 1, as estimating oﬀ of the share would
bias the coeﬃcient towards zero. The coeﬃcient on this regressor is positive in both Tables
17.2 and 17.3, although it is insignificant in Table 17.3, and only weakly significant in Table
17.2. While initially surprising, this coeﬃcient is being estimated solely oﬀ of how reported
profits change in the year in which the information exchange agreement goes into force, not
the years that follow, when the firm has had additional time to adjust. If the reported profits
drop in the years that follow the information exchange agreement, then the reported profits
in the year it goes into force will in fact appear to have deviated above the average level.
When included, lagged values of this indicator do in fact appear with a negative coeﬃcient,
which provides support for this interpretation.
Thus far, all specifications have only considered firms with positive reported profits. If
information exchange agreements prevent profit-shifting inflows, however, firms with negative
profits should be no diﬀerent than those with positive profits. When information exchange
goes into force, less profit can be shifted to these firms, and thus profits will be even more
negative. Column (3) of both tables considers firms with sustained losses by using the
dependent variable of the log of negative profits. This variable will only exist for firms with
profits below zero. If information exchange prevents shifting in, then an increase in the
share of higher-tax aﬃliates covered by information exchange should make profits even more
negative, and thus should increase the value of the log of negative profits. The limited number
of firms that have multiple years with negative profits over the period limits the power of
this specification, the coeﬃcient in Table 17.2 is of the expected sign, but is insignificant,
while the coeﬃcient in Table 17.3 is negative and insignificant.
By construction, the largest changes in ShareIEhigh will occur for the firms that have the
fewest higher-tax aﬃliates. This could bias the estimates if the number of higher-tax aﬃliates
also influences how reported profits respond to changes in ShareIEhigh. Consider what would
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happen in the following scenario. Suppose that firms with one higher-tax aﬃliate are unlikely
to see a large change in reported profits when information sharing goes into eﬀect because
little profit shifting is occurring between the higher-tax aﬃliate and the firm. Suppose that
firms with many higher-tax aﬃliates are also unlikely to see a large change in reported
profits when information sharing goes into eﬀect because the shifting can be directed to
the firm through some other aﬃliate. In this case, then, it would be the firms with a few
higher-tax aﬃliates, and thus firms that experience moderate changes in ShareIEhigh, that
would experience the largest decrease in reported profits. This would results in a non-linear
relationship between the share of higher-tax aﬃliates covered by information exchange and
reported profits. Table 17.4 tests for this kind of non-linear relationship by interacting the
share of higher-tax aﬃliates covered with the number of higher-tax aﬃliates that a firm
has. The results suggest that the number of higher-tax aﬃliates does in fact seem to be
correlated with the response of reported profits to an increase in the share of higher-tax
aﬃliates covered by information exchange. Allowing for the interaction of the number of
higher-tax aﬃliates and ShareIEhigh results in a negative, statistically significant coeﬃcient
on ShareIEhigh, both for the sample of firms with no lower-tax aﬃliates, and for the sample
of firms with lower-tax aﬃliates that do not face new IE agreements with those lower-tax
aﬃliates between 2003 and 2012. The variable, CountHi, which measures the number of
higher-tax aﬃliates, has a statistically insignificant eﬀect on reported profits. In the fixed
eﬀects framework, the eﬀect is being estimated oﬀ of changes in the number of higher-tax
aﬃliates that a firm has. As discussed earlier, archival data on ownership structure is not
available, so changes in the number of higher-tax aﬃliates will only occur when a firm’s home
country, or the home country of an aﬃliate, changes its corporate tax rate.
Overall then, the results suggest that information exchange limits profit-shifting inflows.
If information exchange is aﬀecting profit shifting inflows, then it should, presumably, also
aﬀect profit shifting outflows. As discussed in Section 3.2, however, things become more
complicated when considering the expected eﬀect of increased information exchange with
lower-tax aﬃliates. While outflows may change, the response of reported profits to the
increase in coverage will depend on if there is a reduction in total outflows or simply a
reallocation of where the profits go. This means that the response of reported profits to an
increase in information exchange with lower-tax aﬃliates is likely to depend on how many
other lower-tax aﬃliates the firm has, how many of those other lower-tax aﬃliates are covered
by information exchange, and even if the firm also has higher-tax aﬃliates. Tables 17.5 and
17.6 explore these diﬀerent dimensions of variation.
Column (1) of Table 17.5 simply replicates Column (2) of Table 17.1. Using the full
sample of firms that have lower-tax aﬃliates, increased information exchange with lower-tax
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Table 17.2: Response to IE with Higher-Tax Aﬃliates: Firms with no lower-tax aﬃliates
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log EBIT log EBIT log (-EBIT)
ShareIEhigh -0.0591 0.0553
(0.0625) (0.140)
ChangeIEhigh 0.0960**
(0.0461)
Log Assets 0.0860*** 0.0837*** 0.0564***
(0.0118) (0.0132) (0.0155)
Log Labor 0.386*** 0.392*** 0.399***
(0.0187) (0.0199) (0.0202)
Observations 49,639 42,568 18,617
Within R-squared 0.112 0.100 0.142
Number of Firms 13,639 12,558 7,923
Country-by-Year F.E. Y Y Y
Industry-by-Year F.E. Y Y Y
Notes: Firm fixed-eﬀects regressions. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. These results include all firms that do not have any lower-tax aﬃliates. The
dependent variable in the first two columns is the log of reported profits before interest and taxes. Col-
umn three considers firms with losses, so the dependent variable is the log of negative reported profits
before interest and taxes. ShareIEhigh=share of higher-tax aﬃliates covered by information exchange agree-
ments. ChangeIEhigh=indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a newly signed information exchange
agreement with the home country of a higher-tax aﬃliate. Log Assets=log(fixed tangible assets). Log
Labor=log(employee compensation).
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Table 17.3: Response to IE with High-Tax Aﬃliates: Firms with no new low-tax IE
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log EBIT log EBIT log (-EBIT)
Share IE high -0.0962** -0.105
(0.0463) (0.108)
Change IE high 0.0313
(0.0304)
Log Assets 0.0858*** 0.0753*** 0.0598***
(0.00905) (0.0102) (0.0125)
Log Labor 0.418*** 0.425*** 0.402***
(0.0165) (0.0180) (0.0161)
Observations 74,965 63,709 28,196
Within R-squared 0.115 0.097 0.133
Number of Firms 18,374 16,683 11,203
Country-by-Year F.E. Y Y Y
Industry-by-Year F.E. Y Y Y
Notes: Firm fixed-eﬀects regressions. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. These results include all firms that either do not have any lower-tax aﬃliates or
that do not have a new information exchange agreement come into force with a lower-tax aﬃliates between
2003 and 2012. The dependent variable in the first two columns is the log of reported profits before interest
and taxes. Column three considers firms with losses, so the dependent variable is the log of negative
reported profits before interest and taxes. ShareIEhigh=share of higher-tax aﬃliates covered by information
exchange agreements. ChangeIEhigh=indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a newly signed information
exchange agreement with the home country of a higher-tax aﬃliate. Log Assets=log(fixed tangible assets).
Log Labor=log(employee compensation).
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Table 17.4: Controlling for the number of higher-tax aﬃliates
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Log EBIT Log EBIT
ShareIEhigh -0.300*** -0.195***
(0.109) (0.0691)
ShareIEhigh*CountHi 0.202*** 0.0867*
(0.0727) (.0451)
CountHi 0.0035 -0.0185
(0.0432) (.0132)
Log Assets 0.0861*** 0.0843***
(0.0118) (.00914)
Log Labor 0.386*** 0.421***
(0.0186) (0.0165)
Observations 49,639 73,951
Within R-squared 0.112 0.115
Number of Firms 13,639 17,919
Country-by-Year F.E. Y Y
Industry-by-Year F.E. Y Y
Firms with only Firms with no
Sample higher-tax new IE with
aﬃliates lower-tax aﬀ
Notes: Firm fixed-eﬀects regressions. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The results in column 1 include all firms that do not have any lower-tax
aﬃliates. The results in columns 2 include any firm that either has no lower-tax aﬃliates or that has no
new information exchange agreement come into force with a lower-tax aﬃliate between 2003 and 2012. The
dependent variable both columns is the log of reported profits before interest and taxes. ShareIEhigh=share
of higher-tax aﬃliates covered by information exchange agreements. ShareIEhigh*CountHi=ShareIEhigh
multiplied by the number of higher-tax aﬃliates the firm has. CountHi=Number of higher-tax aﬃliates. Log
Assets=log(fixed tangible assets). Log Labor=log(employee compensation).
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aﬃliates seems to have little eﬀect on reported profits. The regressor used, Share IE low,
has a couple of important limitations that may bias this estimate. The first limitation is
similar to that discussed earlier, for Share IE high. By construction, the largest changes in
share will occur for firms that have the fewest aﬃliates, i.e. 1 new information exchange
agreement for a firm with a single aﬃliate will increase share IE low by 1, whereas it will
only increase Share IE low by .1 for a firm with 10 aﬃliates. This means that the size of
the change in the share is correlated with the number of lower-tax aﬃliates that a firm has,
a variable that may also be playing a role in determining the magnitude of the response.
This is likely to create a non-linear relationship between changes in the share and changes
in reported profits. Columns (2) of Table 17.5 controls for this by interacting Share IE low
with the number of lower-tax aﬃliates that the firm has.
The second limitation of using the share of lower-tax aﬃliates covered is that it will treat
a change from a share of 0 to .1 and a change from .8 to .9 as being the same. This is likely
not true, as the firm that experiences a change from 0 to .1 can easily change where it shifts
its profits, while the firm that experiences a change from .8 to .9 has more limited options.
The first firm, then, would likely show little change in its reported profits, while the second
firm would be more likely to show an increase in reported profits. The average eﬀect for a
given change in share (in the above example, 0.1) will depend on the composition of firms
that experience a change of that magnitude. This will likely mean that the average response
is not particularly informative. The results in column (4) attempt to control for this by
interacting Share IE low with a variable that is equal to 1 if more than 50% of a firm’s
lower-tax aﬃliates are covered by an information exchange agreement. This allows a given
increase to have a diﬀerent eﬀect for firms that have other shifting options available relative
to those that do not. Column (4) controls for both of these limitation by including both
interactions. The sign of the coeﬃcient on the interaction between Share IE low and the
coverage variable is consistent with reported profits being more likely to increase if a firm has
limited options for alternative profit shifting paths, but none of the terms are statistically
significant.
One concern with Table 17.5 is that these firms may also be experiencing a change in
the share of their higher-tax aﬃliates that are covered by information exchange agreements.
Table 17.6 considers the same specifications for a sample that is limited to firms that do not
have any higher-tax aﬃliates. The results are similar, although many of the coeﬃcients are
much closer to being statistically significant. Overall, the results provide little evidence that
the share of lower-tax aﬃliates covered by information exchange aﬀects a firm’s reported
profits.
All of the results show in this section assume that a firm responds to information ex-
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Table 17.5: Response to Information Exchange with Lower-Tax Aﬃliates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Log EBIT Log EBIT Log EBIT Log EBIT
Share IE low 0.00649 0.00974 -0.0455 -0.047
(0.0248) (0.0280) (0.0853) (.0892)
Share IE low*CountLo -0.00169 -0.00149
(0.00869) (.00881)
Share IE low*IE Coverage >50% 0.0352 0.0398
(0.1104) (0.113)
Log Assets 0.0903*** 0.0903*** 0.0904*** 0.0903***
(0.00603) (0.00603) (0.00603) (0.00603)
Log Labor 0.435*** 0.435*** 0.435*** 0.435***
(0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113)
Observations 147,802 147,802 147,802 147,802
Within R-squared 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.115
Number of Firms 29,472 29,472 29,472 29,472
Country-by-Year F.E. Y Y Y Y
Industry-by-Year F.E. Y Y Y Y
Firms with Firms with Firms with Firms with
Sample lower-tax lower-tax lower-tax lower-tax
aﬃliates aﬃliates aﬃliates aﬃliates
Notes: Firm fixed-eﬀects regressions. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. These results include all firms that have at least one lower-tax aﬃliate. The
dependent variable in all columns is the log of reported profits before interest and taxes. Share IE low=share
of lower-tax aﬃliates covered by information exchange agreements. Share IE low*CountLo= Share IE low
multiplied by the number of lower-tax aﬃliates that the firm has. Share IE low*IE Coverage>50%= Share IE
low multiplied by a dummy variable that equals one if more than 50% of a firms lower-tax aﬃliates are covered
by an information exchange agreement. Log Assets=log(fixed tangible assets). Log Labor=log(employee
compensation).
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Table 17.6: Response to Information Exchange with Lower-Tax Aﬃliates (No Higher-Tax
Aﬃliates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log EBIT log EBIT log EBIT log EBIT
shareIEloaﬀ 0.00127 0.0497 -0.256 -0.3144
(0.0296) (0.0477) (0.204) (0.215)
Share IE low*NoHigh 0.0117
(0.0351)
Share IE low*CountLo 0.00112 0.00333
(0.0227) (0.0228)
Share IE low*IE Coverage>50% 0.234 0.315
(0.261) (0.269)
Log Assets 0.0903*** 0.0839*** 0.0839*** 0.0839***
(0.00603) (0.00723) (0.00723) (0.00723)
Log Labor 0.435*** 0.396*** 0.396*** 0.396
(0.0113) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130)
Observations 147,802 102,638 102,638 102,638
Within R-squared 0.115 0.104 0.104 0.104
Number of Firms 29,472 23,032 23,032 23,032
Country-by-Year F.E. Y Y Y Y
Industry-by-Year F.E. Y Y Y Y
Sample All firms with Firms with Firms with Firms with
lower-tax no higher-tax no higher-tax no higher-tax
aﬃliates aﬃliates aﬃliates aﬃliates
Notes: Firm fixed-eﬀects regressions. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The results in column 1 include all firms that have at least one lower-tax
aﬃliate. The results in columns 2,3 and 4 only include firms that do not have any higher-tax aﬃliates. The
dependent variable in all columns is the log of reported profits before interest and taxes. Share IE low=share
of lower-tax aﬃliates covered by information exchange agreements. Share IE low*NoHigh= Share IE low
multiplied by a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm does not have any higher-tax aﬃliates. Share IE
low*CountLoAﬀ=1=Share IE low multiplied by a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has only one
lower-tax aﬃliates. Share IE low*CountLo= Share IE low multiplied by the number of lower-tax aﬃliates
that the firm has. Share IE low*IE Coverage>50%= Share IE low multiplied by a dummy variable that
equals one if more than 50% of a firms lower-tax aﬃliates are
covered by an information exchange agreement. Log Assets=log(fixed tangible assets). Log La-
bor=log(employee compensation).
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change agreements when they actually go into force. It is, alternatively, possible that a firm
begins responding to information exchange agreements earlier. In order to avoid attracting
the attention of tax authorities or in order to shift real activity, it is possible that a firm
would begin adjusting its profit shifting behavior and activities a number of years before an
information exchange agreement actually goes into force. Replicating table 17.4, but instead
including, first, the share of higher-tax aﬃliates covered by information exchange one year
later, and second, the share of higher-tax aﬃliates covered by information exchange two
years later, there does not seem to be a relationship between reported profits and future in-
formation exchange agreements. Replicating table 17.6, but including the share of lower-tax
aﬃliates covered by information exchange both one year in the future and two years in the
future, again seems to indicate little relationship between reported profits and future infor-
mation exchange agreements. These results, available on request, do not appear to suggest
that firms adjust their behavior prior to information exchange agreements actually entering
force, but more work would need to be done to fully establish the timing of the response.
The results in this section seem to suggest that information exchange has a relatively
limited eﬀect on reported profits, which suggests that it has a relatively limited eﬀect on
profit shifting. These results might be biased, however, by the lack of archival information
on a firm’s ownership structure. It is possible that an information exchange agreement being
signed with the home country of a lower-tax aﬃliate would cause a firm to sever ties with that
lower-tax subsidiary. These firms would not be captured in the sample of firms aﬀected by
the information exchange agreement, as the available data would make it appear as though
the firm did not have an aﬃliate in that country. If the firms that are most actively shifting
profits are the most likely to drop their subsidiaries, then that would mean that the eﬀect
of information exchange is being estimated oﬀ of a group of firms that are less active profit
shifters to begin with. This could bias the results towards zero, and might, partially, explain
the relatively limited eﬀects found above.
18 Conclusions
Overall, this paper finds evidence that the reported profits of a firm decrease when the
firm’s home country signs a tax information exchange agreement with the home country of
a higher-tax aﬃliate. This is consistent with tax information exchange agreements reducing
profit-shifting inflows. There is little evidence, however, that a firm’s reported profits increase
when that firm’s home country signs a tax information exchange agreement with the home
country of a lower-tax aﬃliate. This is not surprising given that a high-tax aﬃliate will often
have a number of lower-tax aﬃliates. This means that information exchange agreements may
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simply change the destination of shifted profits rather than reduce profit shifting outflows.
The reported profits of firms with few lower-tax aﬃliates and firms that have information
exchange in place with a high share of lower-tax aﬃliates show a more positive, although
still statistically insignificant, response to changes in information exchange coverage. From
a policy perspective, this is relevant, as policy makers tend to view information exchange
agreements as way to increase tax revenue. These results suggest that information exchange
agreements with key tax havens may not be enough to reduce profit-shifting outflows, as
these agreements may simply serve to change the route of profit shifting.
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Appendices
A Details on Transfer-Pricing Risk Measure
The Mescall transfer-pricing risk measure is created by regressing experts’ perceptions of
transfer-pricing risk on observable characteristics of transfer-pricing regulation. To create
the measure, he collected data in 2010 from 76 transfer pricing experts on their perceptions
of transfer-pricing risk for 27 diﬀerent countries, and also information on if they believed
certain characteristics of transfer-pricing policy would serve to increase or decrease transfer-
pricing risk. They were asked about 14 diﬀerent components of transfer-pricing regulation,
13 of which are available from Deloitte’s annual transfer pricing survey and 1 of which, the
use of secret comparables, is available from KPMG’s annual transfer pricing survey. 29 In his
survey he also asked the experts to assess the enforcement level for each of the countries that
he was interested in. Using the survey results, he regressed the perception of transfer-pricing
risk, obtained from the experts, on the 14 components of transfer-pricing regulation and the
experts’ measure of transfer-pricing enforcement. The 15 characteristics considered and the
variable used to capture each of these characteristics are described in Table A.1. Mescall’s
results suggest that only nine of the fifteen factors are statistically significant in determining
the level of transfer-pricing risk. From his results, he estimates the following relationship:
tprisk = 1.027 + (0.224)NoPriorityofMethods+ (0.251)RelatedParty+ (0.387)SecretComp
+(0.227)NoPenaltyReduction+ (0.178)TaxFirst+ (0.229)NoSetoﬀs
+(0.175)NoCCAs+ (0.326)NoBenchmark+ (2.794)TPAudit
Arguably, the coeﬃcients obtained from the regression can be used to generate a value for
the level of transfer-pricing risk for both years and countries outside of the sample. Since
the transfer-pricing enforcement measure obtained from the experts is not available for other
years, transfer-pricing audit risk, which is available from Ernst & Young’s annual transfer
pricing guide is used in its place. That data needed to calculate this measure for the period
29For years 2010 and earlier, this publication was called the Strategy Matrix for Global Transfer Pricing.
From 2011 on, it is referred to as the Global Transfer Pricing Desktop Reference.
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between 2006 and 2011 are collected. Depending on the year, the number of countries for
which the necessary information is available varies, so the set of countries ranges from 37
countries in 2006 to 53 countries in 2011. Countries that are known to have no transfer-
pricing regulations a tprisk score of 1.03.30
From the initial survey, the practitioners believed that priority of methods, related-
party disclosure requirements, transfer-pricing documentation requirements, contemporane-
ous documentation requirements, the use of secret comparables, not having transfer-pricing
penalty reductions, having to pay tax first, not having related-party setoﬀs, not having cost
contributions agreements, not having commissionaire arrangements and not allowing for the
use of foreign comparables would all increase transfer-pricing risk. They believed that al-
lowing for advanced pricing agreements, allowing for self-initiated adjustments and having
benchmark data available should decrease transfer-pricing risk. The above results then, are
roughly in line with the perceptions of the transfer-pricing experts. Table A.2 summarizes
the measure tprisk for each country for the years between 2006 and 2011.
Since the weights given to various aspects of a country’s transfer pricing system (such
as documentation requirements, the ability to use foreign comparables, if a country uses
secret comparables, if advanced pricing agreements are available, and a variety of other
factors) are determined based on practitioners’ perceptions of risk, the tprisk measure should
do a reasonable job of capturing the variation in transfer-pricing regulation that exists.
One drawback to this measure is that it is constructed using a rather limited sample of
countries, so it is not clear if the weights assigned to the diﬀerent kinds of transfer pricing
regulation would be expected to carry over to a broader sample of countries. To control
for the fact that the coeﬃcients found by Mescall may not be generalizable across countries
or across years, an alternative measure of enforcement, tpcost, is also considered. The
variable tpcost simply measures how many of the seven characteristics that are statistically
significant and were expected by practitioners to increase risk (RelatedParty, SecrectComp,
NoPenaltyReduction, TaxFirst, NoSetoffs, NoCCAs and NoBenchmark) are present in
a given country in a given year. The TPAudit variable, which is based on an individual’s
perception, is omitted from this measure so that it is fully based on observable characteristics.
This measure is summarized in Table A.3. On first glance, neither measure seems to match
up particularly well with popular perceptions of the ability to detect profit shifting across
countries. The United States, for example, on the seven point cost index only gets a score
of one. The training and the ability of the IRS to target audits is not something that can
be picked up by this measure. That might suggest that this measure is going to do a better
30Table A.4 summarize the periods for which various countries are assumed to have had no transfer-pricing
regulations in existence.
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job of capturing variation in pure compliance costs than it does capturing variation in the
ability to deter profit shifting. This also speaks in favor of using tprisk which does at least
include the audit risk term.
Both measures suﬀer from the problem that they cannot fully capture diﬀerences across
countries in the resources that are available to the tax enforcement agency, and so they will
struggle to capture variation in the risk of audit or variation in the quality of the training of
those who will perform the audit. While the measure of audit risk may, in part, capture the
availability of resources for a given tax agency, it is unlikely to capture variation in expertise.
A recent paper, Klassen, Lisowsky, and Mescall (2013) also uses a survey to rank countries by
the experience and expertise of their transfer pricing authorities. In future work, a measure
of this nature could also be interesting to analyze. For now, however, this paper will use
tprisk as the preferred measure of transfer-pricing enforcement.
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Table A.1: Transfer-Pricing Policy Characteristics
Characteristic Description of Variable
Priority of Method NoPriorityofMethods=1 if a country
does not identify a priority of
transfer-pricing methods to use
Transfer-Pricing Documentation Requirement DocReq=1 if a country has legislation
requiring transfer-pricing
documentation
Contemporaneous Documentation Requirement ContempDoc=1 if a country has a
requirement that documentation be
prepared at the time of transactions
Related-Party Disclosure RelatedParty=1 if a country has a tax
return that requires disclosure of
related-party transactions
Availability of Benchmark Data NoBenchmark=1 if benchmark data
on prices is not available to taxpayer
Use of Foreign Comparables NoForeignComp=1 if the government
does not allow the use of foreign
comparables for transfer pricing
transactions
Use of Secret Comparables SecretComp=1 if the government uses
secret comparables in the calculation
of “correct” transfer prices
Transfer-Pricing Penalty Reduction NoPenaltyReduction=1 if the
government does not allow for
reductions in transfer-pricing penalties
Pay Tax First TaxFirst=1 if the taxpayer is required
to pay tax assessment before going to
competent authority
Availability of Cost-Contribution Agreements NoCCAs=1 if the government does
not allow cost-contribution agreements
Availability of Commissionaire Arrangements NoCommissionaire=1 if the
government does not allow
commissionaire arrangements
Related-Party Setoﬀs NoSetoﬀs=1 if no bundling of
transactions is allowed
Self-Initiated Adjustments Adjust=1 if self-initiated adjustments
are allowed
Availability of Advance Pricing Agreements APA=1 if advanced pricing
agreements are allowed
Audit Risk TPAudit: ranges between .2 if audit
risk is low and 1 if audit risk is high
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Table A.2: Transfer-Pricing Risk Measure by Country
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Argentina 3.5302 3.1775 3.7363 3.7363 4.8539 3.7363
Australia 4.2352 2.7303 3.2891 3.2891 3.2891 3.8479
Austria 4.2133 3.6525 3.0937 3.0937 4.2113 4.2113
Belgium 3.0385 3.0385 3.0385 3.2891 3.2891 3.2891
Brazil 5.1895 4.2434 4.2434 4.2434 4.2434 3.6846
Canada 4.4643 4.4643 4.4643 4.4643 4.4643 4.4643
Chile 2.5431 1.7606 4.9419
China 4.2526 4.3069 4.3069 4.8657 4.8657
Colombia 3.5096 2.9508 3.5096 3.5096 4.6272 4.6272
Czech Republic 3.4226 3.0961 3.0961 3.0961 4.2137 4.2137
Denmark 2.7303 3.8479 3.8479 3.8479 3.8479 3.8479
Ecuador 4.1463 3.914 3.6903 4.8079 5.1952
Egypt 2.0112 4.8052
Finland 3.8957 4.2278 4.2547 4.2547 4.4784 4.4784
France 4.435 4.2113 4.2113 4.2113 4.2113 4.2113
Germany 3.9846 3.9846 3.9846 4.3111 4.3111 4.3111
Greece 4.4643
Hong Kong 2.9053
Hungary 3.6634 3.6634 3.1592 3.1592 3.4098 4.5274
India 3.8969 3.8969 3.8969 3.8969 3.8969 5.0145
Indonesia 3.8999 5.0175
Ireland 2.3681 1.3565 1.9153
Israel 3.5126 3.5126 3.5126 3.5126 4.6302
Italy 4.4035 4.4035 4.4035 4.4035 4.4035 4.4035
Japan 4.0808 4.0808 3.9031 3.9031 3.9031 3.9031
Kenya 3.1105
Korea 3.8479 3.8479 3.8479 3.8479 4.0716
Luxembourg 3.1592 4.2768
Malaysia 4.7908 4.7908 4.7908 4.7908 4.7908 4.7908
Mexico 4.0746 3.6218 3.6218 3.6218 4.7394 4.7394
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Table A.2: Transfer-Pricing Risk Measure by Country
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Netherlands 4.4643 4.688 4.688 4.688 4.688 4.688
New Zealand 4.3111 4.5348 4.3111 4.3111 4.3111 4.3111
Norway 4.2308 4.6181 4.8687 4.8687 4.8687 4.8687
Peru 3.2805 3.2805 3.2805 3.2805 3.6678 3.6678
Philippines 3.4857 4.2081 4.2081
Poland 4.4011 4.6369 4.6369 4.6369 4.0781
Portugal 4.077 3.3467 3.3467 3.3467 3.3467 3.3467
Romania 3.2162 3.775
Russia 3.437 2.3194 2.3194 2.3194 3.8243 4.9419
Singapore 3.7242 3.3369 3.3369 3.3369 3.3369 3.3369
Slovak Republic 3.3467 3.3467
South Africa 4.8049 4.8049 4.8049 4.8049 4.5758 4.5758
Spain 3.1132 2.8865 2.3277 4.2547 4.2547 4.2547
Sweden 3.2652 4.435 4.2113 4.2113 4.2113 4.2113
Switzerland 2.9355 2.9355 2.9355 2.9355 4.2768
Taiwan 3.9748 3.9748 5.0924 5.0924 4.7051 4.7051
Thailand 3.8326 4.0563 4.0832 4.0832 4.0832 4.642
Turkey 4.9906 5.0145 5.0145 4.7908 4.7908
UK 4.1623 4.1623 4.1623 4.1623 4.1623 3.8272
Uruguay 2.2349 5.0289
US 4.0716 4.0716 4.0716 4.0716 4.0716 4.0716
Venezuela 3.2859 4.4035 4.4035 4.4035 4.4035 4.4035
Vietnam 5.4162 4.8574 5.4162 5.4162 4.8574
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Table A.3: Number of Transfer-Pricing Characteristics
by Country
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Argentina 6 4 4 4 4 4
Australia 2 1 1 1 1 1
Austria 2 2 2 2 2 2
Belgium 0 0 0 1 1 1
Brazil 5 4 4 4 4 4
Canada 3 3 3 3 3 3
Chile 2 4 4 4 4 5
China 7 7 4 4 4 4
Colombia 3 3 3 3 3 3
Czech Republic 3 2 2 2 2 2
Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ecuador 4 5 5 5 6
Egypt 5 5 5
Finland 3 2 3 3 3 3
France 2 2 2 2 2 2
Germany 1 1 1 2 2 2
Greece 3
Hong Kong 2 2
Hungary 4 4 2 2 3 3
India 5 5 6
Indonesia 4 4 4 4 4 4
Ireland 3 2 2 2 2 2
Israel 4 4 4 4 4
Italy 3 3 3 3 3 3
Japan 4 4 3 3 3 3
Kenya 3
Korea 1 1 1 1 1 1
Luxembourg 2 2 2
Malaysia 4 4 4 4 4 4
Mexico 5 4 4 4 4 4
Netherlands 3 3 3 3 3 3
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Table A.3: Number of Transfer-Pricing Characteristics
by Country
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
New Zealand 2 2 2 2 2 2
Norway 3 4 5 5 5 5
Peru 2 2 2 2 3 3
Philippines 3 3 4 4 4 4
Poland 3 3 4 4 4 4
Portugal 2 3 3 3 3 3
Romania 1 1
Russia 4 4 4 4 5 5
Singapore 4 3 3 3 3 3
Slovak Republic 3 3
South Africa 4 4 4 4 3 3
Spain 3 2 3 3 3 3
Sweden 1 2 2 2 2 2
Switzerland 2 2 2 2 2
Taiwan 5 5 5 5 4 4
Thailand 3 3 4 4 4 4
Turkey 4 4 4 4 4
UK 2 2 2 2 2 2
Uruguay 5 5
US 1 1 1 1 1 1
Venezuela 3 3 3 3 3 3
Vietnam 6 6 6 6 6
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Table A.4: Existence of Transfer-Pricing Regulation
Country No TP Regulation Country No TP Regulation
Algeria 2003-2010 Liberia 2003-2011
Andorra 2003-2011 Libya 2003-2011
Anguilla 2003-2011 Macau 2003-2011
Armenia 2003-2011 Macedonia 2003-2007
Angola 2003-2010 Malawi 2003-2007
Aruba 2003-2007 Mali 2003-2011
Bahamas 2003-2011 Mauritania 2003-2011
Bangladesh 2003-2011 Mongolia 2003-2011
Belarus 2003-2011 Morocco 2003-2008
Bolivia 2003-2011 Mozambique 2003-2009
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003-2006 Namibia 2003-2005
Botswana 2003-2011 Netherland Antilles 2003-2009
Brunei 2003-2011 Nicaragua 2003-2011
Burkina Faso 2003-2011 Nigeria 2003-2011
Cambodia 2003-2011 Oman 2003-2009
Cameroon 2003-2010 Pakistan 2003-2011
Cayman Islands 2003-2011 Panama 2003-2010
Costa Rica 2003-2011 Papua New Guinea 2003-2011
Cote d’Ivoire 2003-2011 Paraguay 2003-2011
Cyprus 2003-2011 Puerto Rico 2003-2010
Dominican Republic 2003-2010 Qatar 2003-2011
Ecuador 2003-2004 Senegal 2003-2011
Egypt 2003-2004 Sierra Leone 2003-2011
Ethiopia 2003-2011 Sri Lanka 2003-2009
Gambia 2003-2011 Swaziland 2003-2011
Georgia 2003-2010 Syria 2003-2011
Ghana 2003-2010 Trinidad and Tobago 2003-2011
Honduras 2003-2011 Tunisia 2003-2011
Iraq 2003-2011 Turkey 2003-2006
Jamaica 2003-2011 Uganda 2003-2010
Kuwait 2003-2011 United Arab Emirates 2003-2011
Lesotho 2003-2011 Zimbabwe 2003-2011
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B Alternative Measure of Enforcement
Since it is the most readily available measure and also the most used in previous papers,
in this appendix a measure of documentation that expands on a measure created in Lohse,
Riedel, and Spengel (2012) is also considered. In their paper, they create a measure that
places a country in a category between 0 and 5, depending on the strictness of its transfer-
pricing documentation requirements. Countries in category 0 have no transfer pricing regu-
lations. Countries in category 1 have regulation that introduces the arm’s length principle
but have no documentation requirements. Countries in category 2 do not have legislation on
documentation requirements, but documentation is required to exist in practice. Countries
in category 3 have documentation requirements introduced in national law, but the submis-
sion of documentation is only required on request. Countries in categories 4 and 5 require
automatic disclosure of documentation, with category 4 countries requiring a short form and
category 5 countries requiring a long form. In this section, the measure is extended to include
years between 2003 and 2012. The information is obtained from a combination of Ernst &
Young Transfer Pricing Global Reference Guides, Deloitte Transfer Pricing Country Guides,
KPMG Global Transfer Pricing Reviews and PwC International Transfer Pricing publica-
tions. 31 For the period from 2003 to 2012, Table B.1 summarizes the minimum enforcement
level observed and the maximum enforcement level observed for each country. The distribu-
tion of the firms in the sample (described in Section 4.3) across the diﬀerent documentation
categories is detailed in table B.2. The large decrease in category zero firms from 2003 to
2004 is caused by Belgium implementing transfer pricing legislation in 2004. The increase in
category 4 firms in 2008 is largely due to Norway moving up to category 4 in 2008. Overall,
there is a clear trend towards having statutory documentation requirements (categories 3
and above) over the time period being considered. As can be seen from Table B.1, many
countries change categories between 2003 and 2011, so it seems like there is the potential for
enough within-country variation to identify the eﬀect of changes in enforcement in the firm
fixed-eﬀects framework.
Recognizing both that diﬀerence across these categories might be small in practice and
that few firms are located in category 0 or category 5 countries, the measure used in the
regressions that follow places countries into three diﬀerent categories, where a country is
classified as category 0 if there is no documentation requirement at all (categories 0 or 1 of
the original index), category 1 if there is no statutory documentation requirement but there
is a documentation requirement in practice (category 2 of the original index) and category
31For earlier years, the Deloitte publication is referred to as the Strategy Matrix for Global Transfer
Pricing.
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Table B.1: Documentation Requirement Measure by Country
Country Min. Enforce Max. Enforce Country Min. Enforce Max. Enforce
Argentina 5 5 Lithuania 3 3
Australia 4 4 Luxembourg 2 2
Austria 2 2 Malaysia 4 4
Azerbaijan 2 2 Mexico 5 5
Belgium 0 2 Moldova 2 2
Brazil 5 5 Montenegro 2 2
Bulgaria 1 2 Namibia 2 2
Canada 4 4 Netherlands 4 4
Chile 1 1 New Zealand 2 2
China 4 5 Norway 3 4
Columbia 2 5 Panama 1 3
Croatia 1 3 Peru 2 5
Czech Republic 2 2 Philippines 1 2
Denmark 4 4 Poland 4 4
Dominican Republic 0 3 Portugal 4 4
Ecuador 0 5 Qatar 2 2
Egypt 0 3 Romania 2 3
El Salvador 0 2 Russia 2 3
Estonia 0 4 Saudi Arabia 2 2
Finland 2 3 Serbia 2 2
France 2 3 Singapore 2 2
Georgia 1 1 Slovak Republic 2 3
Germany 3 3 Slovenia 4 4
Greece 1 4 South Africa 2 3
Hong Kong 1 3 Spain 2 3
Hungary 3 4 Sweden 2 3
Iceland 1 1 Taiwan 4 4
India 4 4 Tanzania 2 2
Indonesia 4 5 Thailand 2 2
Ireland 1 3 Turkey 4 4
Israel 1 4 Ukraine 1 1
Italy 4 4 United Kingdom 3 3
Japan 4 4 US 4 4
Kazakhstan 2 3 Uzbekistan 0 1
Kenya 1 2 Uruguay 1 3
Korea 3 4 Venezuela 4 4
Latvia 1 2 Vietnam 2 3
Lebanon 1 1 Zambia 2 2
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Table B.2: Summary of documentation requirement measure for sample used
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
0 12.38 % 1.37% 1.01% 1.22% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1 1.25% 1.30% 0.38% 0.67% 0.95% 0.58% 0.54% 0.61% 0.07%
2 49.44% 57.71% 57.94% 56.66% 31.56% 29.24% 26.65% 13.99% 14.25%
3 14.75% 15.51% 18.60% 19.21% 43.70% 37.50% 40.05% 52.26% 52.19%
4 21.67% 23.42% 22.07% 22.23% 23.46% 32.35% 32.40% 32.83% 33.49%
5 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02%
Missing 0.52% 0.69% 0.00% 0.01% 0.32% 0.31% 0.34% 0.30% 0.28%
Note: The countries with at least one year of missing information on enforcement are Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Liechtenstein, Malta, Morocco and Slovakia.
2 if there is a statutory documentation requirement (categories 3, 4 and 5 of the original
index). If there is evidence that a country has no transfer-pricing regulation in place, then,
for this three category classification, the country is assigned to category 0. A summary of
the countries that this rule is applied for is in Table A.4. The only exception to this rule
is Switzerland, which, although it has no oﬃcial transfer-pricing regulation, follows OECD
guidelines and so receives a documentation requirement score of 2 for all years between 2003
and 2012.
Replicating the baseline results obtained using the transfer-pricing risk index in Table
5.1, Table B.3 indicates that increases in documentation requirements have also been as-
sociated with a reduction in reported profits. Column (1) of Table B.4 indicates that the
eﬀect of increased enforcement is again less negative for higher-tax rate countries, which
is consistent with documentation requirements reducing outflows. The limited variation in
transfer-pricing documentation requirements over time, however, means that it is not possi-
ble to identify a heterogenous response by the distribution of a firm’s aﬃliates. Column (2)
suggests that having more lower-tax aﬃliates makes the response to increased documentation
less negative, but it is very small and statistically insignificant.
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Table B.3: Baseline Regressions-Documentation Measure
(1) (2) (3)
Log EBIT Log EBIT Log EBIT
Doc Req=1 0.0295*** -0.0309*** -0.0312***
(0.00986) (0.0112) (0.0113)
Doc Req=2 0.0364 -0.0660** -0.0678**
(0.0255) (0.0279) (0.0283)
Tax Rate 0.0671
(0.167)
Log Assets 0.107*** 0.0932*** 0.0933***
(0.00502) (0.00514) (0.00514)
Log Labor 0.473*** 0.432*** 0.432***
(0.00886) (0.00928) (0.00928)
Log GDP -0.773** -0.756**
(0.374) (0.375)
Log GDP2 0.202*** 0.199***
(0.0556) (0.0557)
Deficit -0.000153 -4.97e-05
(0.00187) (0.00190)
Observations 196,350 194,433 194,433
Within R-squared 0.103 0.118 0.118
Number of Firms 36,760 36,444 36,444
Industry-Year F.E.
Notes: Firm fixed-eﬀects regression. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable in all columns is the log of reported profit before
interest and taxes. Doc Req=1 indicates the firm’s home country is in category 2 of the documentation
requirement measure that is discussed in this appendix, Doc Req=2 indicates the firm’s home country is in
category 3, 4 or 5. Tax Rate=corporate tax rate in the firm’s home country. Log Assets=log(fixed tangible
assets). Log Labor=log(employee compensation). Log GDP=log(per capita GDP). Log GDP2=log(per
capita GDP)2. Deficit=government deficit/surplus as a percentage of GDP.
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Table B.4: Heterogeneous Response-Documentation Measure
(1) (2)
Log EBIT Log EBIT
Doc Req=1 0.00822 -0.000237
(0.0619) (0.0628)
Doc Req=2 -0.393*** -0.393***
(0.0860) (0.0881)
Tax Rate -0.219 -0.242
(0.222) (0.228)
Doc Req=1*Tax Rate -0.151 -0.141
(0.197) (0.200)
Doc Req=2*Tax Rate 1.252*** 1.171***
(0.289) (0.292)
Doc Req=1*NumLo 0.000298
(0.00146)
Doc Req=2*NumLo 0.00706
(0.00537)
Doc Req=1*NumHi 0.00556
(0.00594)
Doc Req=2*NumHi -0.00321
(0.00961)
Log Assets 0.0938*** 0.0937***
(0.00514) (0.00514)
Log Labor 0.433*** 0.433***
(0.00928) (0.00928)
Log GDP -0.587 -0.565
(0.374) (0.376)
Log GDP2 0.147*** 0.143**
(0.0560) (0.0561)
Deficit 0.00247 0.00245
(0.00193) (0.00193)
Observations 194,433 194,433
Within R-squared 0.119 0.119
Number of Firms 36,444 36,444
Industry-Year F.E.
Notes: Firm fixed-eﬀects regression. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable in all columns is the log of reported profit before interest and
taxes. Doc Req=1 indicates the firm’s home country is in category 2 of the documentation requirement
measure, Doc Req=2 indicates it is in category 3, 4 or 5. Tax Rate=corporate tax rate in firm’s home
country. NumLo=number of lower-tax aﬃliates the firm has. NumHi=number of higher-tax aﬃliates the
firm has. Log Assets=log(fixed tangible assets). Log Labor=log(employee compensation). Log
GDP=log(per capita GDP). Log GDP2=log(per capita GDP)2. Deficit= government deficit or surplus as a
percentage of GDP. 99
Figure C.1: Structure of a Hypothetical Multinational Corporation
C Details on Corporate Group Membership
Figure C.1 shows the structure of a hypothetical multinational firm. Assume, for now, that
each firm is located in a diﬀerent country and that it is fully owned by the firm above it. In
that case, the sample could include any of the firms outside of C2, C3 and D1. By pulling
information on all foreign subsidiaries and foreign shareholders, all shifting opportunities
are captured for aﬃliate A1. For other aﬃliates, however, the opportunities for shift across
the diﬀerent branches of the multinational are not captured. For aﬃliate B1, for example,
only the opportunities to shift profits to or from aﬃliates A1, C1, C2 and D1 are captured,
potential shifting with B2 or C3 will not be captured. In terms of how they would appear
in the data, firm A1 is diﬀerent from the other firms in the group in that it would be listed
as its own global ultimate owner (GUO). The current dataset will fully capture shifting
opportunities for GUOs, but may miss some aﬃliate links for Non-GUOs. Approximately
35% of the firms in the sample are GUOs.
The information from ORBIS on ownership links is static. Although information is
available on what year the information on the subsidiary or shareholder was obtained, there
is no way of knowing if a firm is linked to its subsidiaries and shareholders in all years that
it appears in the sample. The model suggests that the number of higher-tax aﬃliates a
firm has and the number of lower-tax aﬃliates a firm has are important in determining the
response of reported profits to a change in own-country enforcement. For these purposes, it
is assumed that set of subsidiaries and shareholders remains constant for all years between
2006 and 2011. While this may not perfectly reflect the composition of the multinational
over time, it should do a reasonable job. Even holding constant the firm’s set of shareholders
and subsidiaries, the number of higher-tax aﬃliates and the number of lower-tax aﬃliates a
firm has will vary because of changes in corporate tax rates. When including information
on the level of transfer-pricing enforcement in the countries where aﬃliates are located, it
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is again assumed that the firm is linked to all of its aﬃliates for all years in which data is
available. In the future work, it might be possible to use archival data from ORBIS to better
capture ownership links over time.
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